4.1. Each UN organization has developed and refined over the years its own policies and procedures to guide field staff, assure uniform functioning in all countries, and keep headquarters and governing councils duly informed. UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, and WHO manuals establish the groundrules within which field personnel function, the kinds of procedures to be followed, and the nature of the reporting required.

4.2. In the Gulf crisis, some UN organizations moved quickly and flexibly. UNICEF entered local markets to procure emergency materiel such as tents and hire additional local staff. WFP purchased food in nearby countries and transferred it from regional prepositioned stocks to avoid lengthy transport time and expense. UNHCR transferred tents and other relief items that had been stockpiled in Pakistan for the anticipated Afghan repatriation operation. Other UN organizations, however, demonstrated less flexibility. The $50,000 in discretionary emergency funds at the disposition of UNDP Resident Representatives still required touching base with headquarters in New York before actual disbursement, and in any case were soon exhausted. One of the challenges to coordination illustrated is to encourage those UN organizations in a position to respond quickly to do so, but at the earliest possible moment to assure that their initiatives become integrated into a strategy for longer-term and system-wide action.

4.3. Varieties of emergency procedures, in concert with overlapping and conflicting institutional mandates, create the kind of problems for would-be coordinators that emerged in Syria in early January 1991. The SUNEM proposed to the government that the UN build a camp for Iraqis expected to seek refuge in Syria from the looming war between Iraq and the Allied Coalition. The government agreed and signed a memorandum of understanding. It committed five government ministries to participate and covered such policy matters as what the UN agreed to deliver and such technical matters as exchange rates and visas for UN expatriate staff. Individual UN organizations subsequently insisted on negotiating individual service agreements with contractors-UNHCR for roads, electricity, tents, and blankets, UNICEF for water supplies, WHO for health matters. Not only was the overall UN task complicated by the competition among UN organizations for limited contractor services; the government was soon forced to deal with separate UN organizations on individual aspects of the task, ministry by ministry.

4.4. If resources are to be used to maximum effect in emergencies where multiple UN organizations are involved, individual organizational procedures need to be streamlined and common interagency ones developed and implemented. Those procedures would allow the system as a whole to move with greater flexibility and dispatch to procure the necessary materiel, hire the necessary staff, and dispense with some of the normal reporting requirements.

5.1. In the absence of the exercise of effective coordination among the multiplicity of UN humanitarian organizations and personnel active in the Gulf crisis, there was not one single United Nations but many. This complicated the challenge of proceeding in a coordinated fashion for all concerned–governments in the region, donor governments, NGOS, and of course the UN itself.

5.2. A consistent theme of discussions with government officials throughout the region was the confusion conveyed by the multiplicity of UN humanitarian agencies. The observation of one Iranian official charged with liaison to international organizations reflects similar perceptions among his counterparts in Jordan, Iraq, and perhaps beyond: "In general, UN efforts were isolated pieces of action by the various players, even though the government did have meetings both with the UN as a whole and with individual agencies. We never got the feeling that the entire system had a coordinated plan in which individual agencies played clear and specified roles."

5.3. In addition to such problems with UN coordination from the perspective of governments in the region, the multiplicity of UN actors created difficulties for the UN system as well. Table I of Annex A indicates the number of UN agencies and personnel present during the crisis in the region.

5.4. As noted earlier, some of the difficulties in UN coordination emerging from the Gulf crisis were between individuals specifically vested with coordination responsibilities. The tensions between the UN Resident Coordinator on the one hand and SUNEMs and high-level UN emissaries on the other are a matter of record. Similarly unhelpful to concerted action was the lack of clarity between the tasks of the UN humanitarian coordinator in Baghdad, who was to orchestrate all UN activities, and that of UNHCR, which had been assigned "lead agency role among UN humanitarian organizations."

5.5. In order to avoid such conflicts and confusions, a single person should be charged with UN coordinator functions for the duration of major emergencies involving multiple UN organizations. This individual should have considerably more authority than was vested in the SUNEMs during the Gulf crisis and be distinct from the UNDP Resident Representative.

POLITICAL ISSUES

6.1. The United Nations Security Council took major political decisions without adequate attention to their far-reaching humanitarian consequences. During the four phases of the Gulf crisis, the UN Security Council passed a lengthy series of resolutions related to various political and humanitarian aspects of the Gulf crisis. Resolution 660, approved unanimously on the day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. Resolution 678 of November 29,1990, which became the basis for the use of military force by the Allied Coalition from mid-January, authorized "all necessary means to uphold Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." On April 3,1991, Resolution 687 specified the conditions for a cease-fire and delineated Iraq's post-war obligations. Resolution 688 of April 5 became the basis for intervention in northern Iraq by Allied Coalition forces to pursue humanitarian actions in favor of those displaced by the Iraqi civil war. Other resolutions imposed trade sanctions, exempted certain humanitarian items, authorized the post-war sale of Iraqi oil to finance humanitarian purchases, and addressed political and military questions such as the Iraqi border, weapons destruction, and general compliance. Some resolutions were unanimous; others had one or more negative votes or abstentions.

6.2. These resolutions set up an ongoing tension between the Security Council and the UN's humanitarian machinery. The humanitarian consequences of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait became apparent overnight. It was not long before the impact of the trade sanctions on Jordan's economy and people were felt. The humanitarian consequences of the international war against Iraq and of the following civil war within Iraq, of course, reached major proportions.

