The tragedies of the past decade have shaken humanitarians to the core. The mere mention of Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone profoundly disturbs their composure. Traumas in these countries have become synonymous with the dilemmas of humanitarian action, that is, with international attempts to help victims through the provision of relief and the protection of their human rights.

Until recently, the two most essential humanitarian principles–neutrality (not taking sides with warring parties) and impartiality (nondiscrimination and proportionality)–have been relatively uncontroversial, as has the key operating procedure of seeking consent from belligerents.' However, a host of developments in the 1990s has altered this attitude toward humanitarian action. These include the complete disregard for international humanitarian law by war criminals and even by child soldiers, the direct targeting of civilians and relief personnel, the use of foreign aid to fuel conflicts and war economies, and the protracted nature of many so-called emergencies that in fact last for decades. The result has been a collective identity crisis among aid workers in war zones as well as among those who analyze such efforts.

Founded in 1864, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), through its apolitical practices and principles, has shined as the beacon of humanitarianism. In 1986 the International Court of Justice chose not even to define humanitarianism but rather to equate it with the work of the ICRC. The father of the organization's Fundamental Principles, Jean Pictet, defined each principle as "a rule, based upon judgment and experience, which is adopted by a community to guide its conduct."² In addition to providing life-saving ministrations, the ICRC has pushed governments to adopt the rules of war: indeed, it fulfills a unique role as the custodian of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The ICRC's prominence among humanitarian agencies is suggested by its having won four Nobel Peace Prizes.

Yet in many ways, international humanitarian law seems to have been formulated mainly to deal with a different world from today's–a world populated by governments and regular armies whose interests were served by adhering to the rules of warfare. Concepts once widely respected, especially domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty, have been breached even by humanitarians; for instance, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at times have been among the most numerous and vociferous proponents of military intervention, a position quite inconceivable a decade ago.

In today's environment, humanitarian tragedies have become "normal." Cynics even view them as growth opportunities for aid agencies, while others see winners as well as losers in a new international political economy of war.³ Severe criticism of the aid establishment in general and relief agencies in particular has fueled the identity crisis experienced by humanitarians and analysts and has polarized debate.⁴

Understanding the differences between two groups of humanitarians is crucial: "classicists," led by the ICRC, who believe that humanitarian action can and should be completely insulated from politics; and "political humanitarians," who believe that political and humanitarian action "could not and should not be disassociated."⁵ I place myself in the latter camp.

Even classicists increasingly acknowledge the need for parallel, politically savvy action. According to ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga, "humanitarian, political, and development actors manage crisis in a comprehensive manner."⁶ Thus, in the words of the ICRC's chief medical officer, projects must be "specifically tailored to the needs [of victims] while minimizing the undesirable effects of aid."⁷ This is a rhetorical step beyond earlier acknowledgments by the ICRC that its activities sometimes have political implications. The organization still maintains an apolitical veneer, however, and is unwilling publicly to admit that its principles should be adapted to political exigencies, although it has commissioned a new volume about "hard choices."⁸ David Forsythe has consistently argued that the ICRC has always pursued "humanitarian politics– the struggle to implement humanitarian values as part of public policy."⁹ At the same time, the organization has underestimated the impact of two other types of politics, realpolitik among states and factional politics within them.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata notes that "political and humanitarian actors are uncomfortable bedfellows," an apt image for this awkward reality because politics and humanitarianism are intimately intertwined.¹⁰ As a result, classical proponents of apolitical humanitarianism increasingly encounter problems in relating to those political humanitarians pursuing either "minimalist" or "maximalist" objectives. Minimalists aim to "do no harm," whereas maximalists have a more ambitious agenda of employing humanitarian action as part of a comprehensive strategy to transform conflict.

Classicists have always disagreed adamantly with a third group of political humanitarians–"solidarists," who choose sides and abandon neutrality and impartiality as well as reject consent as a prerequisite for intervention. Although solidarists first appeared in the Spanish Civil War, the most visible contemporary representatives are Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, who were established as a "counter" ICRC in the midst of the Biafran civil war by a group of ICRC field staff who could no longer abide by the organization's principles. The judgment of these renegade ICRC professionals that the application of traditional principles did more harm than good for the Ibos foreshadowed the current debate.

In many contemporary conflicts, humanitarians find neutrality and impartiality problematic at best and impossible at times. They also encounter serious difficulties in seeking the consent of numerous and undisciplined belligerents whose antics often have led to coercive economic and military sanctions. Even when they attempt to be neutral and impartial, aid agencies often are perceived to favor one side over the other. Here, though, "political humanitarianism" refers to conscious decisions to employ humanitarian action as an integral part of an international public policy to mitigate life-threatening suffering and protect fundamental human rights in active wars.

THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF HUMANITARIANS

AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADITIONAL OPERATING PRINCIPLES

(diagram not available online)

It is useful to situate humanitarians along the analytical spectrum depicted above. The diagram locates classicists, minimalists, maximalists, and solidarists according to their degree of political involvement and their willingness to respect traditional principles. From left to right, the scale indicates low to high political involvement, from the extremes of no political ties at all to complete identification with victims by fervent proponents. Humanitarian action for each group from left to right on the diagram is respectively: warranted as long as it is charitable and self-contained, defined only by the needs of victims and divorced from political objectives and conditionalities; worthwhile if efforts to relieve suffering do not make matters worse and can be sustained locally; defensible when coupled with steps to address the roots of violence and as part of a conscious and comprehensive political strategy; and justifiable when siding with the main victims. A blurring of categories is inevitable because the four positions are not hard and fast, but are tempered by realities on the ground.

