Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct:

Codifying Humanitarian Intervention

Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss

Eliminating human rights abuses has been a central theme in this journal since its founding. One word explains why the international community has difficulty countering violations: "sovereignty." The distinguishing feature of a new order established by the Treaty of Westphalia, it obscured humanitarian intentions of earlier founders of international law.¹ However, developing guidelines for the forcible delivery of assistance, beyond historical and recent experience, can break the human rights-sovereignty deadlock in a system where states remain the principal actors.

In the bloody aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, which insisted "that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq to make available all necessary facilities for their operations." This effectively authorized two major relief operations, "Safe Haven" and "Provide Comfort." In spite of host government hostility and widespread reluctance in the region and in UN circles, some 13,000 U.S. troops and 10,000 soldiers from twelve other nations delivered 25 million pounds of food, water, medical supplies, clothing, and shelter to protected areas carved out of northern Iraq.

Several observers labeled these efforts "humanitarian intervention," resuscitating a conceptual debate on the subject.² The intervention in Kurdistan reflected growing public outrage with African countries–particularly in the Horn– where both governments and rebels had deprived civilians of international succor as part of their war arsenals. But intergovernmental discussion was divided during the 1991 General Assembly. Representatives of developing countries were particularly sensitive about reform of the UN humanitarian assistance machinery as a possible "Trojan horse" for big-power intervention after the Cold War.³

Traditionally, sovereignty has been interpreted to exclude interference in local affairs, thereby preventing international responses to atrocities such as genocide by the Khmer Rouge or gassing of Kurds by the Iraqi government. Hence, the creation of havens in Kurdistan was a watershed and precedent. But deep suspicion of the event highlighted 13ractical inadequacies of humanitarian intervention. The Iraq case was unique and another bad example on which to base general principles; and more sign)ficantly, it illustrated that there is no mechanism in place to distinguish truly humanitarian motivations from biased national interests. In his last annual "report on the work of the organization," former UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar called for reinterpretation of the Charter principles of sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs to allow for intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as identification of the objective conditions under which it should be carried out.⁴

In the past, debate about humanitarian intervention had been primarily among legal scholars, who affirmed the validity of the concept but disagreed on whether or not to codify the objective conditions under which it should be carried out.⁵ The principal shortcoming was vulnerability to abuse: powerful states with ulterior motives would be able to intervene in weaker states on the pretext of protecting human rights. The legal debate continues, with Oscar Schachter, for example, stopping short of referring to Resolution 688 as an authorization for humanitarian intervention: "It is unlikely that most governments would approve a broad right of the United Nations to introduce troops for humanitarian purposes against the wishes of the government.⁶ At the same time, he argues that the UN could override reluctant host governments by invoking enforcement procedures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Current debate has moved beyond lawyers to include diplomats, politicians, and political scientists. Most of these practitioners and analysts, however, have little understanding of the essential legal quality and background of humanitarian intervention. It is the working hypothesis of this article that greater familiarity with international legal arguments would not only clarify debate but assist in developing a mechanism to guarantee,, by force if necessary, the access of innocent civilians to international assistance.⁷ "Humanitarian" and "intervention" are contradictions when viewed through the prism of sovereignty, but it is our contention that the two can be reconciled by examining closely the sources of underlying authority for both sovereignty and human rights.

I

While battles are not won by relying on lessons from previous wars, new international principles necessarily build on experience. The current, largely political, debate about humanitarian intervention represents a step backward from the conceptual progress made during an extensive legal debate two decades ago. The present focus is on "intervention" per se and, therefore, sovereignty, while previously domestic jurisdiction as an issue was considered secondary to preventing the abuse of humanitarian justifications. The preoccupation with intervention, and whether it is permissible on humanitarian grounds, is a red herring; it ignores the practical concern for adequate measures to prevent states from using human rights to camouflage ulterior motives.

Legal debates in the 1960s and 1970s over the codification and objective criteria of humanitarian intervention paralleled earlier arguments about the definitions of "war" in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and "aggression" under the 1945 UN Charter.⁸ Since no definition could be sufficiently comprehensive, it was argued in both cases that potential aggressors would be able to navigate between provisions and circumvent the letter of any prohibition. Instead, without defined parameters states found that they did not have to navigate at all to contravene the spirit of the prohibition For example, in 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and declared that since a formal state of war did not exist its actions were not inconsistent with the 1928 Pact Similarly, Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1936 without any formal declaration

Whether the Kellogg-Briand Pact prohibited only formally declared war, or measures involving force short of war as well, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter rectified this discrepancy by forbidding "the threat or use of force." It still permitted and described exceptions in the form of self-defense (Article 51) and collective action (Chapter VII). But unacceptable aggressive uses of force were not defined for fear that states would abuse such a definition and also because the Charter’s more general prohibition was thought to redress the restrictiveness of the term "war."