6.3. The Security Council appears not to have fully anticipated the human dislocations which were to be triggered directly or indirectly by its various actions. In the days following the invasion of Kuwait and the initial Security Council resolution, one UN secretariat staff member offered to carry out a prospective assessment of possible consequences of various political and military courses of action that the UN might subsequently take on such matters as human displacement, ecological damage, political destabilization, and ethnic conflict. His suggestion was dismissed on the grounds that his findings would be irrelevant for Security Council action.

6.4. The Security Council was not unmindful of the need to minimize the negative humanitarian consequences of economic sanctions or war. However, the enforcement mechanism established in the form of the Sanctions Committee complicated the responses of the UN's own organizations to human needs in the region. Since air travel was affected by the trade embargo, the IOM Director-General and his staff pressed the Committee to allow flights to evacuate the displaced. UNICEF and WFP were required to request approval for their shipments of health supplies and food, even though medicines and most foodstuffs were exempt from the sanctions. A UNICEF shipment of health kits was delayed for a time while one government represented on the Sanctions Committee questioned whether scissors in health kits could be used as weapons. WFP, appealing to the Committee for assistance in releasing a cargo shipment caught in the naval blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba, was referred to the US Navy, which was unresponsive.

6.5. Ironically, the UN's own organizations could have helped monitor the effects of the sanctions. UNICEF staff throughout the region was probably the most familiar with the status of vulnerable groups, on whom sanctions and war could be expected to fall most severely. Its own publications and missions helped highlight suffering throughout the region. WFP staff in Baghdad monitoring the adequacy of Iraqi food supplies were in an ideal position to help determine whether unfrozen Iraqi assets or the proceeds from a one-time oil sale were actually being used for food purchases. This role, however, would have been possible only had the Sanctions Committee shared data on a regular basis about the food shipments that it had approved.

6.6. Association with the Security Council, in addition to complicating the coordinated functioning of the UN's humanitarian agencies, created political problems for them in the region and undermined their ability to function effectively. Feelings ran high about the war and also about the roles of the United Nations, both political and humanitarian. One knowledgeable observer noted, "It's hard for people on the ground who see punitive actions which harm people more than their leaders not to be emotional about the role of the United Nations." Another observed, "The United Nations kills, and then hurries to walk in the funeral."

6.7. In an attempt to preserve a distinction between humanitarian activities and their political context, some UN officials made distinctions between a "good UN" and a "bad UN." When people in Jordan vented their anger at the UN in a demonstration in front of the UNDP offices–there was no separate representative of the UN Security Council in the country–UN officials met with them and conveyed their petitions to UN headquarters. We are UN humanitarian organizations and not the Security Council, UN staff in effect explained to the leaders. We are here suffering with you and trying to help. Conversely, however, the identification of UN staff with the plight of the people also drew criticism. "Whose side are they on anyway?" asked one diplomat from an Allied Coalition embassy.

6.8. Such attempted distinctions simply underscored the extent to which there were many different faces of the UN. Distinctions aside, attempts by humanitarian staff to keep their distance from the political aspects of the UN were as unsuccessful as attempts by the UN's political organs to accommodate humanitarian concerns.

6.9. The association of humanitarian action with political /military strategies affected the perceptions of the UN among governments and aid agencies. Government officials in Jordan and Iran commented on the extent to which the amount of the UN aid received closely mirrored the political-military objectives of the Allied Coalition. "Had Turkey," say the Jordanians, "incurred the expenditures on evacuees for which Jordan is being denied reimbursement, the funds would have been provided with the stroke of a pen." "We got the refugees," say the Iranians, "but Turkey got the funds. " The Iraqi government viewed the concentration of UN assistance on the Kurds, which was of course also the focus of the political-military strategy of the Allied Coalition, as discrediting the UN's avowed humanitarian objectives.

6.10. The impact of infusing humanitarian action with political considerations led some private relief groups to separate themselves, to the extent possible, from the United Nations. The ICRC made clear not only to the UN but also to the Iraqi government, which took careful note, that it would notify the Sanctions Committee of its humanitarian shipments but would not seek its approval. The approaches of various other groups is noted in Section C below.

PRINCE SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN
EXECUTIVE DELEGATE
OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

6.11. On a more positive note, the association of UN organizations with UN-blessed sanctions and war appears in some instances to have impelled more energetic humanitarian action. One of the stated rationales for the WHO/UNICEF convoy, which during the height of the air war threaded its way from Teheran to Baghdad with much needed medical supplies, was that the UN's humanitarian resources needed to be deployed to address human needs in a situation in which the UN itself was already deeply implicated.

6.12. In short, there was little effective coordination between the humanitarian and political sides of the UN. The Security Council's impact on humanitarian organizations was far greater than any influence they were able to bring to bear in return on the Security Council.

SECTION B: UN COORDINATION AND GOVERNMENTS

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

7.1. During the Gulf crisis, western media concentrated on the international activities of donor governments and the Allied Coalition, the UN, and NGOS. As a result, the critical humanitarian role played by the governments and peoples of the region was obscured. Media focus notwithstanding, the states bordering Kuwait and Iraq represented the forward line of the international community's response.