Nonetheless, these ideal types are helpful in understanding the current acrimony in international discourse, the focus of the first section of this essay. They also provide useful background for the second section, which examines why humanitarians feel such a sense of despair and defeat in the face of recent tragedies. The pros and cons of impartial versus political humanitarianism and the differing approaches by the four kinds of actors on the spectrum are the subject of the third section of the essay.

In their most straightforward form, contemporary criticisms of humanitarian practices range from moderate analyses about how to reform the international humanitarian system to fundamental questions about whether it is worthy of reform at all. Possible responses from aid agencies range from making the existing system more effective and thereby rekindling the trust of donors and recipients to revamping the conceptual basis of what it means to be "humanitarian" and making humanitarian action as relevant to problem solving and conflict management as it is to natural disasters. Representatives across the spectrum agree that substantial alterations in past practices are required: few foresee a return to the "good old days" when neutrality, impartiality, and consent were unquestioned tactics.

I situate myself to the right of center on the spectrum, but I do not believe that humanitarian action is anachronistic. Traditional principles may be helpful in one context, but in others, hard-headed and hard-hearted calculations–including triage and "tough love"–are more relevant than a formulaic recitation of the classical humanitarian mantra. Andrew Natsios has argued persuasively in these pages that "the advocates of neutrality are losing ground in the debate."¹¹ But within the same theater of conflict, classicist principles and the call to intervene can clash. Leading the charge is usually MSF, the most visible and vocal of the solidarists, arguing that agencies should employ humanitarian action within a political strategy on behalf of victims. The ICRC position is giving way to the notion that the two types of action–political and humanitarian–cannot and should not be dissociated. This shift was remarkably stated in a background document for the second ICRC Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum: "It is difficult to imagine how humanitarian assistance could remain fully neutral in complex emergencies."¹²

Recent complex emergencies have given rise to a clarion call for improved collaboration and perhaps integration among the "intervention trio" of the military, the political and diplomatic elements, and the humanitarian agencies. As a guide to action, the "do no harm" position of minimalists seems hard to dismiss on logical grounds alone. Furthermore, it is plausible that humanitarian help as part of an ambitious political package, as recommended by maximalists, could ultimately relieve more life-threatening suffering than similar help in a political vacuum, however effectively it is delivered.¹³ Many situations require calculations with which few are comfortable and by which many will be appalled.¹⁴

Cornelio Sommaruga and Adam Roberts caution that "we should not be too hasty in announcing that barbarism is back."¹⁵ I am tempted to ask when it disappeared. David Rieff has asserted that ignoring the resurgence in grisly violence is a "humanitarian illusion" and that "disillusionment is the beginning of wisdom in the analysis of this terrible reality, this time of piety and iron."¹⁶ A striking fact of contemporary international society is that the number of individuals and organizations fostering humanitarian norms and action has risen dramatically, along with media attention to the plight of victims. The paradox is that barbarism has kept pace. In the words of the late historian Eric Hobsbawm, there has been a "return to what our nineteenth-century ancestors would have called the standards of barbarism."¹⁷

Traditional humanitarian principles are now under siege. The extent to which they can be applied depends on the context. Classicists are becoming aware of the unacceptable results of applying neutrality, impartiality, and consent when dealing with unprincipled actors in a variety of armed conflicts. Humanitarian action has never been easy, but abiding strictly by traditional principles used to be a better tactical guide to sustaining the vast majority of impulses to rescue war victims than it is today. Although this approach led to dissension in ICRC ranks and the creation of MSF, in the late 1960s it was possible for classicists to view the Biafran civil war as anomalous and to dismiss the claims of dissenters. But in the post-Cold War period, Biafras have become routine, and classicists are obliged to engage in a conversation with representatives from most of the spectrum of political humanitarians.

In many war zones, context is as important as principles because the latter often clash. Thoughtful reflection thus has come to assume a growing role relative to visceral reaction. At the beginning of this decade and in the face of new challenges in Kurdistan and Bosnia, Larry Minear and I spelled out an alternative to the ICRC's practices, the Providence Principles, which are more flexible than the classical ones.¹⁸ This approach was a step toward modifying established rules to guide the conduct of humanitarians in a new and troubled period. The ICRC's own Fundamental Principles are not immutable, although this is frequently overlooked. Last modified in 1965 during "an orgy of rule-making," these principles may be adapted when necessary to reflect the changing nature of war, humanitarian agencies, and donor policies.¹⁹

Operational principles thus are not moral absolutes. Whether from the ICRC or other agencies, they are norms toward which to strive, but without the illusion that their application is possible in every situation or that their success is guaranteed. They are means to achieve ends but not ends in themselves. Differences exist in the interpretation given to principles by various individuals and agencies, in the importance of some relative to others, and in the extent to which a given principle or set of principles will prevail in particular circumstances. The need for case-by-case judgments has been reinforced by recent experience. From sustaining vulnerable groups in the African Great Lakes region while feeding thugs and fueling the war to moving threatened populations in Bosnia while facilitating ethnic cleansing, operational situations in the 1990s have been tortuous–for victims as well as their humanitarian benefactors.