Since the Second World War, the nature of conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes to more complex internal insurgencies.⁹ Foreign economic and political coercion replaced massed armies, and intervention was often based on requests from governments with questionable legitimacy. In the absence of specific Charter directions, states were able to avoid the international characterization of their actions as "aggression." Superpowers intervened in their spheres of influence–the United States in the Americas and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan; as did lesser powers in theirs–Cuba in the Caribbean and Africa, and India on the subcontinent. They resorted to justifying such actions as assistance to legitimate governments.

Efforts to clarify the threat or use of force prohibited under Article 2(4) included the 1974 passage of General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the "Definition of Aggression." It proved not to be comprehensive and excluded disputed categories of force in the interest of agreement. States have not been able to manipulate the letter of the provisions included, however, and instead have relied on elastic interpretations of entirely separate, lawful justifications for using force, such as self-defense or invitation by host governments. States have had to flout openly these provisions, and this has made unilateral uses of force easier to condemn since the first determination of "aggression" by the Security Council in 1976, when South Africa invaded Angola. Definitions restrict by raising barriers and thereby reducing incidents. While determined efforts cannot be deterred by rules, coordinated responses to the clearly labeled "aggression" of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait is a dramatic illustration of what condemnation can entail in the post-Cold War era.¹⁰

The legal debate concerning humanitarian intervention has remarkable similarities, particularly whether objective criteria of the concept should or could be codified. Comprehensiveness and fear of abuse were as prevalent as in the earlier debates about war and aggression. There are essentially four lines of reasoning against cod)fication:¹¹

At the same time, there are four arguments, largely mirror images of the above, in favor of cod)fication:¹²

This legal debate was largely static during the 1980s, until political developments reshaped the arguments and placed the issue once again prominently on the global agenda. Theoretical questions about the acceptability of humanitarian intervention remained secondary to the practical problem of how it should be conducted.

While the right of humanitarian intervention was not on the agenda, human rights were central international concerns. In the four decades since the signing of the UN Charter and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, boundaries of state sovereignty became more and more porous, as any number of technical, economic, and environmental challenges demonstrated. Moreover, areas that formerly were considered entirely domestic, such as minority and individual rights, became subject to externaliscrutiny.¹⁵ This led to a growing body of international conventions, rules, and norms aimed at regulating the humanitarian behavior of states. Following the creation of several prominent nongovernmental organizations, like Amnesty International, Jimmy Carter placed human rights at the center of his presidential platform. While controversy was not lacking, human rights became viewed as less Western and more universal.¹⁶ But until recently the capacity of the international community to respond when such norms are violated has been meager.

However, 40 years of international norms-creation led to the possibility of and need for norms-implementation. In December 1988 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 4~131, which formally recognized the rights of civilians to international aid and the role of nongovernmental organizations in natural disasters and similar emergencies. Two years later, General Assembly Resolution 45-100 reaffirmed these rights and provided specific access corridors of "tranquility" for humanitarian aid workers. With the passage of Security Council Resolution 688 a few months later, the issue of humanitarian intervention was thrust squarely onto the political agenda of states when the acute problems of some 1.5 million Kurds were interpreted as a threat to international peace and security.

In the process, however, the finely tuned legal debate has been forgotten in the defensive reaction of many developing countries to "another form of intervention." The old shibboleths of noninterference in the domestic affairs of governments and the inviolability of sovereignty have been cited instinctively, with increasing frequency and inadequate reflection.

Can the protection of human rights justify setting aside inherent organizing principles of the international system? Bold proponents of the cause, including former UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, call for limited acceptance of the idea. However, we have taken a step backward because the issue of codification has became secondary to whether or not the basic right of humanitarian intervention exists. The political debate has lost sight of plausible answers to the following practical questions: What has sovereignty been and what is it now? What is its relation to human rights? What are the objective criteria of humanitarian intervention? It is to these questions that we now turn.

II

Sovereignty is pivotal in determining whether or not to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Intervention implies violation or intrusion upon authority; and while authority, like sovereignty, is an abstraction, its concrete form consists of territorial boundaries. Controversy over crossing borders occurs not only because they represent the extent of local political control, but because the right to this control is a sacred underpinning of international order as currently understood. Hence, significant legal instruments have been concluded that prohibit action which is considered threatening to the overall system.¹⁷

However, sovereignty is a legal fiction that continues to evolve. Perceiving it as immutable and beyond question requires resort to selective memory, a tendency in international fore. The family, the tribe, and the city all did quite well without it. Yet the widespread view persists that it is the best mechanism for organizing human society at the global level. The inability of sovereignty to reflect adequately the effective self-development of international society has relegated it to increasing conceptual and practical irrelevance in such fields as trade, famine, and environment.¹⁸ For the protection of human rights too, there has been a perceptible movement away from the anachronism of exclusive domestic jurisdiction.