7.2. At the beginning of the evacuee crisis, Jordan shouldered the burden of the influx of what would become about 850,000 third country nationals and some 300,000 returning Jordanians. The government advanced some $55 million in the form of foodstuffs, shelter, logistics; donors have subsequently reimbursed only $18 million. "Humanitarian gestures can place a burden on the host country," officials observe. "Unless there is a mechanism that recompenses and replenishes, many countries will think very hard before allowing their facilities to be used."

7.3. Examples are not restricted to Jordan. When Kurds began to converge on the Turkish border, the first assistance was provided by local communities and authorities and the Turkish Red Crescent Society. In Iran, the majority of the assistance provided to the Kurdish refugees was mobilized by national, provincial, and local governmental authorities; and there, as in Turkey, estimates made to the UN about potential refugees were dismissed.

7.4. The actual contribution of front-line governments went far beyond direct humanitarian assistance; emergency operations depended heavily on personnel redeployed from normal duties as well as on national logistics and infrastructure. This was particularly evident in the western border provinces of Iran, where resources previously set aside for reconstruction after the Iran/Iraq War were pressed into the refugee relief effort.

8.1. If the United Nations is to assume a coordinating role in humanitarian emergencies, it must be able to launch fast and effective operations and respond swiftly to changing needs and circumstances. In the Gulf crisis, the UN system's ability to act was obstructed by the absence of pre-negotiated agreements with governments in the region concerning the deployment of UN resources. The time spent negotiating with local and national authorities could have been more beneficially spent on operations. Moreover, the heat of events made negotiations an additional irritant in relationships between the UN and various governmental structures, thereby reducing further the level of cooperation.

8.2. Access, communications, and monitoring were the main sources of contention. On a number of occasions, the UN's ability to deploy staff rapidly and appropriately was limited by delays in issuing visas, travel permit requirements imposed on UN staff, denials of access to affected areas, and restrictions on establishing field offices. Mobility was further curtailed by insistence on local registration of vehicles.

8.3. By way of illustration, UNHCR was never authorized to establish permanent presence in areas of south-east Turkey where the 1988 influx of Kurds from Iraq had settled. Staff members required special permission to visit the area. These regulations remained in force through phase II and part of phase III. In Iraq, routine UN staff travel was severely restricted and on some occasions prevented by the unwillingness of the authorities to issue appropriate travel permits. Key staff were stranded in Baghdad for days and unable to resume their duties in the field. In Iran, the authorities finally lifted longstanding restrictions on the establishment of UN field offices, only then to deny UN staff access to refugee camps and border-crossing points.

8.4. The need for reliable and independent UN communications was obvious. UN organizations do not have automatic rights to import telecommunications equipment or to use the radio frequencies required to operate such equipment. In Iran, UN staff had to rely on regular telephone/fax systems for communications between Teheran and the field rather than on their own channels. UN staff in western border provinces were unable to communicate with colleagues on the other side of the Iraqi border, making coordination of repatriation extremely difficult.

8.5. Problems were experienced in a number of countries regarding monitoring relief supplies and the transfer or diversion of items in response to ever-changing needs. In Iran, the government insisted that UN supplies be consigned to local authorities. But UN staff were then routinely denied access to warehouses and refugee camps where the supplies were stored. In these circumstances, undertaking stock control or assessing evolving needs of refugees proved impossible. Elsewhere, stockpiled items could not be transferred expeditiously to the areas of greatest need. In Turkey, the government insisted that all incoming relief goods be consigned to the Red Crescent Society, which was initially reluctant to release goods for use across the border in northern Iraq. Similar problems occurred in Syria when the UN sought to transfer items temporarily stockpiled in phase 11 for later operations in Turkey and Iran.

8.6. There was an obvious need for agreed memoranda of understanding between the UN and the governments so that issues touching upon government prerogatives did not have to be negotiated in the crunch when lives were on the line. As part of prenegotiated agreements, the UN could pledge its support in mobilizing the resources necessary from the international community for emergency operations, which would include addressing the negative consequences of an emergency on the economy and infrastructure of the host country. Additional elements of potential attractiveness to governments would be the ability of the UN to act as a single point of contact, both for UN agencies and for NGOs working in the country.

9.1. The management and coordination of emergency relief relies on team-work. In practice, however, the staff of UN organizations and those of host authorities sometimes inhabit quite separate worlds and cultures. Major responses in the Gulf crisis were orchestrated by officials from ministries of defense, not by officials sent from foreign affairs ministries to UN agency meetings. "Responding to the Gulf crisis," recalls one official, "was a learning experience for us all. People and institutions from different nationalities and religions were thrown together and achieved a good degree of cooperation."

9.2. While some officials with major responsibilities in various front-line states had little previous experience with UN agencies, bilateral aid organizations, or NGOS, some were more knowledgeable. In Turkey, where government authorities were well aware of UNHCR's traditional insistence on the right of asylum, they requested actions of a kind that were unable to be performed such as discouraging the flow of refugees from Turkey.

9.3. It is probably not possible to avoid all the misunderstandings that arise in the heat of an emergency, given the organizational and cultural differences, the rapid turnover of UN and government staff, and the difficulty of finding aid personnel familiar with a specific context. Nevertheless, the UN could take greater initiative in bringing UN and government staff together in joint training and orientation workshops as well as in contingency planning exercises and other confidence- and team- building measures.

