Contents

Preface Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Part 1 Humanitarian Values

Commentary

1 Humanitarianism Across Religions and Cultures

2 Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies

3 Public Opinion, the Media, and Humanitarianism

Part 2 Military Force and Humanitarian Action

Commentary

4 Humanitarian Intervention

5 Armed Relief

6 Relief Operations and Military Strategy

Part 3 Humanitarian Institutions: A Look to the Future

Commentary

7 Assessing Humanitarian Law

8 Humanitarian Assistance in the Post-Cold War Era

9 The Future Architecture for International Humanitarian Assistance

About the Authors

The Sponsoring Institutions and Project Publications

Index

Books in the Series

Preface

THOMAS G. WEISS & LARRY MINEAR

Widespread and endemic conflicts have presented humanitarians with formidable challenges in recent years. The initial euphoria surrounding the waning of the Cold War now has given way to a more realistic appraisal of the likelihood of continuing–perhaps even increasing–violence. The prospects for the lives of civilians caught in the throes of war are chilling.¹

In areas such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Somalia, conflicts kindled largely by superpower rivalry have taken on lives of their own.² Other conflicts dampened for decades by the existence of the Cold War are being rekindled in the Balkans and various republics of the former Soviet Union. In conflicts with no direct links to East-West rivalry–such as those in the Sudan, Liberia, and Sri Lanka–seething ethnic tensions are fueling a new micronationalism. Violence and chaos have reached such levels that the term "failed states"³ has been coined to describe political entities that no longer can be characterized as functioning in any normal sense.

Whether between or within nations, strife has increased the need for humanitarian assistance and protection–and increased the difficulty of providing international relief effectively. In many of the areas of seemingly endless violence and warfare, humanitarians themselves–like the persons in need of assistance–have been harassed and held hostage, injured, and killed. Aid convoys have been hijacked and blocked, relief activities commandeered and shut down. Withholding food and medicine is often a ready weapon in the arsenals of governments and insurgents.

Confronted with burgeoning need and yet faltering institutional responses, the world is poised between the Cold War and an embryonic new humanitarian order. Emerging from an era that made humanitarian values subservient to geopolitical considerations, the world is groping toward arrangements in which life-threatening suffering and human rights abuses become legitimate international concerns irrespective of where they take place. Moving from a controlling paradigm in which state sovereignty has served as an all-purpose rationalization for the abuse of civilians within a

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state's borders, the world is now infusing sovereignty with a greater sense of humanitarian obligation. Humanitarianism across borders seems to be the direction of the future, even though the geographical state remains the cornerstone of world politics.

To help the humanitarian community and the institutions–civilian and military, public and private–with which it interacts forge an analytical and practical understanding of this transitional moment, we launched the Humanitarianism and War Project in 1991. Based on the analysis of interviews with practitioners and other data gathered in conflict areas, the project seeks to identify lessons from recent humanitarian experience within conflict and to recommend institutional strategies for the future. A list of project publications appears at the end of this book.

This book is the second of three, each with a different audience in mind. The first volume was designed for agencies and individuals whose task involves the actual provision of assistance and protection. Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners,⁴ identifies eight principles of humanitarian action and presents practical strategies for improving the operational effectiveness and accountability of the international humanitarian network.

Scheduled for publication next year, the final volume, Humanitarianism and War: Reducing the Human Cost of Armed Conflict,⁵ is written with the concerned international public in mind. Sustained and effective humanitarian action requires the active support of an increasingly well-informed constituency. Consequently, we seek to convey to concerned but nontechnical readers the challenges of expressing international solidarity in today's complex, interconnected world. We plan to analyze the organizations involved, review the tough choices they face, and highlight some of the creative ways that have succeeded in reaching civilians trapped in situations of conflict.

Positioned between these two volumes, this book spans those two audiences. It is designed for practitioners concerned with the broader context of their day-to-day tasks, and also addresses persons not directly associated with humanitarian organizations–be they policy- or opinionmakers, media professionals, scholars, analysts, or ordinary citizens–who wish to explore some of the critical humanitarian issues facing the world today.

This is a collection of thoughtful essays by nine authors who have been involved in one way or another in efforts to alleviate civilian suffering in times of war. We sought them out because of the constructive roles they have played in recent years and the respect they have earned among their colleagues. They reflect the diverse makeup of the humanitarian family: practitioners, academics, journalists, military people, UN and private organization of ficials, and persons from nonprofit and commercial sectors.

The work is organized into three interrelated parts that represent crucial aspects of the global effort to improve the international humanitarian system:

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values, the use of military force, and the future shape of humanitarian institutions. Preceding each of the three sections, our commentary places the contributions of the authors within current debates about how best to sustain civilians in times of war. We identify how each author adds to an understanding of the most critical issues regarding the norms (Part 1), processes (Part 2), and institutional structures (Part 3) of humanitarian action. We also frame questions arising from each chapter that merit additional analysis, reflection, and action.

The authors write in their personal capacities rather than speaking on behalf of organizations with which they are or have been affiliated. Their essays have benefited from a conference in Providence, Rhode Island, in December 1992, at which the authors presented their chapters to one another and to a carefully selected group of humanitarian professionals. Following the conference, which was funded by the French government and hosted by Brown University, the authors revised their chapters to take into account the critiques of colleagues.

Three assumptions have influenced the topics addressed by the authors and our commentary. First, the focus is on widespread civilian suffering resulting from international or internal armed conflict rather than on the havoc wreaked by so-called natural disasters.⁶ While the intent is not to ignore humanitarians in other operational landscapes–such as those responding to droughts and floods–the difficulties in helping civilians in such disasters are exacerbated during conflict. A recent document from an international group of experts correctly argues that coping with armed conflict is the principal remaining obstacle to eliminating famine in our time.⁷

Second, our use of the concept of humanitarianism is positive rather than pejorative. We employ it, even though in some quarters the term conveys high praise, while in others it rings of do-goodism and naivete. The ambiguity is complicated by the fact that over the years the term has not been defined clearly in international law or codified in national legislation with the same precision accorded concepts such as human rights or refugees. Our book encourages self-criticism rather than self-congratulation and endorses humanitarian action, but of a variety that matches warmhearted compassion with toughmindedness.

Third, the expression "across borders" in the title is not intended to imply that all action geared toward sustaining civilians in times of war comes from outside a given country or region in conflict. Our case study of the Gulf crisis concluded that the most immediately available humanitarian assistance to third-country nationals fleeing Kuwait and Iraq came not from the international community and its established institutions but from the Jordanian and Iranian people themselves.⁸ In many circumstances and at many points in the relief and reconstruction process, however, humanitarianism across borders is indispensable. In Somalia, for example, the breakdown of political and civil institutions rendered massive outside involvement essential. Yet even there,

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local resources existed that were not used. In Somalia and elsewhere, the challenge is to find ways of supporting and supplementing indigenous capacity with action across borders.

This book reflects the contributions of many persons and organizations. The two institutions cosponsoring the Humanitarianism and War Project deserve special thanks: Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies in Providence, Rhode Island, and the Refugee Policy Group of Washington, D.C., have provided us with an institutional home for our research and writing. We would like in particular to acknowledge the encouragement and assistance of RPG's executive director, Dennis Gallagher.

Financial contributions from many quarters lend both breadth and credibility to our work. Current sponsors include ten nongovernmental organizations (Catholic Relief Services, Danish Refugee Council, Lutheran World Federation, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam-UK, Save the Children-UK, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and Canada's International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development); six UN organizations (UNICEF, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Special Emergency Programme on the Horn of Africa, UN Development Programme, Department of Humanitarian Affairs-UNDRO, and World Food Programme); four governments (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States); and three foundations (the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Rockefeller and Arias Foundations).

The text of this volume has profited immensely from reflections and comments by numerous colleagues and friends throughout the humanitarian community, too numerous to name here. We would like to single out Mary Anderson, however, who not only contributed a chapter but also helped identify the issues addressed in our commentary. We are also indebted to Fred Fullerton, Mary Lhowe, Susan Costa, and Amy Langlais of the Watson Institute for editorial assistance; and Judy Ombura at the Refugee Policy Group for her administrative help.

We note in conclusion that the task of analysis and commentary is far less daunting than the daily challenges faced by humanitarians on the front line in conflicts around the world. Their perilous efforts and excruciating experiences, frequently involving great personal hardship and risk, inform this volume. We share their commitment to forging a humanitarian regime that more effectively assists and protects all those in need.

T.G.W. and L.M.

Notes

1. For a discussion of these developments, see Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Thomas G. Weiss and James G. Blight (eds.), The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); and Brian Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

2. For a discussion of reconstruction costs from Cold War conflicts, see Anthony Lake (ed.), After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1990).

3. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93): 3-20.

4. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

5. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1994.

6. See Randolph Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief (London: Pinter, 1987).

7. "The Bellagio Declaration: Overcoming Hunger in the 1990s," reprinted in Food Policy 15 (August 1990): 352-358.

8. See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, "Groping and Coping in the Gulf Crisis: Discerning the Shape of a New Humanitarian Order," World Policy Journal 9, no. 4 (Fall/Winter 1992-1993): 755-788.

Part 1

Humanitarian Values

Commentary

THOMAS G. WEISS & LARRY MINEAR

The most logical place to begin a discussion of humanitarianism across

borders is with a review of the values that inform and motivate humanitarian activity. These values are being scrutinized intensively at today's pivotal moment in modern history. The Cold War has ended and its era is passing; the post-Cold War order is just beginning to take shape. Yet to emerge are the values around which a new order will be constructed and the institutions that will put them into practice.

During the Cold War, geopolitical considerations infiltrated fundamental values such as the sanctity of human life. In the frenzied competition between communism and anticommunism, promoting political ideology became more important than protecting human life. The right to food and freedom from persecution were not treated as absolute or universal. Rather, the key factor was whether the use of food as a political weapon or the violation of fundamental civil and political rights were perpetrated by "friendly" or "unfriendly" regimes.

Depending upon which superpower made the judgment, a Nicaraguan life was more or less important than a Salvadoran, a Cambodian refugee more or less valuable than a Filipino. Responses to human rights violations in East Timor were calibrated according to the perceived importance of the Indonesian government. Entire regions of the world, and the people who lived in them, were valued according to their strategic significance.

The Horn of Africa, for example, was caught in the crossfire between Washington and Moscow. Initially, the principal U.S. client was the Ethiopian government of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Soviet Union's the Somali regime of Siad Barre. Shortly after Selassie was ousted in a Com-munist takeover in 1974, the superpowers exchanged clients and adjusted

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flows of military and economic aid accordingly. The Reagan administration delayed the U.S. response to the famine of 1983-1985 because Ethiopia was viewed as the Soviet Union's responsibility. After a late start, however, the United States eventually became the major outside provider of humanitarian relief, joining the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.¹

While East-West tensions did not divide the world neatly into two camps, the division was surprisingly clearcut. Whose side a government was seen to be on in the global struggle affected the international attention given to an emergency and the longer-term human needs of its people. Even the work of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations was politicized. As the near-total isolation of Vietnam throughout the 1980s suggests, the country allocations of many specialized UN agencies and the World Bank took their cues from the United States. The UN Security Council, the international community's most influential political body, rarely addressed humanitarian issues during the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, humanitarian crises no more serious than those earlier ignored by the Security Council are viewed as "threats to international peace and security." In fact, "humanitarian intervention" has become a household word. In April 1991, following the defeat of Iraq and the subsequent flight of Kurds from their homes, UN Resolution 688 determined that the mass upheaval constituted precisely such a threat. The Security Council insisted that humanitarian organizations receive access to the dislocated civilian population within Iraq and authorized military force to guarantee that access.

In the wake of the Security Council's unprecedented invocation of life-threatening suffering among Iraq's Kurds as the rationale for military intervention in northern Iraq, humanitarian considerations have figured in the authorization of subsequent commitments of UN-related military forces to such places as Somalia and Bosnia. Yet the same groups that lamented the marginalization of human needs during the Cold War are now seeing in their post-Cold War elevation another danger. The new attention to threats to humanity is, of course, welcome. However, in the absence of mechanisms to ensure that all suffering exercises equal claim on Security Council attention, the necessary equity in the protection of human life remains elusive. The serious needs in the world's Somalias will continue to upstage the even more catastrophic plights of the Sudan and Liberia.

This swing of the humanitarian pendulum confronts the international community with the fundamental issues that it chose to ignore during the Cold War. What is the nature of humanitarianism and its relation to sovereignty? When national borders are becoming more porous, do human values exercise transnational claims on political authorities, be they seated government or insurgent challengers? Under what kind of accountability does the international community respond to violations of humanitarian norms? What are the mechanisms for assuring such accountability?

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The three chapters in Part I of the book deal with the values that are at

the core of humanitarian action. Are humanitarian values universal or culturally specific? Do they impel emergency lifesaving action only, or do they also encompass a more inclusive and wide-ranging set of concerns and initiatives? Do they comprise a reliable force that supports and demands strong international responses, or are they uneven and unreliable as the basis for consistent and systematic humanitarian action?

Where does one turn for an informed and thorough discussion of humanitarian values? Ironically, organizations that provide daily assistance and protection to vulnerable populations may not be the best sources to articulate and elaborate them. Practitioners tend to be action oriented; their strength is saving lives. Caught up in the turbulence of sustaining civilians in one emergency after another, humanitarian organizations and their staffs typically consider discussions of values to be luxuries for a sunny day when demands for their services ebb. Such a day, unfortunately, seems a long way away from dawning.

Philosophers, theologians, political theorists, and ethicists sometimes better explain humanitarian values. Based upon their views of human nature and institutions, human interaction and behavior, they can identify the determining forces behind economic, social, and political organization and action, be they respect for life and responsibility to other human beings or security and self-aggrandizement. Surveying the universe of humanitarian organizations, they also identify shared values and principles. But these do not always work in the rough-and-tumble circumstances of wars, in which norms are challenged by powerful self-interests and humanitarian acts are more opportunistic than principled.

A middle course is charted by the Humanitarianism and War Project, which seeks to examine the values affirmed by humanitarian organizations in the difficult terrain of armed conflicts. Growing out of our field research and discussions to date, we have identified eight principles that should guide humanitarian action. These principles are presented not as moral absolutes but as norms toward which humanitarians should strive; their formulation and implications require further debate and refinement, since a variety of viewpoints and trade-offs exist. However, principles are benchmarks against which performance can be measured; they help to prevent pragmatism from degenerating into unprincipled opportunism.

We offer these Providence Principles² as a backdrop for the chapters in Part 1, which seek to identify and explore humanitarian values. These principles also provide the context for discussions in Part 2 about the use of military force, which some see as a violation of humane values and others as a protection of them. Such principles are also central to the discussion in Part 3 about the shape of future institutions needed to protect and advance humanitarian values.

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1. Relieving Life-Threatening Suffering: Humanitarian action should be directed toward the relief of immediate, life-threatening suffering.

2. Proportionality to Need: Humanitarian action should correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs. It should affirm the view that life is as precious in one part of the globe as another.

3. Non-Partisanship: Humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other extraneous agendas. It should not take sides in conflicts.

4. Independence: In order to fulfill their mission, humanitarian organizations should be free of interference from home or host political authorities. "Humanitarian space" is essential for effective action.

5. Accountability: Humanitarian organizations should report fully on their activities to sponsors and beneficiaries. Humanitarianism should be transparent.

6. Appropriateness: Humanitarian action should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant, locally available resources.

7. Contextualization: Effective humanitarian action should encompass a comprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of interventions. Encouraging respect for human rights and addressing the underlying causes of conflicts are essential elements.

8. Subsidiarity of Sovereignty: Where humanitarianism and sovereignty clash, sovereignty should defer to the relief of life-threatening suffering.

Domestic and international humanitarian agents generally subscribe to these principles, although different organizations and practitioners may interpret them differently or assign them different relative priority. This becomes particularly evident during wars when sustaining civilians presents tough trade-offs between various principles. Although the Providence Principles are less moral absolutes than norms toward which practitioners should strive, they represent fixed points on a shared compass that also stimulate dialogue and focus discussion.

Are the values that motivate humanitarian action universal, or are they culturally specific? Are concrete expressions of solidarity a feature unique to so-called advanced societies, or are they perhaps more essential to peoples whose existence is harsher and may require greater mutual support? Is compassion an instinct basic to humankind, or is it more often an expression of caring by those who are reasonably well-off? Does humanitarianism have religious and cultural roots? What is its relation to religious fundamental-ism, which often seems to politicize human obligation and action? Does the recent upsurge in brutality in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere confirm the Hobbesian suspicion that people are inherently selfish and nasty, or is it the

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result of the willingness of politicians to play on ethnic fears to serve their own narrow objectives?

Our exploration of these matters begins with the chapter by Ephraim Isaac, "Humanitarianism Across Religions and Cultures." A scholar of ancient religions and a linguist with a working knowledge of some fifteen languages, Isaac brings a rich background to his assignment. An Ethiopian by nationality, he has played a role in efforts to build peace in his country and to use the opportunity provided by the change in governments to work at reconciliation within his country. An orthodox Jew with catholic interests, he is ideally situated to explore the extent to which humanitarian impulses and institutions are universal, as well as culturally specific. He examines humanitarian obligations and practices in the major religions and traditional practices in Africa.