Nation-states have been the principal building blocks of the international system, and their measure of legitimacy as states has been the attribution of sovereignty. As the only abstraction, sovereignty is special in the list of criteria of statehood. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States lists three others: a permanent population, defined territory, and a government. While a state, as any collective construct, is something more than the sum of its parts, sovereignty transforms it into an absolute. Hinsley points out that sovereignty is not a fact, like energy or power; it is a quality of a fact. Sovereignty is a characteristic of power that relegates its holder to a place above the law. A sovereign is immune from law and only subject to self-imposed restrictions.¹⁹

While the Treaty of Westphalia is the usual point of departure for historians, the origins of sovereignty were properly in the Roman Empire. The Hellenistic monarchies were restricted by the Greek notion of law as something more valid than the community or its rulers. As such, the king "personified law" since his will amounted to the rules of order. This was different from the divinity of the ruler in the Near East and ancient India, where the king may have governed by the grace of gods but was, like his subjects, subordinate to the external laws of the universe, or dharma. In the Roman Empire, however, it was argued that the source of law must be above the law, and hence the emperor was so regarded. This essential element of sovereignty emerged at the end of the first century.

The rebirth of sovereignty in the nation-state is customarily dated from the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648. Despite attempts during the Middle Ages, such as by the Carolingians and the Holy Roman Empire, to unify and centralize authority, large concentrations of secular power never attained the distinct feature of sovereignty. Its metaphorical implications of immutability, inviolability, perfection, and transcendence were monopolized by the church, on which the emperor relied for legitimacy. Eventually, following three decades of war between Catholics and Protestants, the Peace of Westphalia separated the powers of church and state. In so doing, it transferred to nation-states the special godlike features of church authority. Nation-states inherited the pedigree of sovereignty and an unassailable position above the law that has since been frozen in the structure of international relations.

Whether the power structure of nation-states ever accurately reflected textbook characteristics, sovereignty is no longer sovereign, the world has outgrown it.²⁰ The exclusivity and inviolability of state sovereignty are increasingly mocked by global interdependence. Electronic communications and media have fostered conscious and unconscious identification among all of humarrity.²¹ Convenient and accessible transportation has facilitated mass movements of people and, consequently, the increasing de-linkage (psychologically and physically) of populations from territory. The atomic age extinguished boundaries between destruction and the destroyer. Satellites that penetrate "space above any territory of the globe, regardless of ‘sovereign’ rights over air spaces and duties of ‘non-intervention,’ serve to emphasize the new openness and penetrability of everything to everybody."²² "The common heritage of mankind," enshrined in the 1979 Convention on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, "marks the passage from the traditional postulate of sovereignty to that of cooperation."²³ It is also the harbinger of an internationalization of "state-territory as a species of property."²⁴ Interconnectedness has entered the consciousness of public opinion and has been expressed through popular concern for the environment, human rights, and health–including the AIDS epidemic. In fact, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), planned for 1992 in Brazil, will debate an "Earth Charter." That the most powerful economies in the world, the G-7, must act in concert on major policies reflects increasing awareness of global financial integration.

At the same time, the fiction of sovereignty has remained greatly intact. The exclusivity of sovereignty has meant that nation-states have been the only members of the international community and the sole "reference points" of international law. In the eyes of the law, individuals do not exist independently of states. There has been no adequate mechanism for redressing state abuse in a system meant ultimately for human welfare.

The direct application of international law to individuals, however, has begun to evolve and circumvent the once impermeable membrane of sovereignty.²⁵ This is the principal consequence of attributing rights, as well as duties, to human beings.²⁶ Also, there is direct participation by individuals in the international system: bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Law Commission (ILC) are composed of specialists who, "whilst appointed by governments, sit in their individual capacities as experts."²⁷ The UN Secretary-General has an influential independent capacity under Article 99 of the Charter.

Other non-state actors also have become influential participants in international processes. Throughout the past four decades, the personalities of international organizations have been affirmed and their capacity to enter into relations with other subjects of international law has grown.²⁸ Business companies have enjoyed limited status as persons under international law.²⁹ The mandate system of the League of Nations, the UN trusteeship system, and the concept of self-determination are expressions of the personality of non-states, or pre-states. National liberation movements the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) prior to Namibian independence–were given observer status in the General Assembly. The proliferation of nongovernmental organizations in the last few decades has resulted in a pnvatization of diplomacy and the realization that local citizens cannot be excluded from the international system. In October 1990 the UN General Assembly admitted the International Comm~ttee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as its first NGO with observer status, while many others hold consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.³⁰ Moreover, Namibia in 1989 and Nicaragua in 1990 held the most extensively civilian-monitored elections in history.³¹

Revolutions in technology and information, as well as the appearance of important actors without the attributes of sovereignty, have diminished the relevance of sovereignty for states. As such, the criteria of statehood have shifted to include more complex subjective standards, and not only the objective characteristics of territory, population, government, and sovereignty.³² Is there-a willingness and ability to observe international law? Is the regime in power racist or unlawfully constituted? That a state’s legitimacy can determine its sovereignty gives this term a completely new meaning.