9.4. Such efforts could also serve to counteract the tendency to delay official requests for assistance, which have been essential to activate UN responses. Governments have been reluctant to request help because they feel that they can handle the emergency themselves and do not wish publicly to admit their inadequacy. Some have underestimated the scale of the need. In August of 1990 in Jordan, for example, it took about three weeks before governmental authorities formally requested UN help, by which time the influx of evacuees had reached crisis proportions. Some, like Iran which had fresh memories of problems associated with the 1990 earthquake response, did not wish to host a large contingent of international staff. Improved relationships would pave the way for more prompt requests and for better coordination in the early stages of emergencies.

10.1. The UN system has an expatriate bias. Crises, particularly those of the magnitude of the Gulf, exacerbate the tendency to import foreign experts, field workers, and relief items irrespective of the human and material resources available locally and of the potential contributions of indigenous institutions. This tendency leads to increased costs and prevents the country concerned from benefiting from commercial opportunities. It also narrows the potential for cooperation, coordination, and institution-building with national authorities and local populations.

10.2. The Turkish authorities and Red Crescent Society, for instance, found many aid personnel unaware that Turkey was a food surplus country with a substantial excess transport capacity. WFP, however, purchased food and, like IOM, contracted locally for transport. Aid agencies flew doctors into Jordan, a country with unemployed doctors of its own, at a cost ten times higher than local doctors' salaries. In Iraq, highly-qualified English-speaking members of the population competed for jobs as UN drivers and messengers, while very young and inexperienced expatriates were brought in by aid groups to undertake more demanding tasks.

10.3. Some aid agencies took advantage of the fact that local organizations are often more cost-effective than outside organizations and have a better understanding of local needs and opportunities. British ODA cooperation with Kurdish relief and reconstruction organizations provides an example of the value of a strategy of investing external inputs such as financial support and training to good effect. The strengthening of local capacity not only helps minimize the foreign nature of external aid and aid agencies; it also equips a country to cope better with future emergencies.

11.1. Working against centralized coordination by the United Nations in the Gulf crisis were a number of practices by donor governments. While these have characterized development assistance for sometime, their utilization in the context of the life threatening suffering of humanitarian emergencies appears particularly wasteful and inappropriate.

11.2. Four types of such difficulties were encountered throughout the Gulf. First, funds were earmarked for particular countries and programs, with the result that assistance was inequitably distributed according to geographical and sectoral priorities established in the various UN action plans. Within northern Iraq, for example, refugees returning to areas supported by British bilateral aid were accommodated in temporary camps with proper water and sanitation, while equally desperate returnees in nearby areas went without such facilities.

11.3. Second, donor governments often sought to micromanage funds allocated for very specific purposes. The insistence that aid, bilateral and multilateral alike, be directed toward a particular village, a particular project, or a particular NGO undermined the ability of UN officials to assure the balanced allocation of overall resources. Third, donor governments frequently required separate reporting on the use of their UN contributions, using forms and timetables specific to a given bilateral donor. Finally, donor governments frequently seemed more interested in the visibility of their presence, complete with media opportunities, than in the welfare of the displaced. UN officials sometimes felt that after the national flags had flown and the media coverage had run, governments turned over ongoing operations, problems and all, to the UN.

11.4. All of these practices reduced considerably the scope and effectiveness of the United Nations to maximize the use of relief assets. The UN is, of course, financially dependent on bilateral sources, perhaps nowhere more so than in humanitarian emergencies. Critical reactions, however justified, usually serve to jeopardize the willingness of donors and parliaments to support the UN system. The UN's ability to negotiate for more resources could be heightened by more effective performance in the field and better assessments that are dealt with elsewhere in this report; improving UN credibility is, in fact, a prerequisite for minimizing unconstructive bilateralism.

BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD F. CAMPBELL
COMMANDER
US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND
INCIRLIK, TURKEY

POLITICAL ISSUES

12.1. According to interviews with several military commanders, confirmed by a variety of UN and NGO officials, liaison with military headquarters posed major problems. There was usually no centralized UN base of operations in a particular theatre. When ongoing contacts between the UN and the military took place, the UN officials involved were often very junior in rank and unfamiliar with military practices.

12.2. The military held important assets, usually far superior in number and kind to those mobilized by the UN. (The comparative financial value of the assistance provided is suggested in Table 2 of Annex A.) Assistance from the military was much in demand, particularly among NGOS. In northern Iraq, for example, there were constant requests for space on military aircraft to facilitate the movement of personnel and supplies. Moreover, military communications and military unloading capabilities were required, even for aircraft that belonged to UN agencies and NGOS.

12.3. Major differences emerged in the Gulf between the "culture" of the military and that of other aid agencies. Military field commanders and staffs were equipped to deal with local authorities at the most senior policy making and executive levels. @le frequently overranked and over-qualified, senior officers were needed for negotiations; and promotions were facilitated by experience in combat zones.

In contrast, UN organizations and NGOs frequently attracted or dispatched junior and unseasoned personnel to the scene, where the challenge was greater and the day-to-day responsibilities more substantial than at headquarters; and career development may or may not be enhanced by experience in war zones.

12.4. In the Gulf crisis, there were numerous instances of junior officials from the UN or first-time NGO recruits dealing with colonels and sometimes generals. In addition to the differences in rank, UN and NGO officials frequently had little knowledge of military operations and culture. For their part, military staff tend to be somewhat insular and offputting to international civilian officials.