The issue of universality is important in theory and praxis alike. It is generally believed that the concept of humanitarianism is most fully developed in the jurisprudence and culture of Judaeo-Christian nations. Popular stereotypes suggest that only these nations place a high value on human life and care enough to assist their own or other distressed populations. Wealthy industrialized nations have not only the resources but also the established traditions that have given humanitarianism a peculiarly Western flavor.

The most actively involved governments and the most well-established and best-known humanitarian organizations are indeed Western in origin and constituency, in personnel and approach. However, recent research and writing has noted with increasing frequency that the concept and practice of humanitarianism is rather more widespread. Fundamental tenets of humanitarianism are more understood to resonate with central elements in nonWestern traditions of religion, law, and ethics.³

A major catastrophe in today's global village generally activates a bewildering array of organizations. Working side by side will be Christian, Muslim, and secular groups; persons from nearby communities and countries and from around the world; governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental workers; and civilian and military personnel. How these organizations and their employees express their values and relate to others has a direct bearing on the success of their endeavors and of the larger effort.

Inadequate understanding of other traditions of assistance, local values, and institutions can negatively affect the success of humanitarian activities. Outside responses based purely on Western legal and cultural traditions often obscure the reality that the most effective relief is probably that which corresponds to local mores and energizes the affected individuals and institutions. Consonance with local values also widens the ownership and accountability for humanitarian action, frequently making the difference between successful and failed undertakings.

When help comes from outside a society whose capacities are

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temporarily overwhelmed, an appreciation of local values encourages humanitarian practitioners to build upon and strengthen indigenous resources. Fostering empowerment and institution building will help the affected community move toward self-reliance rather than remaining disaster prone and dependent upon outside assistance. Cultural sensitivity, however, is more than simply a means toward more effective programming. It also reflects a fundamental commitment to the importance of human life, whatever its cultural context.

An appreciation of the humanity of those affected by life-threatening crises is an essential element in the emerging international humanitarian order. Even a cursory examination of history suggests that an appeal to the universality of human rights and humanitarian law is a distinctly modern phenomenon. History is filled with examples of supposedly superior cultures and values around which states and empires were organized. Distinctions between the sacred and the profane, the citizen and the barbarian, the metropole and the hinterland reflected the conviction that certain human lives were more valuable than others. While altruism may be more widespread in non-Western cultures than many in the West realize, universal humanitarianism is nonetheless a distinctly radical value; it is a notion that has received widespread support only in the modern period.

The second chapter in Part 1, "Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies," explores some universal and specific operational implications of humanitarian values. The relief of life-threatening suffering, for example, does not automatically ensure that response to emergencies will occur in ways that strengthen local institutions. In some circumstances, working through local organizations may delay international responses. However, faced with a choice between saving lives and respecting local mores, practitioners may opt for the former. In the northern Sudan in the mid-1980s, international nongovernmental organizations and donor governments brushed aside the Khartoum authorities in their rush to save lives threatened by the widening famine. In Somalia in 1992, some aid officials placed a premium on averting famine deaths, relegating until later any discussion of how relief aid would affect prospects for reconstruction and development.

The author of Chapter 2, Mary B. Anderson, and a colleague, Peter J. Woodrow, carried out an extensive field review several years ago of the strategies and results of some forty relief projects by nongovernmental groups. Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster⁴ has become a cornerstone of efforts to reconceptualize humanitarian interventions. A private consultant based in Boston, Anderson frequently has been enlisted by United Nations organizations, the U.S. government, and private agencies to improve the effectiveness of their activities in economic and social development, particularly on matters of sensitivity to gender and culture.

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As a relief specialist, Anderson believes that humanitarian action must be cost-effective in terms of the immediate delivery of relief and the mitigation of suffering. As a development economist, however, she suggests that emergency relief must also address other objectives. Since urgent human need is rooted in underlying problems of poverty and powerlessness, humanitarian action should improve the medium- and long-term prospects for equitable economic development and peace, or at a minimum should not undermine or delay those projects. In other words, emergency aid should be provided in ways that will help a society care for itself.

Her examination suggests the artificiality of the traditional dichotomy between rapid responses to urgent needs and advancing the cause of development and peace. Drawing on illustrations from her field research in several regions, Anderson argues that it is possible to relieve immediate suffering through well-conceived programs that augment the capacities of beneficiaries to meet their own long-term needs. Analysts traditionally have identified discrete points on a spectrum, moving from short-term emergency relief through reconstruction of essential infrastructure to medium- and long-term development. Her approach explores interactions along the spectrum between emergency interventions and efforts to reduce poverty and enhance local capacities, a subject with which development organizations themselves increasingly are struggling.

In this regard, there may be a negative lesson to be learned from the most conspicuous and preoccupying international crises of 1992 and 1993, those involving Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. In each, the failure to resolve long-standing tribal and ethnic tensions erupted into bloody warfare, dramatizing the costs of ignoring the interactions along the emergency-to-development continuum. Anderson herself examines the specific operational and institutional difficulties, even for agencies that make the connections between emergencies and their underlying causes, in implementing programs that adequately take them into account. In fact, as the linkages become understood more fully, the difficulties become more operational than conceptual.

One of the most dramatic problems for development agencies is that the public and their parliaments frequently respond far more readily to appeals for assistance in complex emergencies rather than attack long-term problems. A recent UNICEF report distinguishes between "loud" emergencies in war zones that make headlines and the "silent" emergencies of existence for poor families who suffer daily from malnutrition and preventable diseases. The report points out that the world community was horrified enough to act because about half a million children under the age of five had died in 1992 in war-ravaged Somalia, but did little to prevent the deaths of the thirteen million other children, or about thirty-five thousand per day, who died during the same period from poverty.⁵ This aberration is particularly unsettling because every dollar expended in such silent emergencies is an estimated ten to twenty times more effective than in loud ones.

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The concerns with differential reactions to and support for various types of emergencies lead naturally to the final chapter in Part 1, Edward Girardet's "Public Opinion, the Media and Humanitarianism." A journalist with experience in print media, radio, and television, Girardet's reporting during the 1980s for the Christian Science Monitor provided for many Americans the major source of information on the war in Afghanistan and its humanitarian toll. More recently, his special reports on Somalia have been widely viewed on U.S. and British television. Concerned about increasing the responsibility and accountability of the media in its coverage of humanitarian issues, he helped found and now edits a new periodical, Crosslines, a forum for media professionals to reflect on such issues.

Girardet presents the findings of survey work in which he has been involved that suggest coverage of global humanitarian problems is more limited and selective than in the past. Calling for more continuous and accurate coverage of complex emergencies, he examines the collection and dissemination of information by the media and its impact upon public opinion in the West. Taking a hard look at the harsh economics of covering humanitarian crises and the media's penchant for depicting only the graphic violence of war, he urges his colleagues in the media, and in particular network television, to address more consistently the subtleties of poverty and the underlying sources of ethnic conflict.

Without doubt, the media can and has become a partner with the humanitarian community in fostering support for international assistance and respect for human rights, and in sensitizing the international public to the underlying causes of emergencies. That impact is suggested by the fact that during 1992, the Cable News Network aired some 434 items on Somalia as contrasted with six on the Sudan, where human suffering was equally or more widespread. Additional research would probably show that by its reporting on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, CNN reinforced international efforts to respond. The converse is probably also true: that the absence of media attention to the Sudan crisis contributed to the lower priority it received from media-sensitive decisionmakers.

The important role played by the media in humanitarian affairs has led aid organizations to invest sign)ficant resources in facilitating media coverage of major crises. Yet the current economic and institutional constraints that Girardet describes make it difficult for the media to move beyond reporting international ambulance chasing and spectacular atrocities to the insidious long-term effects of war and deprivation on the victims. To the extent that it depicts the relief of suffering in war rather than the less graphic but equally essential efforts to overcome the poverty and injustice beneath the conflicts, the media contributes to a vicious cycle. Because there is so little public and political attention to the underlying causes of emergencies, those emergencies recur with greater frequency. Moreover, such coverage exacerbates the difficulties of aid organizations, noted in Chapter 2, in

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mobilizing resources for indispensable reconstruction and development activities.