Because morally wrenching contexts are now the rule rather than the exception, it is increasingly difficult for humanitarians to occupy unequivocally the moral high ground. For those few on pedestals, it is a precarious perch. Michael Ignatieff anguishes that "almost everyone who tries . . . has a bad conscience; no one is quite sure whether our engagement makes things better or worse."²⁰ Bill Maynes recommends "ethical realpolitik" as an alternative for American foreign policy.²¹ Mark Duffield calls for a "new ethics of working in political crises . . . [where] 'good guys' no longer exist."²² Joanna Macrae states, "The idea that it is easy to distinguish the bad guy from the good woman and child is no longer sustainable."²³ Evoking Dante's Inferno, where the hottest room was reserved for those who vacillated, a Norwegian research group confronts the distinct possibility that "neutrality is a form of moral bankruptcy."²⁴

To date, responses to these critics have often been semantic gymnastics, stretching concepts to such a degree that they become meaningless. For example, the UN secretary-general and others utilize the oxymoron "induced consent,"²⁵ while Hugo Slim calls for a "robust form of impartiality which allows them [NGOs and UN forces] not just to dish out relief in proportion to needs, but also to dish out criticism (advocacy) or military bombardment in proportion to human rights wrong doing."²⁶

What is the value of principles if problems are not uniform across war zones, and if neutrality, impartiality, and consent may be more or less pertinent depending on the qpe and phase of an armed conflict? The clear articulation of principles provides an emergency brake on the slippery slope of shameless opportunism. When principles bump into one another, compromise and tough trade-offs are inevitable; but those who deviate from principles should be aware of the costs. Humanitarians who are clear about the costs of departing from principles undoubtedly will be more successful in helping and protecting victims than those who have none or who are inflexible. The only absolute principle is the respect for human life. Other principles are standard operating procedures reflecting empirical judgments about experience. They amount to finding ways to make things happen in individual situations.

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term "dilemma" to describe painful decision making; but "quandary" would be more apt.²⁷ A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the lesser of evils.

Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict; good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called "instrumental humanitarianism" would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required.²⁸ Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.

Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda–and especially those involving economic or military sanctions– required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that "given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem."²⁹ Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualize their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet's "indivisible whole" because humanitarian principles "are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive.... It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others."³⁰

The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by "clinical ethical review teams" whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.³¹ The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.

Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.³² The evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post-Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don't. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a "moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.³³

This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, "The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so."³⁴ Gwyn Prins has pointed to the "scary humility of admitting one's ignorance" because "the new vogue for 'complex emergencies' is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on."³⁵ To make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast.

International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference.

Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: "Don't just do something, stand there!"³⁶ This advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

Searing experiences have led to such a voluminous literature that analysts are now categorizing the types of criticism.³⁷ Countless conferences and internal agency debates indicate a cultural change under way in institutional behavior as practitioners grapple to comprehend the ugly terrains where they operate, to put what they are doing into a political context rather than react viscerally with the hope that good intentions alone will suffice. Even the most critical of critics, Alex de Waal, observes that "as critiques of humanitarianism become more common and more accepted, some thoughtful agency staff are becoming more questioning."³⁸

"Humanitarianism" means helping and protecting victims irrespective of who and where they are and why they are in need. The three main types of "politics" are: the competition among states for survival and supremacy and for maximizing national interests in an anarchical world (realpolitik); the struggle for power and influence within donor and crisis states (partisan or factional politics depending on the existence of democratic rules or the law of the jungle); and efforts to agree upon desirable international public policies within governmental, intergovernmental, and nongoverrnmental arenas. Humanitarians have a stake in political outcomes at every level, and their actions influence and are influenced by such outcomes.

The intersection of politics and humanitarianism–obvious to elected officials, pundits, and political scientists but not to classicists–alters considerably the usual procedure of seeking consent from belligerents and respecting neutrality and impartiality.³⁹ Much contemporary humanitarian action occurs in countries torn by civil war (that is, in countries of origin and not of asylum) where civilians are targets and outside military forces are sometimes deployed despite objections from sovereign authorities. Outside resources–usually favoring one side (or so perceived)–are actively fought over by local factions, and have unintended and unanticipated negative consequences. Because civilians are now prime targets instead of accidental victims, humanitarians often are obliged to confront those responsible for massive abuses of fundamental rights. In 1992 Jarat Chopra and I wrote in this journal, "Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct."⁴⁰ A fitting corollary in 1999 is "Humanitarian principles are no longer sacrosanct."

The sanctity of human life is the first principle of all humanitarians and overrides other considerations; but neutrality, impartiality, and consent are second-order principles that may or may not be accurate tactical guides. Traditional principles were developed as means to safeguard life, but they no longer provide unequivocal guidance and should be modified when necessary. Classicists disagree with this conclusion, but not with the painful reality suggested by such conference titles as "Principled Aid in an Unprincipled World," which was sponsored in April 1998 in London by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

In a 1997 speech, ICRC President Sommaruga pointed to the need for dialogue among humanitarian and political players because they have "different roles but complementary responsibilities."4' The argument here is different. Whether these players are dealing with the disproportionate burdens on vulnerable groups of economic sanctions, the complications from military enforcement, or the need to balance tensions between protection of human rights and access, they face not only intense interactions and complementary responsibilities but also clashes between political and humanitarian imperatives.

It is crucial to flush out differences and not airbrush them away. The assumption that politics and humanitarianism can be entirely separated, as if they were parts of two different and self-contained worlds, is a fiction. The "dark side" of humanitarian action would include: food and other aid usurped by belligerents to sustain a war economy (for example, in Liberia); assistance that has given legitimacy to illegitimate political authorities, particularly those with a guns economy (for example, in Somalia); aid distribution patterns that have influenced the movement of refugees (for example, in eastern Zaire); resource allocations that have promoted the proliferation of aid agencies and created a wasteful aid market that encourages parties to play organizations against one another (for example, in Afghanistan); elites that have benefited from the relief economy (for example, in Bosnia); and resources that have affected strategic equilibriums (for example, in Sierra Leone).