12.5. Military staff under the stress of combat had no time or patience to deal with multiple representations, too often from contacts who had no knowledge of standard military procedures. In this context, they found both the UN and NGOs difficult to deal with. More informed and sensitive personnel deployed by the aid agencies might have made for better working relationships with the military and, as a result, the more effective tapping of military resources.

13.1. The Gulf crisis, like others before it, demonstrated that it is extremely difficult for the UN system to meet the acute needs of large-scale and rapidly evolving humanitarian emergencies. Even when adequate funding is available, UN agencies have a very limited capacity to procure, transport, store, and distribute large amounts of assistance within a short time-frame. Thus the amount of blankets and tents which had been delivered to Iranian refugees by the UN at the end of April 1991 stood at roughly ten percent of the need.

13.2. At the same time, both governments and their militaries maintain routinely large stockpiles of items against war and disaster contingencies, including: relief items (e.g. tents, food, blankets, Meals Ready to eat, medicines); such specialist personnel as doctors, nurses, health workers; emergency service personnel (e.g. firemen and ambulance staff); and logistic support in the form of transport and communications facilities. The last category may, in fact, be the most important. The UN does not have direct access to fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and ships. The process of chartering such resources is time-consuming, expensive, and virtually impossible in wars where insurance coverage is non-existent.

13.3. The United Nations performed better as a political facilitator and resource coordinator than as a procurer and manager of resources. Governments, and especially their militaries, have a much greater capacity to mobilize and deploy resources, particularly in the logistics sector. At the same time, the cost-effectiveness of military assistance requires more detailed review. Cost notwithstanding, it is undeniable that without the intervention of the Allied Coalition and bilateral donors, the suffering and loss of life in the region would have been much higher.

SECTION C: UN COORDINATION AND NGOs

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

14.1. UN efforts to coordinate relationships with NGOs were undercut by the late arrival of UN personnel and programs on the scene. In the days following the appearance in early August 1990 of the first evacuees from Kuwait and Iraq at the Jordanian border, NGOs mobilized quickly. They established a coordinating committee which held daily meetings, providing an opportunity for sharing information and planning strategies. The Special High Committee for the Welfare of Evacuees was also meeting daily, drawing together key officials from many government ministries and backstopped by reports from the situation room in the basement of the Ministry of the Interior. The committee included two NGO representatives from the NGO coordinating group.

14.2. On the operational side, the ICRC set up the first camp near the Iraqi border. When it was overwhelmed with evacuees, local and international NGOs opened additional sites. The government dipped into its own stores of tents, food, and other emergency items, while embassies and local people in Amman donated foodstuffs that were trucked to the border. Local representatives of UN organizations with ongoing programs in Jordan were present and attended the coordinating meetings. UNICEF called in a shipment of blankets and other relief supplies that arrived the next day. However, the major actors in the critical initial weeks were the government and private relief groups and, in the area of transport, IOM. Any coordination attempts by the UN came after basic working relationships and activities had already been established.

14.3. The dynamic was much the same elsewhere in the region. In northern Iraq in April I991,NGOs and Allied Coalition troop were first on the scene. Given the sensitivity of UN agencies working in a country without government consent and, in UNHCR's case, given other concerns about the appropriateness of becoming involved at all, UN programs were slow to take shape. Meanwhile, the NGOs had taken the lead in organizing themselves and, as a group, were also participating regularly in coordination meetings run by the military. Criticized by NGOs initially for its absence from northern Iraq, UNHCR was later criticized for seeking to assert coordinating responsibility over activities that were well under way. A more productive coordination arrangement was devised in Diyarbakir, Turkey, where UNHCR established a coordination office with one full-time staff member which was used as a meeting place and information focal point by UN and NGO officials as well as military personnel.

14.4. There were also instances of programmatic collaboration between the UN and NGOS. One of the more creative was the secundment to UNHCR of short-term field staff by the governments and refugee councils of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. While the arrangements were not without difficulties in the area of placement, training, and accountability, the extra resources provided at the time of an emergency make the initiative one worth refining and structuring into the stand-by arrangements of other UN agencies as well.

15.1. NGO responses during the Gulf crisis suffered from a lack of coordination. This was particularly evident in Iran, where the government had assigned coordinating responsibilities of all NGO activities to the Iranian Red Crescent Society. The Society devised a plan whereby NGO resources from outside the country would be directed by road or air to particular areas, based on daily field assessments by its staff.

15.2. Inundated with private relief agencies and materiel, however, it soon lost control of the situation. NGOs went their own ways establishing their own access to regional and local government officials and proceeding directly to refugee camps. As a result, NGO assistance is now viewed as the least well coordinated and involved more waste than aid which came from governments and was coordinated, at the request of the Iranian authorities, by the UN. The most effectively coordinated assistance of all apparently was that channeled through the Iranian Red Crescent Society by the international Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Affiliated societies around the world have a history of coordinated action using agreed-upon procedures.

15.3. Similar problems, with even more serious consequences, developed in Iraq. Government authorities took a dim view of NGOs from the outset because most of them simply crossed the border from Turkey and started programs. When the situation had stabilized and NGOs were forced to deal with the government in Baghdad, the authorities insisted on closely monitoring their activities, restricting access to the countryside, and delaying or denying visas. The lack of coordination among the NGOs meant that they were unable to present a common front to the Iraqi authorities. As a result, NGO activities of major consequence in Iraq now face an uncertain future.