At the Providence conference described in the Preface, the Girardet chapter sparked intense debate. Particularly contested was its assertion of a direct and necessary connection between a responsible media, informed public opinion, and enlightened public policies. Girardet was asked what evidence demonstrates actual impacts of the media and public opinion on pragmatic initiatives and policy changes in the humanitarian field? Research about public opinion and policy formation has focused mainly on issues of arms control and the former Soviet Union. Different dynamics there may be at work as humanitarian action, when conventional wisdom suggests that public opinion also drives the policies of Western governments. Girardet's basic hypothesis about the media's influence on public opinion and the resulting changes in humanitarian policy needs more research and analysis. Public outrage generated by the BBC documentary on the Ethiopian famine in October 1984 and rock concerts for the benefit of the victims widely are believed to have forced the U.S. and British governments to focus on the tragedy and step up relief efforts. Public outcry about the plight of Kurds in northern Iraq in April 1991 seems to have forced the reluctant allied coalition to seek the passage of Security Council Resolution 688 as the basis to establish safe havens.

True in some circumstances, the pressure of public opinion hardly explains action in others. Decisions by George Bush just before the Republican convention in August 1992 to mount a U.S. airlift from Mombasa to Somalia, and in December of the same year–in the final months of his lame-duck presidency–to send soldiers to protect humanitarian operations there, seem to have reflected less pressure from public opinion than the interests of the president and other elite decisionmakers. His desire to be associated with humane instincts during the election campaign and, when not reelected, to be remembered as a kinder, gentler chief executive surely figured in his decisions. After months of media coverage of the horrors of internecine violence, the public was predisposed to go along with the President's decisions but public opinion did not cause them.

The first three chapters suggest a number of issues requiring further reflection regarding the nature of humanitarian values and their implementation by the international community in its efforts to sustain civilians in times of war.

1. Humanitarian values resonate with a basic human instinct of compassion and with obligations common to the world's great religious traditions. However, certain fundamentalist approaches to religion now are associated with intolerance, parochialism, and a lack of solidarity and sympathy with some who suffer. To what extent does religious extremism constitute a threat to a more effective global humanitarian system?

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2. Even if humanitarian values are indeed more universal than generally realized, many of the world's principal humanitarian organizations still employ a predominantly Western approach and constituency. What are the operational implications of a more universal approach to humanitarian action for the culture of today's aid institutions? How can existing institutions become more attuned to the cultures in which major humanitarian crises are set? How can institutions that are more indigenous to crisis areas increase their comparative advantages?

3. Humanitarian action and hopefulness go hand in hand. Efforts to assist, protect, and sustain the vulnerable reflect the conviction that however deep-seated current racial, ethnic, tribal, political, and other antagonisms, and however barbaric current behavior, they should not be allowed to triumph. If the opposite of humanitarianism is not inaction but cynicism, what are some of the ways, ranging well beyond the sphere of humanitarian action itself, by which the international community can nurture and sustain the forces of hopefulness in the post-Cold War world?

4. At a time when differences between majority and minority populations are increasingly erupting into civil strife, the principle of tolerance for ethnic diversity is no longer axiomatic. In this perspective, the issue in Bosnia is not territorial aggrandizement but rather the viability of multiethnic living. An alternative viewpoint would suggest that ethnic cleavages are such that a separation of ethnic groups as in Cyprus may be necessary temporarily and perhaps even permanently. To what extent do basic humanitarian values necessitate multiethnic societies?

5. The media are both a valuable asset to a more effective system of global humanitarian action and a dangerous liability. Recent experience suggests that through publicizing assaults against humanity, the media can energize international action. However, media coverage is uneven, sporadic, and short-lived as new crises push still-unresolved crises off the screen. What can be done to utilize the media more routinely in impelling and sustaining humanitarian action? How can the media contribute to a more serviceable humanitarian system that includes a more fail-safe system of early warning devices and longer-term follow-through?

6. In a number of recent civil wars, the abuse of humanitarian activities has been so egregious that organizations have considered suspending–and in some cases have actually suspended–activities to protect their integrity. For agencies whose purpose is to save lives, the idea of voluntarily refusing to carry out their mandates is contradictory. Yet it is undeniable that circumstances may exist, such as rampant violations of international law and morality, in which humanitarian values may require calling a halt to activities that would continue to be manipulated by powers with no serious commitment to their success. How might decisions to withhold or temporarily suspend assistance and protection efforts represent not a denial of humanitarian values but actually an affirmation of them?

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7. With the passing of the Cold War, humanitarian values have an opportunity to become a new cornerstone of international relations. No longer subservient to an East-West agenda, human needs may exercise a claim on international action because of their intrinsic importance. Yet countervailing factors may prevent humanitarian values from coming into their own. These include realpolitik, resource constraints, compassion fatigue, and a reluctance among outsiders to engage in highly fractious conflicts. What strategies should be adopted to assure that in the post-Cold War era humanitarian values become preeminent?

Notes

1. For a more extended discussion of the politicization of humanitarian activity, see Larry Minear, "The Forgotten Humanitarian Agenda," Foreign Policy 73 (Winter 1988-89): 7~93.

2. These are elaborated in Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993): chap. 1.

3. See, for example, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); Marcel A. Boisard, L'Humanism de l'lslam (Paris: Michel, 1979); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991); Emmanuel Bello, African Customary Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 1980); and T. O. Elias, New Horizons in International Humanitarian Law (Dobbs Ferry: Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979).

4. Boulder: Westview, 1989.

5. See UNICEF Emergency Operations, document EACEF/1993/11, February 19, 1993, pare. 5-8.

Part 2

Military Force and

Humanitarian Action

Commentary

THOMAS G. WEISS & LARRY MINEAR

The end of the Cold War has changed the face of world politics. New features include major alterations in the geography of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the breakdown of predominantly bipolar political relationships among states, the new importance of nonmilitary threats to national and international security, and the revitalization of multilateralism, with correspondingly expanded expectations of the United Nations.¹

Breathtaking as these changes are, they are no more dramatic than the series of international military actions mounted in the erstwhile Second (or Communist) and Third (or developing) worlds to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. For military and civil defense establishments to assist in natural disasters is not new, although the nature of cooperation has changed with the availability of underutilized NATO and Warsaw Pact resources.² In light of the altered political context, an effort is in fact now under way to codify and expand this experience under the auspices of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs.³

What is unusual and of potentially enormous consequence for the global humanitarian economy of the future is the use of military force to ensure the delivery of aid on occasions when governments and insurgents prevent relief operations. Major initiatives in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia already have been undertaken in this decade in which foreign soldiers helped to ensure access to suffering civilians in spite of the reluctance or even hostility of local authorities. Each initiative has involved thousands of troops and

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expenditures exceeding one billion dollars. While billed as unique, the peculiarities of each tend to blur over time. A series of initiatives, each presented as one-of-a-kind, soon constitutes a new genre of international action. The need to respond to human suffering was also a significant justification for major UN military operations in Cambodia and Mozambique. Such undertakings lead even skeptics to believe that armed humanitarian efforts may be far more prevalent in the future than in the recent past.

The most unusual event–undoubtedly a watershed and, in retrospect, perhaps more precedent setting than was understood at the time–followed passage of Security Council Resolution 688 in April 1991. Overriding early Iraqi government protests of the presence of elite forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands deployed troops in Operation Provide Comfort, helping to rescue some one and a half million Kurds.⁴ In due course, humanitarian activities spearheaded by troops from the allied coalition were handed over to the United Nations as the allied coalition continued its military monitoring of the area.

The fifteen hundred UN soldiers initially assigned to Sarajevo as part of the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) quickly proved inadequate to the task. In September 1992 the Security Council authorized adding at least five thousand more troops to protect humanitarian convoys and escort detainees in Bosnia-Herzegovina to safety. NATO initially sent sixty-five hundred soldiers from four member countries to support humanitarian activities in the area. Moreover, after months of discussion, a decision was made at the beginning of April 1993 to enforce a ban on Serbian overflights. This type of military action–whose just)fication, as it had been in Iraq, was at least partially humanitarian– indicated the expansion of plausible military options in the service of efforts to sustain civilians in times of war.

The third major event in the series took place in Somalia. The humanitarian protection activities of military forces in northern Iraq and Bosnia were upstaged–and reinforced–by the approval of Security Council Resolution 794, which led to the deployment of what eventually became some twenty-two thousand U.S. marines and ten thousand troops from some twenty other nations. This Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was more widely known under the Pentagon name, Operation Restore Hope. These activities were caused by the failure of only five hundred UN peacekeeping troops that operated under traditional rules of engagement to protect humanitarian operations.