There is also a subtle and oft-ignored "bright side" of humanitarian action in that humanitarians can exert a modest positive influence on peace building and conflict resolution. Humanitarians can play diplomatic roles by taking advantage of their local connections and knowledge to build bridges among warring parties. Rehabilitation and development undoubtedly can take place concurrently with relief, particularly in parts of a country where relative peace is present. Finally, and although it has been minimized in both analyses and budgetary allocations, enhanced protection of human rights also can result from the mere presence of outside humanitarians and military forces.

In brief, reflection is becoming a priority for the staff of most aid agencies, wherever they are on the spectrum of humanitarianism. The laudable action-oriented humanitarian ethos is being tempered with more consideration of missions, mandates, performance, operating styles, and results. Complexity is not an excuse for complacency or a pretext to abandon large numbers of people to their Hobbesian fate in civil wars, but it does introduce elements of confusion and frustration in the formerly more certain and straightforward worldview of humanitarians. Contemporary complex emergencies can and must be understood better, just as humanitarian agencies can and must train and equip their personnel to be more effective.

What are the pros and cons of impartial versus political humanitarianism, and what form do differences in approach take in designing assistance and protection activities? Although agencies frequently have performed well under arduous circumstances, the disastrous consequences of much contemporary humanitarian action constitute a serious enough indictment of past procedures to force a thorough reexamination of how all humanitarian agencies approach their work in war zones. Classicists, whose impulses and mores have compelled them to respond automatically to the plight of victims in the past, now face a painful quandary. If the objective of relieving suffering suffices, there is no reason to scrutinize the short- or longer term impacts of assistance–responding with one's heart and guts is adequate. However, if impacts beyond the immediate intervention are as or more important than the immediate relief of suffering, then a painful process of questioning should begin. Classicists are obliged to take adequately into account the results of the realpolitik calculations by states, factional politics within war zones and partisan politics in donor countries, and outcomes of international public policy debates. Honest questions should be asked about engagement and disengagement. Rushing immediately to the scene of a disaster is not preordained. Doing nothing is an option.

Reflections and not reflexes are required because, in David Rieff's words, "despite the best intentions of aid workers, and at times because of them, they become logisticians in the war efforts of warlords, fundamentalists, gangsters, and ethnic cleansers."⁴² The 1998 background document for the second off-the-record Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum organized by the ICRC was less poignant but similar in its conclusion: "Aid in complex emergencies is always determined by a highly politicized context and has political implications itself, whether as a direct consequence of its provision or by way of intentional or unintentional side-effects."⁴³

The "good Samaritan" figures prominently in ICRC documentation, and many humanitarians agree implicitly or explicitly with Sommaruga's biblical interpretation and his perennial praise for apolitical humanitarianism as an "act of charity."⁴⁴ Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians praises charity as the greatest of virtues, but John Hutchinson has criticized the "champions of charity" on the grounds that they helped make war more palatable.⁴⁵

In light of substantial evidence of the counterproductive effects of well-intentioned humanitarian action, there are still other reasons to question visceral charity. Altruism should infuse debate but not constitute policy. It is impermissible to cede to virtue if it hinders rather than helps a political solution, leads to more violence and conflict, supports unduly the growth of a war economy, or undermines local coping capacities. Classical humanitarianism may seem unequivocally noble, but counterproductive efforts are uncharitable. Benign motivations are insufficient if the results are dreadful–just as selfish motivations are sufficient if the results are beneficial. Alain Destexhe, former secretary-general of the international office of MSF and now president of the International Crisis Group and member of the Belgian Senate, argues: "Humanitarian action is noble when coupled with political action and justice. Without them, it is doomed to failure and . . . a conscience-salving gimmick."⁴⁶

Although politics and humanitarianism are inextricably linked, senior ICRC officials continue publicly to defend the apolitical fiction.⁴⁷ Anything added to or subtracted from the traditional mandate of saving lives allegedly diminishes the humanitarian mission. There is no need to denigrate unselfish acts or compassion and courage. Analysts should be clear, however, that classicists do not engage in the task of–indeed they remain agnostic about–linking emergency help to the longer-term requirements of bringing a society back to some type of equilibrium. Their claims are limited to saving lives and reducing suffering today, to a discrete incrementalism that can be praised or lambasted as the "one more blanket" theory.⁴⁸ This reality creates serious problems for classicists in coming to grips with minimalist and maximalist objectives of a more conscious political humanitarianism, and it continues to compel classicists to reject out-of-hand the approach of solidarists.

The minimalist approach, associated especially with the work of Mary Anderson,⁴⁹ allows the ICRC and other classicists to engage in a conversation in order to determine the conditions under which it is possible, in two recent formulations, "to do good without doing harm" or "to do the least harm."⁵⁰ Both classicists and minimalists acknowledge that poorly designed humanitarian action can promote or nourish violence. Thus, project design and implementation should take into account, for instance, such matters as the location and lighting of women's latrines, which can reduce dramatically instances of rape. Moreover, they should ensure, to the extent possible, that projects take advantage of development possibilities that could be sustainable once expatriates and external resources evaporate. Public relations and speeches emanating from Geneva notwithstanding, the most savvy field staff of the ICRC already act on such insights. In many ways, this is common sense for reflective humanitarians, although it may not be for reflexive ones.