15.4. A lack of coordination also marred NGO relations with the UN. There was little sense among NGOs of humanitarian principles shared with the UN or of mutuality with it. At the same time, NGOs looked to the UN to plead their case with governments, to provide financial resources and transport, and, in case of medical or political emergencies, to evacuate NGO personnel. The UN did its best to meet NGO expectations but found the relationship rather one-sided. A united front might also have been helpful to NGOs in dealing with the UN itself.

15.5. The prevailing picture of NGOs in the Gulf crisis is thus one of energy and determination, mixed with confusion and disarray. Examples of insensitivity abound: of food that was unacceptable to local tastes and Muslim sensitivities, of offensive staff deportment, of proselytization and unseemly jockeying for visibility and exposure, of commercialism and opportunism. Jordanian authorities found it difficult "to distinguish the charlatan from the humanitarian. Much time was expended in briefing so many (NGO officials) who gave empty promises and were never seen again." While every high-visibility international relief effort is marred by similar problems, in the case of the Gulf they reinforced the view of many in the region that the international community was less than fully serious about providing effective assistance.

15.6. Problems such as these lend urgency to efforts already underway among NGOs to develop codes of conduct for international and indigenous aid practitioners. Codes covering both policies and practices would not only increase the professionalism of NGO efforts but allow the NGO community to deal in more coordinated and effective ways with governments and the UN. While such codes would be voluntary in nature and would not eliminate all problems like those in the Gulf crisis, they would increase the effectiveness of aid activities and contribute to public confidence.

15.7. Based on the experience in the Gulf and other recent humanitarian emergencies, a prototype Memorandum or Letter of Understanding between the UN and NGOs would facilitate the delivery of private aid in emergencies. It could address the extent to which the UN would be expected to coordinate NGO activities, the issues on which the UN would be expected to liaise on behalf of NGOs with governments, and the kinds of resources to be made available. NGOs would accept certain discipline and responsibility vis-à-vis the UN. A prototype could be adapted to new situations as they arise, sparing UN and NGO officials the task during an actual emergency of devising anew the terms of their relationship. NGOs would be free to choose whether or not to enter into such an agreement, with costs and benefits ensuing from their choice.

15.8. The UN's coordinating role vis-à-vis the International Committee of the Red Cross is something of a special case. Recognized by name in international humanitarian law and functioning around the world within a clearly formulated set of policies and procedures, the ICRC cooperates fully with the UN but does not seek or accept UN coordination of its activities. "You don't have to be married to be in love," say ICRC staff in explaining why they support the UN's humanitarian principles but insist on maintaining distance from the political context in which it functions.

15.9. In the Gulf crisis the ICRC played a major humanitarian role throughout the region which, because it did not fall within the coordination ambit of the UN, does not figure prominently in this report. Because of the ICRC's involvement in humanitarian and prisoner-of-war matters during the Iran-Iraq war and because of its studied efforts to nurture independent relationships with Iraqi government authorities, its activities in northern and southern Iraq alike did not suffer from many of the problems experienced by UN organizations and NGOS. In UN General Assembly debates and private conversations, ICRC officials express the concern that under the rubric of increasing the coordination and efficiency of UN relief activities, powerful donor governments may be exposing the humanitarian work of the UN, and agencies associated with it, to direct political manipulation.

POLITICAL ISSUES

16. NGO Cooperation with the Military

16.l. The military forces of donor governments played a major role in relieving life-threatening human suffering during the Gulf crisis. The involvement of US troops in Operation Provide Comfort was well publicized during Phase Ill. The use of troops and transport from other Allied Coalition nations such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Belgium is less widely known.

16.2. Many NGOs established mutually beneficial working relationships with military forces. In many instances, these represented the first such interactions. NGOs in northern Iraq were included in regular briefings by Operation Provide Comfort, availed themselves of military telecommunications and transport, and, in a broad sense, used the protective cover provided by the Allied Coalition to carry out humanitarian activities. One seasoned NGO veteran of a generation of major international emergencies expressed his surprise and pleasure at the productiveness of the cooperation. At the same time, NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), after surveying the situation on the ground and discussions with US officials, opted out of collaborative work with the military in the human needs sphere. Eventually CRS, with the consent of the Baghdad authorities, was able to work in Kurdish- as well as government-controlled areas.

16.3. A number of factors help explain the generally positive working relationships which evolved. The first was doubtless the scale of military resources and the UN's relative invisibility, at least at the beginning of the Kurdish emergency. As indicated in Table 2 in Annex A, the costs of Operation Provide Comfort alone were more than double all contributions to the UN from all countries in Phase III. A second factor was that the basic discipline and organization injected by the military into a fluid situation gave the NGOs a firm point of reference. Third, NGOs perceived the military as an ally in their efforts to assist a persecuted minority group. Finally, the fact that Operation Provide Comfort had an unusually high number of personnel drawn from the reserves and national guard with competence in areas such as civil administration and engineering contributed to the professionalism of the relationships.

16.4. Given increased discussions in international circles of the possibility of making similar use of military forces in future humanitarian emergencies, it would be timely for NGOs to reflect on the experience of the Gulf. Whether NGOs choose to cooperate with the military or to keep their distance, there are lessons to be distilled. Those factors that contributed to the generally positive results should be identified. The uncertain future of NGO humanitarian activities in northern Iraq, in part because of their association with the Allied Coalition, also needs to be taken into account.