At the end of March 1993, the Security Council continued its steady progression toward enforcing humanitarian access by authorizing twenty-eight thousand UN soldiers. This included a few thousand U.S. logistics troops left behind, who served for the first time under a UN general, as well as another two thousand soldiers held in reserve as a rapid strike force–under

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U.S. command and control–to take over protection activities from the U.S.led coalition. Scheduled to begin in May 1993, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (the second phase of UNOSOM) would be the largest, most expensive, and most ambitious UN operation to date. Also for the first time, the UN Secretary-General would command directly a military force deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council has empowered UNOSOM to use whatever force is necessary to ensure access to suffering civilians and to disarm Somali warlords who refuse to surrender their arms.

In view of the recurrent authorization of UN or UN-related troops for humanitarian support roles in one conflict after another, it had become difficult by early 1993 to argue that precedents are not being set. Nevertheless, the resolution authorizing action in Somalia goes to great lengths to maintain the fiction–so dear to many developing countries that fear legitimizing the concept of military intervention and to wealthier countries that might be asked to underwrite these activities–that the situation in Somalia is somehow unique. The rapidity of the change to a more assertive approach is particularly noticeable because only a few years earlier the modest idea of assigning peacekeepers a humanitarian support role had been controversial.⁵

Chapter 4, the first in Part 2, is "Humanitarian Intervention" by James O. C. Jonah, a lifetime international civil servant who since 1992 has been UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. As head of the African and Middle Eastern components of the UN's Department for Political Affairs and previously in charge of the UN's Office for Research and the Collection of Information, Jonah has been intimately involved with monitoring complex emergencies and attempting to effect political solutions. He spearheaded UN efforts in 1991-1992 to negotiate a solution to Somalia's violence, served as an emissary after the deportation of Palestinians to southern Lebanon by Israel in late 1992, and has carried out other troubleshooting missions over the years on behalf of the Secretary-General and Security Council.

Jonah lives up to his reputation for candor by using the word "intervention" in his chapter, which normally makes diplomatic hairs stand on end. While the concept of intervention is in the air these days and a frequent topic of discussion in diplomatic circles, even UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali studiously avoided the term in answering the Security Council's call for a new vision of the UN's future activities in international peace and security.⁶ Jonah not only uses the term but embraces it while assessing the current evolution of international norms and suggesting processes and structures for this new day and age.

International relations consist of many efforts to influence the behavior of states, and each effort constitutes intervention in their domestic affairs. Jonah, however, employs a narrower and perhaps more analytically useful approach. He limits the concept of humanitarian intervention to military actions undertaken to guarantee humanitarian access with the approval of the

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Security Council but against the expressed wishes of a state. Somalia provides the gist for his reflections about attempting to negotiate with those who had utilized food as a weapon in their power struggle after the departure of Siad Barre in January 1991. The resulting conflict claimed an estimated three to five hundred thousand lives, jeopardizing the lives of some two million more Somalis by starvation and war.

In addition to employing greater unity in its use of humanitarian intervention, the current international debate would benefit from identifying the terms and preconditions to trigger these actions. Jonah's view is that decisionmaking and accountability for interventions need to be clearly vested in the United Nations, whatever the modalities of implementation. While the lack of a UN military capacity made a U.S.-led coalition the only real option for Somalia, the UNITAF undertaking gained political significance and legitimacy from the UN's blue fig leaf.

Jonah's concentration on Somalia spotlights humanitarian intervention in circumstances in which there is no governmental authority–what international lawyers would label res nullius. The earlier UN-authorized military intervention in northern Iraq took place without governmental consent, although the reluctant consent of Iraqi authorities was subsequently extracted to permit UN guards to help secure humanitarian operations, with allied troops and airpower to back them up from Turkey. The presence of UN troops in Bosnia has been resisted by virtually all parties at one time or another.

Whether the situation is one of anarchy, acquiescence, or resistance, recent international actions put states on notice that major violence against their own populations no longer will be considered exclusively a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The rights of civilians in times of war increasingly are viewed as not being matters of sovereign discretion. Access no longer depends exclusively on decisions of local authorities but is subject to more generally agreed international standards. Boundaries are becoming more porous and more subject to international intervention, if not yet altogether irrelevant.⁷

In short, as the world moves from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, sovereignty as traditionally understood is no longer sacrosanct. The age-old balance between state assertions of sovereignty and international expressions of solidarity with those who suffer has begun to shift perceptibly in favor of those in need. Operations such as Provide Comfort and Restore Hope and many crossborder operations mounted by nongovernmental organizations, and even a few governments in places like Eritrea and Tigray, indicate that humanitarian action precedes codification in international law. Human life takes precedence over artificial legal constructs that are used to justify using food and medicine as weapons by belligerents, whether they are recognized governments or insurgents in armed opposition.⁸

Philosophers and theologians have agreed over the years that no state or

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authority has a right to starve or abuse its own people with impunity. This idea is gaining fresh ground among some analysts as well as practitioners. The international community is groping toward what the French government has trumpeted for some time: le droit d'ingèrence, or the right to intervene.⁹ The international community usually seeks, however, to win the consent of political authorities rather than to override them. To declare that sovereignty is in a subsidiary position to humane values and that the international community can resort to military action to enforce this hierarchy frames the issue in starker terms than those used comfortably by many governments and analysts.

Governments and would-be governments increasingly understand that

claims of sovereignty are sometimes judged by how responsibly it is

exercised. Sovereignty devoid of humane values increasingly appears

illegitimate: "Use it responsibly or lose it." The international community

has chosen, at least in northern Iraq and Somalia, not to finesse the issue of the relative value of sovereignty in a head-on clash with humanitarianism.

This vigor makes more likely appeals to governments to exercise their

sovereignty more responsibly.

The two remaining chapters in Part 2 explore from different perspectives the implications of the increasing use of military force for humanitarian action and actors. In "Armed Relief," John Mackinlay provides reflections based upon his career as a former British military officer who served as an observer in the Sinai, as well as in many overseas postings as a regular infantry officer. His firsthand experience as a peacekeeper has been enhanced by recent analytical work undertaken as director of the project entitled "Second Generation Multinational Operations" at Brown University's Watson Institute.¹⁰ His research involved visits in 1992 to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, northern Iraq, and Kuwait.

Based on recent deployments of multilateral military forces to meet humanitarian exigencies in war zones, Mackinlay foresees a rapidly expanding role for such operations. He analyzes a number of possible uses that vary in the extent of force and the numbers of troops involved. The low end of a range of options involves actions such as positioning troops to forestall an eventual humanitarian catastrophe–for example, the deployment in December 1992 of a UN battalion in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia to avoid another Bosnia. An option involving greater application of force is represented by the provision of troops to escort the transport and delivery of food in Bosnia. At the high end of policy choices are efforts such as Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope in Somalia.

Mackinlay argues that in order to cope with a new world disorder characterized by levels of violence and unrest resulting from micronationalisms undreamed of by the framers of the UN Charter, the increased reliance upon military forces in support of humanitarian action is very probable. However, a number of questions need to be asked about the

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deployment of forces in this context. Are troops able to be trained to deal with highly volatile security situations? Will they be able to function in highly politicized circumstances without being drawn into the conflict, either by choosing sides or being perceived as choosing sides? To what extent will the task of protecting humanitarian operations entail basic police and law enforcement functions (e.g., weapons confiscation)? What are the terms of engagement regarding the authority of the troops to take preemptive as well as defensive action? Should new guidelines be developed for UN troops specifically with humanitarian support functions in mind?¹¹

In Chapter 6, "Relief Operations and Military Strategy," Gayle E. Smith scrutinizes how the activities of belligerent military forces affect the work of humanitarian organizations. For more than a decade, she has worked closely with relief organizations in the Horn of Africa and counseled governments on aid and development issues. She is currently based in Addis Ababa as a consultant to nongovernmental organizations and adviser to the present transitional government in Ethiopia. Her wealth of practical experience in Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Somalia is enriched by familiarity with other regions as well. She is known for her analytical rigor and candor.

Smith advances the thesis, growing out of her own experience, that the success of humanitarian interventions directly correlates with the ability of practitioners to understand military strategy and creatively adapt their activities accordingly. If they fail to do so, relief activities are likely to redound unduly to the military advantage of one or another belligerent, compromising the evenhandedness of humanitarian agencies and in effect making them parties to the conflict and its outcome.

Where Mackinlay describes what he views as the largely positive interaction between outside troops and the humanitarian operations that they support, Smith sees local militaries as purveyors of violence and wreakers of human suffering. At the same time, she urges humanitarian groups to move beyond hand-wringing to greater vigilance in protecting their own activities against manipulation and abuse. She elaborates some preliminary rules of the game to guide private agencies operating in close proximity to military forces in times of war.