This is not the place to examine criticisms of this modified Hippocratic oath, which include the lack of empirical evidence to warrant an emphasis on humanitarian institutions instead of states; the difficulties in disaggregating the effects of humanitarian shortcomings from the effects of local war economies; the inappropriateness of applying concepts from natural disasters to manmade ones; the anecdotal nature of successful cases of peace building; and the questionable sustainability of most projects once outsiders and their funds disappear. There is no pejorative connotation to the term "minimalist," which is intended to indicate a location left of center on the spectrum. Indeed, given the nature of contemporary tragedies, accomplishing the minimalist agenda is ambitious.

If humanitarian agencies are persuaded by the evidence that they are not exacerbating conflict or causing more harm than good, they are pursuing a defensible strategy. Whether or not they maintain the fiction of separating humanitarianism from politics, they can choose to respect the humanitarian imperative and alleviate life-threatening suffering as a stop-gap until political actors catch up. They can take advantage of opportunities, however limited, to pursue "developmentalist relief" that helps build sustainable local capacities for peace.⁵¹

Humanitarian angst results because doing nothing or withdrawing under some circumstances may be necessary, and such eventualities go against the impulse to help. Thus, even the commonsensical notion that relief should do more good than harm is not without controversy. In Britain some observers are so determined to counteract pessimism and halt any erosion in public funds devoted to relief and development that they have attacked the do-no-harm notion with a vehemence ordinarily reserved for the political opposition.⁵² This short-sighted stance, which verges on humanitarian know-nothingness, is hard to fathom because counterproductive efforts are more of a threat to public support over the long haul than is the minimalist position.

The partial entente between classicists and minimalists does not extend much farther along the spectrum of political humanitarianism. The long-standing feud by classicists with solidarists, especially Doctors Without Borders, is well known. But maximalists also pursue a brand of political humanitarianism that is anathema to apolitical classicists. A serious conversation between maximalists and classicists is virtually unthinkable because overt and self-conscious political considerations supposedly corrode the pure humanitarian imperative.

Maximalists go beyond compassion and charity to argue that the relief of life-threatening suffering can no longer be the sole justification for outside assistance. They are determined to tackle the underlying causes of violence and to reform humanitarianism to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts. Sommaruga described the maximalist agenda as a dangerous" because it amounts to "subordinating humanitarian action to political considerations, for instance, or bringing humanitarian issues into broader negotiations where diplomatic or military bargains can sometimes be struck at the expense of humanitarian concerns.⁵³

At this juncture, maximalists are arguing on behalf of a largely untested proposition–indeed, their harshest critics would argue that results thus far have demonstrated that politicized aid has made matters worse, not better. Careful empirical research is required to verify the hypothesis, but it is plausible that placing humanitarian activities within a conflict resolution framework could ultimately work in favor of humanitarian interests, to bring substantially more benefits to victims than myopic or misplaced humanitarian action.

Properly conceived politically motivated assistance would use carrots and sticks, with conditionalities to reward or punish behaviors The notion is that such maximalist projects can reduce violence effectively turning on its head the argument that aid can be manipulated by belligerents and exacerbate armed conflict. The calculation would be that the greatest good for the greatest number over the longer term would be better served by successful conflict management than by successful relief. In spite of billions of dollars of aid, the "well-fed dead" in Bosnia and the African Great Lakes suggest why emergency aid may not maximize relief of suffering even in the medium term.

The Dutch, Canadian, British, and Swedish governments have reorganized to foster better programmatic connections between humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution, and the World Bank has become a major actor in post-conflict peace building in such places as Bosnia, thereby reviving the "R" in their original IBRD acronym (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). A recent report financed by the government of Norway, with guidance from former UN Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, recommends "close cooperation between the political and humanitarian parts of the UN, which implies that in certain circumstances the purely humanitarian mandate may have to be adjusted temporarily to take account of political requirements."⁵⁴ Recent donor practice in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone suggests that political humanitarianism has gained ground and that relief appeals must increasingly aim to do more than save lives in order to sustain financing. Mark Duffield has characterized these institutional changes as a "shift in aid policy away from humanitarian assistance towards attempting to support development in conflict situations."⁵⁵ There are clear implications of this shift in mainstream policy toward developmental relief for both UN agencies and NGOs that have, in the market-driven aid economy, come to depend on government funding or intergovernmental subcontracts.⁵⁶

Instead of the neutral and impartial provision of aid, humanitarian action as a tool of conflict management implies choice, and choices involve political decisions. In describing aid conditionality for peace processes, two observers note: "In an inversion of the children's fable, the unmentionable truth is that the emperor does indeed wear clothes, tailored to the political fashion of the day.... The real issue is not whether political effects will result, but what these will be."⁵⁷ The difficulty of outsiders' making decisions about the legitimacy and desirability of different national institutions should not be underestimated. An in-depth familiarity with local values and institutions is required to begin to act effectively. Even in Western societies themselves, social engineering experiments have hardly been unalloyed successes. Moreover, well-intentioned and well-informed outsiders without a long-term stake in the local economy and political outcomes have no right to influence decisions. At the same time, it is inevitable that the leverage from resources necessarily entails judgments by outsiders about what is just and right, about whose capacities are built, about which local groups are favored. Power imbalances provide at least a cautionary note for political humanitarians.

