Postscript: Learning to Learn

Guest Writer: Larry Minear, Co-Director, Humanitarianism and War Project

Brown University

The spring issue of CARE’s PROGRAM In Touch on institutional learning reminded me of a paper I recently presented at a UN seminar on Lessons Learned in Humanitarian Coordination in Stockholm Last April. I thought I’d pass on some of the highlights to CARE readers.

The Humanitarianism and War Project at Brown University is examining lesson-learning processes among international humanitarian institutions in the post-Cold War period. Research suggests that while there have been profound changes in the outside world during the past decade, they have not been matched by reform in policies and procedures within the humanitarian system.

Impediments to Learning

Four elements in the culture of aid organizations have retarded the pace of institutional change. The first is the tendency to approach every crisis as unique. Sooner or later in most discussions of humanitarian crises, someone observes that Zaire is not Cambodia, Somalia is not Bosnia, or Sierra Leone is not El Salvador. The point, while not exactly profound, is legitimate. The idiosyncratic dynamics of individual conflicts need to be taken into account in charting effective international responses.

Yet no crisis is unique. As the research concluded, each pits the same institutions (the Untied Nations, governments, NGOs) against the same interlocutors (government and insurgent groups, civilian and military host officials) in a continuing effort to find solutions to recurring problems (the obstruction of humanitarian access, the manipulation of relief, inequitable economic relationships and the absence of viable and accountable local structures). As long as every crisis is perceived as wholly without precedent or parallel, there will be little scope for institutional learning.

The manipulation by belligerent and criminal elements of the refugee camps in eastern Zaire in 1994 was a rerun of unaddressed problems in Cambodian refugee camps along the Thai border years before. Unlearned lessons have a way of coming back to haunt us.

The second constraint to learning is the action-oriented nature of the humanitarian ethos. That is a central feature of the culture of CARE and many other NGOs. In the heat of a crisis, aid workers are hard-pressed to bring their institution’s wisdom to bear on a particular challenge. When "crisis X" is followed by "crisis Y" and "Crisis Z," retrospection and the implementation of lessons learned remain more or less permanently on the back burner.

But it takes more than energy to succeed. There is an underlying tension between a can-do mentality and the discriminating calculations needed for effective functioning in today’s internal armed conflicts. Only in recent years have humanitarian agencies taken steps to institute reflection on their mandates, strategies, modus operandi and results. Recent years have also seen an upsurge in activity by independent researchers and think tanks. In fact, there is now concern that attention to the broader political, military and social context in which humanitarian interventions are set may preempt rather than spur action.

The third constraint is a certain defensiveness to criticism. NGOs, UN agencies, USAID and others dependent upon public support are understandably reluctant to wash their dirty linen in public. As a former NGO staffer, I have been in my share of discussions in which a strong case was made for keeping under wraps issues that reflect poorly upon an agency rather than debating them publicly.

The searing experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia, in Somalia and Liberia have caused a failure of humanitarian nerve, or at least a loss of self-confidence. The fact that politicians have used aid efforts as a "humanitarian alibi" has not protected practitioners from serving as their scapegoats, lambasted for not succeeding in impossible situations. Yet the spirit of the times, which requires subjecting policies and programs to rigorous scrutiny, may also be a vehicle to rekindle respect for the humanitarian impulse and principles.

The fourth constraint is the prevailing lack of accountability. The lesson-learning process is undercut by "the culture of impunity," that is, the failure of all actors to be held responsible for their actions. Donor governments often send mixed signals to UN agencies. UN agencies point the finger at governments rather than taking responsibility for variables they themselves control. NGOs rationalize dubious levels of professionalism by citing good intentions, only to be reminded by critics that the road to hell is paved with them.

Change in the Making

The constraints to learning, however, deeply rooted in the culture of humanitarian institutions, are not beyond remedy. Correcting the tendency to approach every crisis as unique is spurring development of greater institutional memory and greater attention to comparative analysis of major humanitarian crises. Greater support for in-house evaluation capacity and more consistent and creative use of the results of outside studies will also be needed.

The action orientation of humanitarian institutions is not likely to change significantly, but it can be balanced by a more reflective approach to the prevailing challenges. The idea is not that the agencies should become furrow-browed like Hamlet, but rather that their activities should be informed by greater savvy about the realities on the ground.

Defensiveness to criticism will not metamorphose overnight into openness to change. More will be needed than placing a suggestion box outside the director’s office ore creating a lessons-learned unit. Yet ways may be found to institutionalize incentives for constructive criticism and promote a culture more receptive to thoughtful critiques of current policy and suggestions of alternatives.

Greater accountability is evolving. NGOs have taken steps to promote a voluntary code of conduct, increase their professionalism and establish minimum standards in key sectors. The Sphere Project, in which CARE has played a major role, seeks to improve not only the quality of humanitarian response but also "the accountability of humanitarian agencies to beneficiaries, members and supporters." Some donor agencies are now making an NGO’s endorsement of the code a condition for receiving grants and contracts.

In short, humanitarian organizations of all sorts are learning to learn.

Larry Minear is co-director of the Humanitarianism and War Project at Brown University. He spent 20 years working with Church World Services and Lutheran World Relief, both in the Sudan and in their joint advocacy office in Washington, D.C. This article is his summary of a paper he presented in Stockholm last April. The paper will appear in adapted form in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (NY: Routledge, forthcoming).