Relying more and more upon outside military forces to sustain civilians and protect aid workers in times of war is not without critics. NGOs are divided about a greater role for the world's militaries in the global humanitarian economy of the future. There is even debate among parliaments and within defense establishments. Some welcome logistical and other resources that the military provide; others note the often high price tag. Some see the addition of a greater element of coercion as helpful in creating humanitarian space in civil strife settings; others hold that voluntariness is at the heart of humanitarian action and that there is no substitute for painstakingly negotiating access to those in need. Some want to harness otherwise underutilized military forces; others believe that doing so will

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strengthen the already disproportionate influence of the military in some societies.

Discussions and conferences, journal articles and books these days are examining the "alternative uses of military forces," an objective indicator that militaries around the world are, from a self-interested point of view, looking for ways to protect their budgets from the post-Cold War scalpel.¹² What could be better insurance against parliamentary cuts than the demonstrated need for assistance from the military in sustaining suffering civilians in a growing number of natural and man-made disasters?

A conference organized in December 1992 by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs was held in facilities in Brussels provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner had just presided over a meeting of defense ministers who had pronounced themselves ready to do "what is necessary" in Bosnia if the UN requested it. During the same week, the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope began deploying troops to Somalia. Worner opened the meeting by announcing to assembled representatives of civilian and military institutions that "this is another NATO from the one that you have known." In April 1993 NATO agreed to enforce a United Nations-ordered no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first NATO military operation out-of-area based upon humanitarian imperatives in support of the United Nations.

Pressing military resources into the service of humanitarian objectives becomes more attractive in light of the growing "humanitarian gap"–that is, the shortfall between the burgeoning demands for relief and the resources available to be committed quickly to sustaining civilians during war. In this context, the use of military and civil defense assets to help victims may be welcomed. At the same time, some argue in favor of reducing the size of post-Cold War military establishments rather than retooling them for new duties. In any event, the determining factor should be the real requirements of disaster victims and not merely the availability of resources. Discussions about applying excess military capacity should be demanded in order to ensure that these resources are used efficiently and appropriately.

Along with the dangers of a supply-driven use of the military are concerns about the militarization of civilian aid programs and of civil society. It is difficult to imagine a positive contribution from heavily armed and repressive militaries of many nondemocratic countries. The use of military resources is as expensive as their deployment is swift. Moreover, it is dangerously easy for the public to confuse an immediate and simple infusion of logistical help with the far more complex and arduous tasks of getting a war-torn society permanently back on its feet. Since resources are scarce, allocations for military relief could occur at the expense of civilian institutions and channels. The issue of demilitarization would seem at least as pertinent for advancing the cause of humanity as any increased reliance

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upon military forces in emergencies.

The three chapters that make up the second part of the book examine different aspects of military force in support of humanitarian action. Since the international community also can apply economic force to advance humane objectives, a word about nonforcible sanction may be useful.

Economic sanctions, like many other policy tools theoretically available during the Cold War, have suddenly become a viable policy option in its aftermath. Economic sanctions are usually seen as the first and least violent form of enforcement to reverse threats to peace, to be followed, if necessary, by the application of military force. In spite of their recent use in Iraq, Haiti, Libya, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia, very little has been determined about their utility in achieving humanitarian goals or their sometimes negative humanitarian consequences. Previous research largely has concentrated instead on the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool of the United States and on their economic consequences.¹³

Two pertinent challenges related to impact and applications emerge from the recent experience of the international community as documented in the field research of the Humanitarianism and War Project.¹⁴ First, can the application of economic sanctions serve humanitarian objectives when they cause serious hardship among civilian populations? As suggested by the Gulf War, the political strategies adopted, the economic sanctions imposed, and the military force authorized by the Security Council each created hardships for civilian populations. Moreover, each also complicated the ability of the UN's own agencies to provide relief to civilians caught in the conflict and undermined their credibility.

Could a better approach have been used to minimize the impact on vulnerable civilians? Several possibilities come to mind. Before the Security Council decides on economic or military enforcement action, the views of UN organizations with humanitarian competence should be given serious consideration. UNICEF and the World Food Programme, for example, are well situated to warn against, anticipate, and monitor such consequences, especially for vulnerable groups who suffer most under sanctions.¹⁵ The UN Secretary-General also could be authorized to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the nature of and restrictions applying to the use of military force in order to reflect adequately concerns related to proportionality and the protection of humanitarian values.¹⁶ If the Security Council decides to proceed with a given action, governments should be obliged to provide resources to the UN system so it can respond fully to the humanitarian consequences. None of these possibilities was explored during the Gulf crisis.

The second challenge regarding economic sanctions relates to the timing of an associated deployment by a UN or UN-authorized military force. Enshrined in the UN Charter and practice is the assumption that economic sanctions should be tried first, and only when they fail should collective

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military action be undertaken. Suffering civilians in Serbia and Haiti in 1993 occasioned by such sanctions provide compelling reasons to rethink this conventional wisdom.

A vigorous and preventive deployment of UN peacekeepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina might have obviated the subsequent need for economic pressure on Belgrade and Serbian irregulars. The need to avoid deploying large numbers of troops to prevent disaster contributed to the Security Council's decision to send preventive UN soldiers to Macedonia in December 1992. An earlier military enforcement action to restore an elected government in Haiti might have entailed far less suffering for the civilian population than extended sanctions.

As with the first triad of essays, the three authors here raise a number of issues requiring further analysis and reflection:

1. "Humanitarian intervention" has become a household term, albeit one whose imprecision generates great public confusion and political controversy. From the standpoint of international law, the concept is an oxymoron: providing truly humanitarian assistance itself does not constitute an unfriendly act. Greater precision therefore would require speaking instead of military action in support of humanitarian activities. To what extent would a clearer definition result in greater consensus and less resistance to assertive international action in support of those in need?

2. The term "new interventionists" has been applied to those who recommend that the international community become more assertive in dealing with massive violations of humanitarian and human rights. While it is widely assumed that such interventionism would deploy military force as needed, some who recommend a more assertive role see the need for a more creative mix of policy instruments, perhaps including–but by no means limited to or starting from–the application of military force. What instruments are available and what mechanisms can be devised to assure that the entire array of possible policy options is used in a timely and consistent manner?

3. Many who are reluctant to see military force assume a larger role in the future international humanitarian economy believe that the problems creating recurrent human suffering need to be addressed by other means. At the same time, it is undeniable that humanitarian action is undertaken sometimes as a palliative or a surrogate for stronger action. Even the deployment of troops to protect humanitarian operations can be a substitute for the direct use of force against the belligerents. What precautions can be devised to protect humanitarian action from abuse as smoke screen or symbol?

4. The effectiveness of humanitarian action in some circumstances may be enhanced by its association with military force. However, while some prefer that the force be multilateral in character, action by individual

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governments or multinational coalitions has often proved more effective than action undertaken by the UN. In fact, multilateral action is caught in a vicious circle. The UN is not entrusted with its own independent military capacity by governments who then argue that the UN is demonstrably unable to mount effective military-support operations. What can and should be done to break the circle?

5. As humanitarian personnel from civilian organizations interact more regularly with military officials, a conflict of cultures becomes apparent. Even when certain objectives converge, military and humanitarian institutions use different methods of decisionmaking, approaches to accountability, operational styles, and relationships with local populations. To what extent will effective international efforts to deal with armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era require bridging these cultural divides? To what degree should the humanitarian culture be adopted to become more compatible with the military, or should the major accommodation be on the side of the military?

6. The use of force can make a positive contribution toward the advancement of humane values, including ending a given conflict. But humanitarian action devoid of coercion also can be a contribution to peace. Agreements extracted from warring parties to cooperate with international aid efforts have offered openings to negotiations that have addressed the roots of conflicts. Does granting military coercion a larger place in the international humanitarian economy risk preempting or sidelining efforts to resolve conflicts through consensual means? How can humanitarian relief play an even more significant role in fostering confidence building, peacemaking, and peace building?

7. Regarding the consequences of economic sanctions on vulnerable civilian populations, largely visceral reactions toward their positive and negative use to date reflect preferences rather than data or analysis. What factors should enter into the search for principles and ground rules underlying decisions on the international use of economic coercion as a response to war or injustice? From a humanitarian standpoint, what objective criteria should be considered before economic, or military, action is undertaken?

Notes

I. For a discussion, see James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); and Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

2. For a discussion of this assistance, see Hugh Hanning, Peaceful Uses of Military Forces (New York: International Peace Academy, 1976); and Assembly of the Western European Union, "Role and Contribution of the Armed Forces in the Event of Natural or Other Disasters in Peacetime," document 960, November 7, 1983.