Moreover, there are risks for political humanitarians. Aid can be held hostage to politics or withheld without commensurate payoffs. Politicians can seize upon the expanded objectives in order to justify isolationism and a reduction in resources devoted to emergency succor. The primacy of humanitarian values can be further eroded. And the overselling of humanitarian action could lead to additional disenchantment by politicians and the public if the more ambitious efforts to link emergency aid and conflict resolution fail. Thus, the maximalist experiment could lead to the worst of many worlds just as the minimalist one can be tritely inadequate.

Nonetheless, growing programmatic emphasis on doing no harm and linking relief with conflict resolution means that major donors increasingly are asking humanitarians to save lives in acute emergencies while simultaneously finding better ways to address underlying vulnerabilities. It is worth considering dispassionately that political humanitarianism may not necessarily be a threat to classicists. Under the right circumstances, the maximalist approach could be viewed as an opportunity to address the roots of violence rather than place emergency Band-Aids, however well funded and effective, on wounds. Nonetheless, some of the more grandiose claims of maximalists should lead to extreme skepticism: there literally is no space for conflict resolution or development activities when deep insecurity prevails. In the darkest moments of civil war, only emergency relief efforts are plausible, and even these often are under siege.

Minimalists, maximalists, and solidarists contribute to today's international tool kit in spite of protests by classicists. Keeping politics and humanitarian action separate appears increasingly problematic. Oxfam, for example, is calling upon humanitarian agencies to conduct "conflict impact assessments" before undertaking what previously would have been apolitical and knee-jerk reactions to come to the rescue.⁵⁸

Conceptions of both "humanitarianism" and "politics" are changing, but stereotypes persist. The ideal is a humanitarianism that is unaffected by political factors in the countries that receive or provide assistance or by the bureaucratic politics of aid agencies themselves. Humanitarianism, after all, means helping and protecting innocent victims. Rooted in morality and principle, such undertakings are unequivocally noble.

There is a mirror image of this stereotype: If humanitarianism claims the moral high ground, politics occupies the nether terrain because it refers to jockeying for power, prestige, and a piece of the pie. Whether one cites Machiavelli or Henry Kissinger, international politics is the self-interested struggle among states over raisons d'état. Within borders, partisan or factional politics occur where deals or throats are cut and where integrity is in short supply. At the level of international public policy, politics refers to the competition and struggle to pursue one's own definition of a desirable outcome, and

this too can seem ignoble.

The experience of the post-Cold War era suggests that the reality in Bosnias, Rwandas, and Somalias is more complicated than these stereotypes. Humanitarian organizations have attenuated human suffering and saved lives; but they have not been apolitical. Although humanitarian agencies go to great lengths to present themselves as nonpartisan and their motives as pure, they are deeply enmeshed in politics. Budget allocations and turf protection require vigilance. Humanitarians also negotiate with local authorities for visas, transport, and access, which all require compromises. They feel the pain of helping ethnic cleansers, feeding war criminals, and rewarding military strategies that herd civilians into camps. They decide whether or not to publicize human rights abuses. They look aside when bribes occur and food aid is diverted for military purposes. They provide foreign exchange and contribute to the growth of war economies that redistribute assets from the weak to the strong.

Humanitarians not only need to understand the prevailing political environment to secure resources and protect organizational mandates, they also deal with and accommodate host governments and a variety of opposition or insurgent political authorities. Local economic, political, and power dynamics are altered whenever outsiders enter a resource-scarce environment. To pretend that pragmatic political calculations are not taken into account as part of legitimate compromises in choosing among several unpalatable options obfuscates the actual nature of humanitarian decision making in complex emergencies. At a minimum, the vast majority of humanitarians now acknowledge the need to minimize their impact on the relative power of warring parties or to affect them as equally as possible. And they certainly influence and are influenced by the outcomes of realpolitik and partisan politics in donor countries as well as by debates on international public policy.

At the same time, political and military responses have demonstrated on occasion the centrality of humanitarian values to governments and policy debates. In the post{:old War era, governmental interpretations of vital national interests and of international conventions have been present along with notions of human solidarity. There is no exit strategy for humanitarians if states do not take their humanitarian responsibilities seriously and use coercion to halt genocide and other massive abuses of civilians. Involvement in politics by humanitarians is necessary in war zones and elsewhere. In the words of Jeffrey Herbst: "It is naive, at best, to believe that peace will break out in some countries without a change in the balance of power given that political influence often flows from the barrel of the gun. Such a reversal of political fortunes can only be achieved through the use of force."⁵⁹ A more subdued version of this idea comes from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a 1997 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) document: "Humanitarian activities take place in a political environment and thus are affected by and affect that environment.⁶⁰

It is hard to square this view with the ICRC's official stance, shared by other classicists, that "humanitarian work must be disassociated from military operations aimed at ensuring security and restoring law and order in regions affected by conflict."⁶¹ In more and more wars, efficacious remedial efforts have little to do with consent and traditional peacekeeping. Rather, effective action often requires such robust coercion as seizing airports in the midst of a Rwandan genocide, creating truly safe areas in a Bosnia, disarming thugs in Somalia, and eliminating war criminals from the management of camps in eastern Congo or Tanzania. These actions are, by definition, coercive and partial. They are political and humanitarian; they certainly are not neutral, impartial, or consensual.

Humanitarians cannot deny political realities. Or if they do, which has been the practice for decades, they do so increasingly at their own peril and to the detriment of victims. They cannot set themselves above the political fray, because they are part of it, in both the countries where they work and the countries where they are incorporated. They should realize that humane values are best served by understanding and minimizing the manipulation inherent in civil wars. They should make use of political momentum and advocate political involvement to halt violence and ensure respect for human rights. They should determine the ultimate impact of emergency assistance on the conflict arena and adapt or even withhold aid if it increases violence, fuels conflict dynamics, legitimizes armed factions, or supports the growth of a war economy. And they should employ their leverage, whenever and wherever possible, to foster conflict transformation.