SECTION D:

17.1. The attempt to enhance the coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian programs by posting SUNEMs in each of the affected countries of the region failed to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of the UN's diverse humanitarian organizations. By extension, the question arises whether the authority granted the new Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs will facilitate effective leadership and management-like coordination. If his tasks are viewed as those of a "super-SUNEM," leaving intact the existing missions and mandates of the organizations of the UN system, the results in the area of coordination may be equally unsatisfactory.

17.2. At the same time, investing sufficient authority and accountability for crises in a single individual in a given country or region would require fundamental constitutional changes throughout the UN system., At present, creative efforts are underway to utilize such mechanisms as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Emergencies to harmonize mandates and address other problems identified in this report. The report itself, however, raises the possibility of a different mechanism.

17.3. Rather than adopting the traditional approach of harmonizing the overlapping mandates and missions of independent institutions, the point of departure could be that of the needs to be addressed in the post-Cold War era. While the fundamental changes which this would require in existing institutions are perhaps unlikely, the Gulf experience suggests that reforms any less sweeping may fail to enable the UN to provide the effective coordination upon which governments are increasingly insisting.

17.4. The diplomacy of the Security Council was decisive in reversing Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, but economic sanctions and military force in the Gulf produced major negative humanitarian consequences. The humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq saved lives but has yet to produce durable benefits for those in need. Further thought should be given to the conditions under which the application of force may serve humanitarian objectives and, at a more profound level, to the extent to which the resort to force should remain a legitimate instrument of international policy.

17.5. Humanitarian activities in the Gulf bore a heavy burden as a result of UN-approved military force, implemented by the Allied Coalition. These first enforcement actions of the post-Cold War era made use of massive fire-power and sophisticated weaponry not mobilized hitherto. The United Nations, however, did not participate in any control, command, or monitoring capacities once it had taken the pivotal political decisions. The feasibility of mounting future operations under fully multilateral command and control needs to be explored. UN- related military actions, undertaken and carried out with due regard to humanitarian consequences, might prove both more accountable and more effective.

PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION A. TO THE UNITED NATIONS

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Recommendation 1: In the interest of more responsive and better coordinated activities, the UN and its organizations should delegate greater authority and responsibility from headquarters to the field.

Recommendation 2: The Department of Humanitarian Affairs should gather, analyze, and share data alerting all parties on a regular basis to changing emergency situations and take the lead in drawing UN organizations together to formulate action plans. It should then launch consolidated appeals for emergencies and allocate resources throughout the UN system.

Recommendation 3: From the outset of emergencies, the expertise of development-oriented organizations of the UN system should be brought into play. Necessary financial and technical resources should be mobilized to assure that the full panoply of UN support addresses needs related to and flowing from emergencies.

Recommendation 4: To meet the exigencies of emergencies, all UN entities concerned should develop and implement common emergency procedures regarding procurement, staffing, and accountability.

Recommendation 5: For the duration of a major emergency, the designation of a single individual in a given country or region is required to assure effective coordination of and accountability for the UN's humanitarian concerted response.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Recommendation 6: Before the Security Council decides on economic sanctions and military enforcement actions with potentially major humanitarian consequences, the views of UN organizations with humanitarian competence and responsibilities should be given serious consideration. Proceeding with such action would commit the UN system to respond fully to their consequences.

SECTION B. TO GOVERNMENTS

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Recommendation 7: The UN should acknowledge that governments of a region in crisis constitute the first-line of the international response to emergencies and ensure that the principles of joint planning and reciprocal accountability are observed in UN-coordinated emergency operations.

Recommendation 8: In anticipating the complementary roles that the UN system and host political authorities play in humanitarian emergency operations, memoranda of understanding should be negotiated in advance of crises between the parties, setting out respective rights and responsibilities.

Recommendation 9: The UN should initiate confidence-building measures to familiarize appropriate government authorities with UN principles, procedures, and structures, including team-building activities at the country level. Governments should thereby be encouraged to request international assistance, where needed, from the outset of humanitarian emergencies.

Recommendation 10: The UN should ensure that local human and material resources are fully utilized during emergency operations and that steps are taken to strengthen indigenous institutions, public and private alike.

Recommendation 11: Donor governments should provide resources in ways that facilitate rather than obstruct the coordinating role of the UN so that such resources can be flexibly and effectively incorporated into concerted responses.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Recommendation 12: In dealing with military headquarters, the UN liaison function should represent the UN system as a whole and be carried out by an appropriately senior official familiar with the military procedures and operations.

Recommendation 13: Civil and military resources with humanitarian potential should be made available by governments to the United Nations within the framework of UN objectives and activities. To facilitate their rapid mobilization and deployment, standby arrangements should be negotiated with potential contributing governments.

SECTION C. TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Recommendation 14: UN coordination efforts vis-a-vis NGOs require that the UN itself respond more quickly to emergencies. The coordination efforts themselves should aim at facilitating information exchange and productive NGO relations with the UN and governments rather than at directing NGO activities.

Recommendation 15: In the interest of improving coordination and increasing effectiveness, international and indigenous NGOs should devise and implement voluntary codes of conduct. A prototype letter of association between the UN and interested NGOs should also be developed.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Recommendation 16: In the light of recent experience in the Gulf and other emergencies, NGOs should review their policies and procedures regarding collaboration with military forces.