3. See documentation prepared for a meeting at NATO headquarters,

"Workshop on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief," Brussels, December 14-15, 1992.

4. See Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism,"

Survival 33, no. 5 (September/October 1991): 451-465.

5. See Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help

in Africa (London: Macmillan, 1990); and Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Soldiers, Peacekeepers, and Disasters (London: Macmillan, 1991).

6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations,

1992).

7. For a set of essays about these matters, see Gene M. Lyons and Michael

Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 1993).

8. For an elaboration of these issues, see Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss,

"Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 95-118; Larry Minear, "Humanitarian Intervention in a New World Order," Overseas Development Council Policy Focus I (1991); and Barbara Hendrie, "Cross-border Relief Operations in Eritrea and Tigray," Disasters 13, no. 4 (1989): 351-360. For a discussion of the extent to which the military option has become plausible within the United States, see Raymond W. Copson, "The Use of Force in Civil Conflicts for Humanitarian Purposes: Prospects for the Post-Cold War Era," CRS Report for Congress, document 92-899F, December 1992. For a more skeptical view of the overextension of both the United States and the United Nations, see Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72, no. I (1992/93): 1-16.

9. See Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, Le droit d'ingérence (Paris: Denoel, 1987); and Bernard Kouchner, Le Malheur des Autres (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1992).

10. See John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989);

and John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational

Forces," Washington Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 113-134, and A Draft

Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations (Providence: Watson Institute, 1993).

11. See James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1990); Augustus Richard Norton, "The Security Legacy of the 1980s in the Third World," in Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992): 19-34; Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs 71 (1991/92): 20-37; Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1992); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy (New York: Random House, 1993); and Ethnic Conflict and International Security, special issue of Survival 35, no. I (Spring 1993).

12. See, for example, Colin L. Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead,"

Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 32-45.

13. One recent exception is Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining

Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a more traditional treatment, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy and Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), which updated Economic Sanctions in Pursuit of Foreign Policy Goals (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983). See also David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), and Theodore Galdi and Robert Shuey, U.S. Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Specific Countries: 1979 to the Present (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1992).

14. See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, "Groping and Coping in the Gulf Crisis: Discerning the Shape of a New Humanitarian Order,"World Policy Journal 9, no. 4 (Fall/Winter 1992): 755-788.

15. The impact of economic sanctions on vulnerable groups seems akin to that of structural adjustment programs. For a discussion of the latter, see Richard Jolly and Ralph van der Hoeven (eds.), Adjustment With a Human Face–Record and Relevance, special issue of World Development 19, no. 12 (1991).

16. This suggestion was made by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992): pare. 38-39. For a further discussion, see Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, UN Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text (Hanover: Academic Council on the UN System, 1992): 41-42.

Part 3

Humanitarian Institutions:

A Look to the Future

Commentary

THOMAS G. WEISS & LARRY MINEAR

Having reviewed key values and processes, we now turn to explore in more detail the emerging institutional shape of the world's new humanitarian order. This examination is particularly timely as attention in the wake of the Cold War is focused on changes needed to assure greater responsiveness from the world's humanitarian machinery. Discussions about the shape of the evolving humanitarian order¹ must be situated firmly within the context of international law. There is a well-established right of access to humanitarian assistance and a well-established right for impartial aid organizations to provide this assistance. In the codification, evolution, and dissemination of humanitarian law over a period of 125 years, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has played the central role.

A fitting start is Michel Veuthey's "Assessing Humanitarian Law." For the last two decades, Veuthey has monitored closely discussions by the international community of humanitarian law and practice. His duties as a staff member of the Geneva-based ICRC have included regular attendance at United Nations debates in Geneva and in New York. The recent grant of observer status to the ICRC by the UN General Assembly was an acknowledgment by governments of its importance as an institution and as a contributor to international policy and action on humanitarian affairs.

Writing from his own point of view, Veuthey presents the body of humanitarian law already agreed upon and ratified by states. He makes particular reference to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 that elaborate the rights and responsibilities of political

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authorities and humanitarian organizations. He also describes the ICRC's efforts to monitor compliance with existing law and provide humanitarian assistance and protection to civilians when warfare breaks out within countries. He examines in depth the set of implementation mechanisms that have been agreed upon and sometimes utilized by states.

Veuthey points out, however, that legal safeguards are insufficient to sustain civilians during armed conflicts, or even to equip humanitarian organizations to provide sustenance. As many analysts have noted, the conventions and protocols are not as "hard" a law as the domestic law of most countries that is adjudicated in the courts and backed up by specific enforcement. Humanitarian law is "softer," and it is implemented or not in the actual behavior of soldiers and government of ficials.² However useful in circumscribing inhumane practices by governments and insurgents, warring parties often ignore international strictures that they see as contravening their immediate interests. The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues concurs. Many governments take "a rather relaxed view regarding compliance with humanitarian norms," the Commission has stated. "Political considerations prevail over humanitarian requirements and humanitarian concerns are used to further political aims."³ Breaches of legal obligation often are not counteracted swiftly and firmly.

It is also true that the rights to receive and provide humanitarian assistance are less fully elaborated, less clearly monitored, and perhaps also less widely respected than are individual civil and political rights.⁴ Some experts therefore have suggested that it is premature to speak of a humanitarian "regime," since a regime requires a detailed set of obligations and system of enforcement, including penalties. Some scholars argue that the use of regime analysis might help bridge the analytical gap between existing legal texts and behavior;⁵ some practitioners would counter that what is needed is less analysis and more political will to enforce existing provisions.

What makes Veuthey's description so useful is that it provides a historical backdrop for the evolution of international law more generally. The Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted in the wake of World War I, was silent about the legal obligations of states in the humanitarian sphere. After the searing experience of World War II, however, governments made several landmark decisions that laid the groundwork for the evolution and acceptance of greater humanitarian responsibilities. The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, enacted in 1948, have come to be seen as milestones in the redefinition of sovereignty in relation to humanitarian responsibilities.

The most common interpretation of the UN Charter emphasizes the role of domestic jurisdiction in the often-cited paragraphs in Article 2. The negative protections afforded states against interference in their domestic affairs, however, exist in tension with their positive obligations in the area of human rights. The first words of the Charter's Preamble are: "We the

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Peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." Other articles, in particular 55 and 56, specify the critical importance of values and a "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." In this perspective–and developments in recent years have highlighted it–states in joining the United Nations place key domestic policies and practices within the realm of international scrutiny.

Particularly since the end of East-West rivalry, the international community has embraced sovereignty more circumspectly, including outside humanitarian relief, when national authorities prove unable or unwilling within their own borders. Even the current UN Secretary-General, whose responsibilities make him acutely aware of the sensitivities of sovereign states, acknowledges that "the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory. A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty."⁶

The Security Council since April 1991 has pronounced itself clearly on the subject of the implementation of humanitarian values, in a manner that is distinct from the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that is the ICRC's hallmark. As mentioned earlier, Resolutions 688 and 794 authorized the use of military force to guarantee humanitarian space in northern Iraq and Somalia, when local authorities refused to respect international norms. The second decision demonstrated far more consensus. While the former received the support of only ten Security Council members (three others voted against, two abstained), the vote for the latter was unanimous. Many decisions on the former Yugoslavia also have inched toward more drastic outside action to sustain imperiled civilians.

Moreover, humanitarian law consists not only of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols but also of the decisions of the General Assembly, as well as evolving international practice. Within the General Assembly–the world's quintessential political forum–recent discussions about the tensions between sovereignty and humanitarian access suggest a continuing evolution toward more progressive norms. In 1988 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/131, which recognized the rights of civilians to international aid and the role of NGOs in emergencies. In 1990 General Assembly Resolution 45/100 reaffirmed these rights and specifically endorsed the concept of corridors of tranquillity to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies. In 1991 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 requested the UN Secretary-General to create the position of an emergency assistance coordinator to work with governments and insurgents to provide more effective humanitarian assistance. This resolution draws no distinction between victims of natural and man-made disasters; only the tacit "consent" of authorities rather than their "request" is required to activate a UN response.

Following from recent General Assembly debates and adding political

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weight to existing legal safeguards was the creation in early 1992 of a Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The major purpose of the new unit is to assure greater coordination and effectiveness of international activities. The terms of reference provided by the General Assembly, however circumspect and carefully crafted, contain evidence of a more assertive humanitarianism.