The fact that humanitarian space cannot be opened or maintained by humanitarians themselves suggests clear benefits from thinking politically and collaborating with diplomatic and military institutions. This political vision transforms humanitarianism. At the same time, the political sphere needs to be widened to ensure that the international arena is as hospitable as possible for both emergency aid and the protection of rights. Politics at its best embraces a vision of human solidarity and works to operationalize a strategy for making that solidarity real rather than rhetorical.

Political actors have a newfound interest in principles, while humanitarians of all stripes are increasingly aware of the importance of politics. Yet, there remain two distinct approaches–politics and humanitarianism as self-contained and antithetical realities or alternatively as overlapping spheres.

Nostalgia for aspects of the Cold War or other bygone eras is perhaps understandable, but there never was a "golden age" when humanitarianism was insulated from politics. Much aid was an extension of the foreign policies of major donors, especially the superpowers. Nonetheless, it was easier, conceptually and practically, to compartmentalize humanitarianism and politics before the present decade. Then, a better guide to action was provided by an unflinching respect for traditional principles, although they never were absolute ends but only intermediate means.

In today's world, humanitarians must ask themselves how to weigh the political consequences of their action or inaction; and politicians must ask themselves how to gauge the humanitarian costs of their action or inaction. The calculations are tortuous, and the mathematics far from exact. However, there is no longer any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersect. The real question is how this intersection can be managed to ensure more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action. To this end, humanitarians should be neither blindly principled nor blindly pragmatic.

^*For their thoughtful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this essay, I would like to thank David P. Forsythe, S. Neil MacFarlane, lan McAllister, Larry Minear, and Peter Uvin, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, for having challenged me to develop these ideas for the Second Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum, June 5-7, 1998. Responsibility for the views expressed and any remaining errors in fact or interpretation are mine.

1 Neutrality and impartiality arc important because they arc central to the humanitarian ethos and give rise to much controversy. Consent is emphasized here because nonintervention in domestic affairs is the glue of international relations, and consent guides virtually all UN actions with The exception of Chapter VII coercion. See Marion Harroff-Tavel, "Neutrality and Impartiality: The Importance of These Principles for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them," International Review of the Red Cross, no. 273 (November-December 1989), pp. S36-52. See also Yves Sandoz, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Law of Armed Conflict Today," International Peacekeeping 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 86-99.

2 Jean Pictet, "The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross," International Review of the Red Cross, no. 210 (May-June 1979), pp. 130-40, quote at p. 135, and Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nilhoff, 1985). Humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, universality, voluntary service, and unity are principles of "humanitarian action" (guiding relief and protection of rights) as distinct from principles of "international humanitarian law" (for example, the distinctions between combatant and noncombatant), which are not the subject of this inquiry.

3 Mark Duffield, "The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer and the Internationalisation of Public Welfare in the Horn of Africa," in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, eds., War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 50-69. For a discussion of humanitarian tragedies as growth opportunities see, for example, Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York: Free Press, 1997). See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Adelphi Paper 320; and François Jean and Christophe Rufin, eds., Economies des Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996).

4 The debate was initiated by Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies (London: African Rights, 1994), Discussion Paper No. 5.

5 Steering Committee, "Background Paper: Humanitarian and Political Action: Key Issues Priorities for a Concerted Strategy," Report on the Second Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum, 5-7 June 1998 (Geneva: ICRC, 1998), p. 1, hereafter Report Second Wolfsberg.

6 Cornelio Sommaruga, "Concluding Remarks," Report Second Wolfsberg, p. 3.

7 Pierre Perrin, "The Impact of Humanitarian Aid on Conflict Development," International Review of the Red Cross, no. 323 (June 1998), p. 332.

8 Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

9 David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 3.

10 Sadako Ogata, "Keynote Address," Report Second Wolfsberg, p. 1.

11 Andrew Natsios, "Commentary," Ethics & International Affairs 11 (1997), p. 133.

12 Steering Committee, "Background Paper," p. 4.

13 See Jarat Chopra, Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority (London: Routledge, 1999); and Jarat Chopra, ed., The Politics of Peace-Maintenance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

14 See Michael J. Smith, "Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues," Ethics & International Affairs 12 (1998), pp. 63-80.

15 Adam Roberts, "Threats to Humanitarian Action: Remedies," Report on the Wolfsherg Humanitarian Forum, 8-10 June 1997 (Geneva: ICRC, 1997), p. 1, hereafter Report First Wolfsberg.

16 David Rieff, "The Humanitarian Illusion," The New Republic, March 16, 1998, p. 29.

17 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 13.

18 These are: relieving life-threatening suffering, proportionality to need, nonpartisanship, independence, accountability, appropriateness, subsidiarity of suffering, and contextualization. See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 7-41.

19 Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics, p. 28. See also Jean-Luc Blondel, "The Fundamental

Principles of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent: Their Origin and Development," International Review of the Red Cross, no. 283 (July-August 1991), pp. 349-57.

20 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), p. 5.

21 Charles William Maynes, "Principled Hegemony," World Policy Journal 14 (Fall 1997), p. 36.

22 Mark Duffield, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political

Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid," Disasters 20 (September 1996), p. 191.