Recommendation 17: Discussion and action should address major issues emerging from the international humanitarian response to the Gulf crisis. These include the following:

UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL

Bernt Bernander, Representative of the Executive Delegate, Baghdad, Iraq

Jeurgen Dedring, Office for Research & Collection of Information, UN, New York

Hans Einhaus, Senior UN Emergency Officer, Amman, Jordan and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Baghdad, Iraq

Gualtiero Fulcheri, Coordinator, UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, Baghdad, Iraq

James O.C. Jonah, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, New York

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special Representative and Executive Delegate of the UN Secretary-General, Geneva

Hiroshi Matsumoto, Deputy Coordinator, UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, Baghdad, Iraq

Staffan de Mistura, Office of the Executive Delegate, Turkey and Iraq

Henrik Olesen, Director, Office of the Executive Delegate, Geneva

Gerhard J.W. Putman-Cramer, Office of the Executive Delegate, Geneva

Roy E. Skinner, Principal Operations Advisor, UN Iraq Relief Coordination Unit, Baghdad, Iraq

Michael Stopford, Office of the Executive Delegate, UN, New York

UN DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (DHA)

Philippe L. Boullé, Senior UN Emergency Manager, Amman and Ankara

Jacques Cuénod, Senior UN Emergency Manager, Ankara, Turkey

Oto Denes, Office of the Executive Delegate and Special Unit on Iraq, DHA, Geneva

Jan Eliasson, UN Under-Secretary-General For Humanitarian Affairs, DHA, New York

Paul Hébert, Senior Programme Officer, DHA/Special Unit for Iraq, Geneva

Charles LaMunière, Director, DHA/UNDRO, Geneva

Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel, Director, DHA/UNDRO, Geneva

Sabine R. Metzner-Strack, Relief Coordination Officer, DHA/UNDRO, Geneva

Sergio Piazzi, Programme Coordinator, DHA/UNDRO, Geneva

Hans Zimmerman, Programme Coordinator DHA/UNDRO, Geneva

UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

Ali Attiga, Resident Representative, UNDP, Amman, Jordan

S. Bourgini, Resident Representative, UNDP, Baghdad, Iraq

E.J. Cain, Resident Representative, UNDP, Ankara, Turkey

H.R. Ghaffarzadeh, Resident Representative, UNDP, Teheran, Iran

Nadia Hijab, Programme Officer, Arab and Middle East States Bureau, UNDP, New York

K.L. Hla, Resident Representative, UNDP, Damascus, Syria

K. Philby, Resident Representative, UNDP, Kuwait City, Kuwait

Mohammad H. Pournik, Programme Officer, UNDP, Teheran, Iran

Michael Priestley, Senior Advisor to the UNDP Administrator, Member of various missions to the Persian Gulf, New York

Michael v.d. Schulenberg, UNDP Resident Representative, Iran, and formerly Sernior UN Emergency Officer, Damascus

Rafik Shukor, UNDP Resident Representative a.i., Amman, Jordan, Syria

Mary Gibney-Stuart, Administration/Logistics Officer, UNGCI, Baghdad

Henrik Lehmann, Senior Operations Officer, UNGCI, Baghdad

Paavo Pitkanen, Chief, UNGCI, Baghdad

David Rajkumar, Movcon Officer, UNGCI, Baghdad

Umberto Ravalico, Chief, UNGCI, Baghdad

Costas Trachanatzis, Associate Chief, UNGCI, Baghdad

UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

Majid Aloui, MD, UNHCR Representative, Damascus, Syria

Omar Bakhet, Charg6 de Mission, UNHCR, Teheran, Iran

Louis Barbeau, Senior Organization and Methods Officer, UNHCR, Geneva

D. Carminati, MD, Deputy Representative, UNHCR, Ankara, Turkey

Susan Carroll, Emergency Management Officer, UNHCR, Incirlik, Turkey

Shun Chetty, Deputy Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, Geneva

Janvier de Riedmatten, UNHCR Representative, Amman, Jordan

Aiman Ghraibeh, Temporary Field Assistant, UNHCR, El Hall, Syria

Kate Jastram, Legal Advisor, Protection Division, UNHCR, Geneva

Janet Lim, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section, UNHCR, Geneva

Ekber Menemencioglu, Senior Programme Officer, UNHCR, Geneva

Izimi Nakamitsu, Liaison Officer, UNHCR, Incirlik, Turkey

Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner, UNHCR, Geneva

Pierre-Franqois Pirlot, Deputy Chief of Mission, UNHCR, Baghdad

Aziz Sami, Field Representative, UNHCR, Orumiyeh, Iran

Nader Soufi, Field Assistant, UNHCR, Orumiyeh, Iran

P. Volker, Assistance and Protection Officer, UNHCR, Kuwait

P. Winingen, Project Officer, UNHCR, Kuwait City, Kuwait

UN CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

Gullmar Andersson, Chief, Emergency Unit, UNICEF, Geneva

Nigel Fisher, Deputy Regional Director, Regional Office for the Middle East And North Africa, UNICEF, Amman, Jordan

Mahasent Hapte-Mariam, Project Officer, Middle East and North Africa Section, UNICEF, New York

Tuma Hazou, Chief of External Relations Regional Office for the Middle East And North Africa, UNICEF, Amman, Jordan

Reza Hossaini, MD, Assistant Representative