This evolution in law and practice leads to divergent conclusions about future steps. Some join Veuthey in his conviction that the essential missing ingredient in the humanitarian regime of the future is not new conventions or protocols, but greater fidelity by belligerents to existing law and more vigorous engagement by the international community. Others indicate that it is essential, both in raising international consciousness and in ameliorating the behavior of belligerents, to simplify and codify existing law so that warring parties understand their obligations and comply, particularly during civil wars. Veuthey and his ICRC colleagues concede that the existing provisions to protect civilians in internal wars are far weaker than the comparable protection for soldiers and victims of interstate conflict.

In any case, they are dissatisfied with the international capacity to provide humanitarian assistance. This is the subject of the final two chapters, which contain thoughtful reflections by two seasoned practitioners regarding the structural inadequacies and existing capacities of the international delivery system. Frederick C. Cuny, who elaborates his vision of "Humanitarian Action in the Post-Cold War Era," is a planner who founded and heads INTERTECT, a professional disaster management consulting firm based in Dallas, Texas.

Cuny has been involved in many emergencies over the last two decades. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal has referred to him as "Mr. Disaster." At the time of the Providence conference in December 1992 to review the chapters in this volume, he was advising the U.S. government about humanitarian strategies to deal with the crisis in Somalia. The revisions to his chapter were sent from Zagreb, where he was working under dangerous conditions to arrange fuel and firewood deliveries to Sarajevo and accelerate the pace of relief activities in eastern Bosnia. He has sought throughout his career to make use of his on-the-spot activities and written reflections to improve international efforts. His recommendations for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia were informed by his experience with Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and his views on airdrops into Bosnia by his experience with the use of the military in humanitarian support in both Iraq and Somalia.

The book concludes with James Ingram's "The Future Architecture for International Humanitarian Action." Chapter 9 reflects a distinguished career in international relief efforts, first as an Australian diplomat and head of Australia's bilateral aid organization and then as the chief executive officer of the World Food Programme. While Ingram presided over enormous growth in UN food aid programs, he viewed the organization's task not only as that of the world's principal food logistician but also as a focal point for reflection

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about food aid, food security, and food management challenges. Ingram now directs the Australian Institute for International Affairs.

Where Veuthey argues for greater use of existing institutions, Cuny and Ingram urge a radical overhaul of the international humanitarian delivery system. They question the ability of the United Nations as a whole, and the organizations that make up the UN system in particular, to deal adequately with the growing number of conflict-related emergencies in the post-Cold War era. Cuny calls for a drastic revamping of the UN system to respond effectively to massive population displacements caused by internal wars. Rather than being localized in developing countries, these crises will take place increasingly in nontropical countries of the former Soviet bloc. They also will involve a growing number of Muslims, whose cultural background is vastly different from that of the majority of outside aid workers and institutions.⁷

To cope with the growing challenge, Cuny proposes harnessing available military resources and pooling existing international nongovernmental organizations and specialized UN agencies under the aegis of a new UN Organization for the Victims of Armed Conflict. He has little patience with turf battles among relief of ficials or with the current confusing array of overlapping and sometimes nonexistent mandates. He readily criticizes bureaucrats–governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental alike–for ineptitude and waste in dealing with the suffering caused by armed conflicts. In spite of past criticisms, he still sees no realistic alternative to the sign)ficant remodeling needed to create a new super organization that should improve the prospects for effective humanitarian action.

Ingram's analysis and recommendations range well beyond remodeling existing United Nations institutions. He goes against the tide of conventional wisdom in arguing that the UN cannot and should not be the centerpiece of future efforts to sustain civilians. He has concluded that the world organization is inherently unable to act with the impartiality necessary for effective relief in situations in which its member governments face challenges from armed insurgents. This is a surprising conclusion for a senior UN of ficial who negotiated access for food shipments to places such as the port of Massawa in northern Ethiopia. However, he believes that his negotiations would have been equally successful as a non-UN official with similar political support.

Ingram pairs his views about the negative impacts of the UN's political orientation with sharp criticism of its management culture and the lack of professional orientation among its relief specialists. Rather than thorough reform of the world organization–there are clearly changes that he would like to see implemented immediately in the United Nations–he calls instead for the expansion and internationalization of the ICRC. While he favors having the UN continue to coordinate natural disasters, he urges that the ICRC be charged with orchestrating the global response to complex emergencies and

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delegating specific tasks to UN organizations and international NGOs as necessary.

One of the themes that recurs in these last three chapters, and is implicit in the previous six, concerns the proper relationship between humanitarian action and politics. The growing concern of the UN General Assembly and Security Council with relieving the urgent suffering of civilians more effectively is undeniably positive after the long dark humanitarian night of the Cold War. Offsetting the value of this higher visibility is the reality that geopolitics still dictates that some suffering in some countries will command the attention of the United Nations more than in others. Similarly, the implementation of humanitarian activities may benefit from added international political and military pressure emanating from the Security Council. At the same time, experiences in the Gulf and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate that humanitarian activities sometimes lose in integrity and effectiveness when associated with coercive strategies by the international community.

Another recurring theme concerns the international division of labor needed to sustain civilians in war zones more efficaciously. An improved humanitarian architecture for the future will require as its foundation a clear understanding of what each kind of humanitarian organization does best. Each of the main types of external humanitarian organizations (bilateral, UN, nongovernmental, ICRC) and their internal counterparts (governments, armed opposition groups, local NGOs) have made indispensable contributions to a more effective international humanitarian economy. It also seems clear that the edifice of the future will need to be tailored to the demands of the post-Cold War era, which include tensions within geographic borders, massive population displacement within and across state frontiers, and a growing role for nonstate actors.

The highly divergent views about institutional reform among the three authors in Part 3, however unsettling, may still be helpful in navigating uncharted waters. The fact that all three have hands-on experience in many institutions and are knowledgeable about a broad range of national and regional contexts requires that their views receive analysis and reflection. The continuing in-country research of the Humanitarianism and War Project, and a book to be published next year with that title,⁸ will seek to provide data and recommendations for this ongoing process.

As with the first six chapters, these last three chapters raise additional questions for study:

1. In the current rash of humanitarian crises around the world following the Cold War, the behavior of belligerents is a daily affront to the conscience of the civilized world. Gross, calculated violations of human rights and humanitarian law are perpetrated routinely in spite of the provisions of existing international law. What sorts of educational and political strategies

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could be devised to hold warring parties more effectively to their acknowledged obligations?

2. Those who oppose the creation of new humanitarian law argue that the problems faced today reflect not the absence of clear legal obligations but rather the unwillingness of governments to meet their agreed commitments and to keep them. What mechanisms–international and national, governmental and private–could be devised and implemented during the early post-Cold War era to assure greater accountability?

3. The largest number of persons affected by major humanitarian emergencies are now Muslim, while the vast majority of external humanitarians organizations and personnel are not. To what extent should the international community seek to stimulate the growth of Muslim organizations to meet these needs? To what extent can existing institutions become more attuned to the needs of civilians caught in war zones and more appropriate in their responses?

4. Given the plethora of institutional humanitarian actors–governmental and nongovernmental, international and indigenous, specialized and generalist–what sort of coordination should be expected in the evolving international humanitarian economy? Should some authority be created that would be able to direct activities more decisively, or should voluntary cooperation in coordination efforts be the maximum expected? Would it be more useful to seek better coordination within the individual institutional families (e.g., among UN organizations or among NGOs) rather than across the full range of actors? What personnel policies could be used to improve the professionalism of humanitarians?

5. While they figure increasingly in the rhetoric of decisionmakers and international solutions, with few exceptions regional organizations have been remarkably absent from the security and humanitarian arenas.⁹ To what extent are these organizations able realistically to contribute to more vigorous humanitarian action? What can the international community do to strengthen their effectiveness?

6. The work of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, recommended by the General Assembly in December 1991 and created by the Secretary-General in early 1992, will be reviewed by governments in late 1993. What does the experience in the early chapter of its existence suggest about the changes needed for the future? Should attention be given to the creation of a coordination or oversight mechanism outside of the United Nations?

Notes

1. See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, "Groping and Coping in the Gulf Cris~s: Dlscermog the Shape of a New Humanitarian Order," World Policy Journal), no. 4 (Fall/Winter 1992): 755-788.

2. See David P. Forsythe, "Choices More Ethical Than Legal: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights," Ethics and International Affairs 7 (1993): 136.

3. Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Winning the Human Race (London: Zed Books, 1988): 71-72.

4. See David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington: Heath, 1991); and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

5. See Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 89-102.

7. See Sohail H. Hashini, "Is There an Islamic Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention?" Ethics and International Affairs 7 (1993): 55-74.

8. Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism and War: Reducing the Human Cost of Armed Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1994).

9. See Neil S. MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," Security Studies 2, no. I (Autumn 1992): 6-37.