23 Joanna Macrae, "The Death of Humanitarianism? An Anatomy of the Attack," Disasters 22 (December 1998), p. 316. This is part of a special issue entitled "The Emperor's New Clothes: Charting the Erosion of Humanitarian Principles," p. 7.

24 Chr. Michelsen Institute, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict (Bergen, Norway: Chr.

Michelsen Institute, 1997), p.3; this publication contains a good review of the literature of the 1990s.

25 See Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates through the Employment of Military Force," International Peacekeeping 3 (Winter 1996), pp. 105-25; and Kofi Annan, "Challenges of the New Peacekeeping," in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, eds., Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 169-87.

26 Hugo Slim, "International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil War in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory," a briefing paper for ActionAid UK, document dated 19 December 1997, p. 16.

27 See Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 97-134.

28 Myron Wiener, "The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policics," Journal of Refugee Studies 11 (1998), pp. 1-21. See also Dan Smith, "Interventionist Dilemmas and Justice," in Anthony McDermott, ed., Humanitarian Force (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1997), pp. 13-39, especially pp. 29-31.

29 Thomas Nagle, Moral Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 74.

30 Pictet, "The Fundamental Principles," p. 136; and Nicholas Leader, "Proliferating Principles or How to Sup with the Devil Without Getting Eaten," Disasters 22 (December 1998), p. 30S.

31 The author is grateful to Charles Keely for this thought.

32 ICRC founder Henry Dunant's efforts could be contrasted with the more circumscribed assessment of his Swiss compatriot Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who earlier had emphasized the importance of kin, kith, and ken: "It appears that the feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all mankind, and that we cannot be affected by the calamities of Tartary or Japan, in the same manner as we are by those of European nations." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy," The Social Contract and Discourses (New York: Dutton, 1950), p. 301. See also Nancy Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs 12 (1998), pp. 103-19.

33 Dave Rowlands and David Carment, "Moral Hazard and Conflict Intervention," in Murray Wollson, ea., The Political Economy of War and Peace (The Hague: Kluwer, forthcoming), p. 2, emphasis in original.

34 Ignatieff, The Warriors Honor, p. 8.

35 Gwyn Prins, "Modern Warfare and Humanitarian Action," keynote lecture to an ECHO-ICRC conference entitled "Humanitarian Action: Perception and Security," Lisbon, March 27-28, 1998, p. 6.

36 Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, p. 37.

37 See, for example, Macrae, "The Death of Humanitarianism? An Anatomy of the Attack"; and Cindy Collins, "Critiques of Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Action," in Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons Learned (New York: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1998), pp. 12-26.

38 Alex dc Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), p. 145.

39 See, for example, Taylor B. Seybolt, "The Myth of Neutrality," Peace Review 8 (1996), pp.521-27; and Richard Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs 73(1994), pp.20-33.

40 Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs 6(1992), pp.95-118.

41 "Objectives and Agenda of the Forum," Report First Wolfsberg, p. 1.

42 Rieff, "The Humanitarian Illusion," p. 30.

43 Steering Committee, "Background Paper," p. 4.

44 "Introductory Address by Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga," Report First Wolfsberg, p. 3.

45 John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder: Westview, 1996).

46 Alain Destexhe, "Foreword," in François Jean, ea., Populations in Danger 1995 (London: Médecins Sans Frontières, 1995), pp. 13-14.

47 Eric Roethlisberger, "Faced with Today's and Tomorrow's Challenges, Should the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Rethink Its Code of Ethics?" speech of March 20, 1998, p. 2; and "Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance," International Review of the Red Cross, no. 297 (November-December 1993), pp. 519-25.

45 Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics, p. 234.

49 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid (Cambridge, Mass.: Collaborative for Development Action, 1996).

50 Astri Surhke and Kathleen Newland, "Humanitarian Assistance in the Midst of Armed Conflict," paper presented for a conference on "The Evolution of International Humanitarian Response in the l990s," Carnegie Endowment and the Gilman Foundation, Yulee, Florida, April 23-26, 1998, p.2; and Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones, and Janice Gross Stein, Mean Times: Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies–Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas (Toronto: Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, 1999), p. vi.

51 See Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategics in Times of Disaster (Boulder: Westview, 1989); and lan McAllister, Sustaining Relief with Development (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993).

52 See Dylan Hendrickson, "Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New Relief ‘Agenda’ and Its Limits," RRN Network Paper 25 (London: ODI, April 1998).

53 "Concluding remarks by Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga," Report First Wolfsberg, p. 2.

54 Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 1998), p. 14.

55 Mark Duffield, Aid Policy and Post-Modern Conflict: A Critical Review (Birmingham, UK: School of Public Policy, 1998), Occasional Paper 19, p. 3.

56 See Development Assistance Committee, Policy Statement on Conflict, Peace and

Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997).

57 James K. Boyce and Manuel Pastor, Jr., "Aid for Peace: Can International Financial Institutions Help Prevent Conflict?" World Policy Journal 15 (Summer 1998), p. 42.

58 Edmund Cairns, A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War (Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 1997), p. 94.

59 Jeffery Herbst, Securing Peace in Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 1998), WPF Reports no. 17, p.10.

60 "Review of the Capacity of the United Nations System for Humanitarian Assistance: Report of the Secretary-General," document E/1997/98, July 10, 1997, para. 6.

68 Jean de Courten, "ICRC Statement on Security Environment," Geneva, draft presented at the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, 24 April 1997, p. 2. For a discussion against the use of force from the classicist perspective, see Umesh Palwankar, ed., Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peacekeepmg Operations (Geneva: ICRC, 1994).