III

The supremacy of sovereignty over law is untenable. Sovereignty as a transcendent source of law is supposed to operate hierarchically between ruler and ruled; it is not supposed to function horizontally, or relatively with other sovereigns. Sovereign equality supposedly prevented developing or legitimating primus inter pares. The flaw in the theory of sovereignty is that it was a unitary concept operating in a community: mutual respect implied not being sovereign at all. As such, it is universally recognized that in conflicts between laws of a national sovereign and international law, the latter prevails.³³

The principle of unanimous voting in the League of Nations became decision making by majority in the UN. This means that sovereign states can be bound against their will by the votes of other states. The veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council vitiates the sovereignty of all other members because by definition one cannot be more sovereign than another. Paradoxically, decolonization eroded the concept because newly emerging small states were forced to rely on community laws for security. In any case, the natural law tradition within international legal thought always perceived the ultimate source of law as supranational, for only the law is sovereign: "the public interest (state necessity,

reason of state, or whatever) cannot be invoked against the law, except to the extent that the law itself so allows."³⁴

What then has sovereignty become (or perhaps, what has it always been)? There are two interpretations, one through international law and the other political. Under international law, there are not degrees of sovereignty; it either exists or it does not. The narrow standard of traditional sovereignty forms a threshold: once nations achieve a kind of critical mass, they are catapulted to a transcendent status through recognition by other members of the states club.

Legal sovereignty cannot be partially redefined or refined. Even when international lawyers account for factual challenges they retain the classic formula.³⁵ If the standard of definition is not met, sovereignty does not exist. When NGOs, corporations, and revolutionary movements interact directly with states, both non-states and states are considered to operate as legal equals. Employing the logic of the law, either both or neither are sovereign.

Fear of attributing recognition has been a primary reason for Israel’s refusal to meet with the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the general hesitation of government officials and senior staff members of international secretariats to meet with insurgents or to consider national liberation movements entitled to protection under the humanitarian laws of war.³⁶ When non-states gain personality, statehood is no longer an exclusive status; and sovereignty verges on operational irrelevance. Moreover, if collective enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is acceptable intervention, then states are not absolutely inviolable, nor therefore sovereign. Even if sovereignty is said still to operate in pockets at the highest levels of government, current challenges to the concept lead to the conclusion that it is gradually becoming a dead letter of international law.

Political scientists and theorists of international relations have formulated a corruption of sovereignty, which they perceive in terms of degrees. By redrawing strict parameters to include challenges, sovereignty is not seen as incompatible with individual rights, non-state actors, or permeable boundaries. It is possible to be more or less sovereign. Sovereignty becomes an elastic term that refers to a category of social and political organization that is linked geographically to delimited territory. As such, it has no special meaning other than a contextual one. In contrast to international law’s objective, largely standardized threshold, political scientists view limits as determined subjectively. Hence, humanitarian interventions, non-state actors, international organizations, and human rights could all be included as exceptions to the anomaly of partially absolute sovereignty.

During the 1991 General Assembly debate on emergency assistance in wars, redefinitions of sovereignty were apparent. The ICRC argued: "In terms of the existing right to assistance, humanitarian assistance cannot be regarded as interference. Far from infringing upon the sovereignty of states, humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, as provided for by international law, is, rather, an expression of that sovereignty." At the same session, the Soviet Union noted that reservations about "humanitarian intervention" can be addressed by reformulating the issue as "humanitarian solidarity."

Proponents of humanitarian intervention can, and usually do, rely on one of two arguments, both of which lead to the same conclusion. To maintain the traditional concept of sovereignty is to accept its obsolescence and recognize that the emperor has no clothes. If sovereignty is dead, humanitarian intervention does not violate a sacred principle. On the other hand, if humanitarian intervention is permitted as part of an expanded definition of sovereignty and solidarity, then it does not conflict with the remainder of sacrosanct sovereignty.

Eliminating sovereignty from the lexicon of international relations in the foreseeable future is unlikely, however, for state-centered power structures will not agree easily to part with the basis for their status quo. Moreover, sleights of hand and redefinitions that include humanitarian intervention would perpetuate the fiction of sovereignty and continue to slow the acceptance of such rapidly developing concepts as cross-boundary environmental protection. One way to circumvent sovereignty altogether is to explore why human rights constitute a legitimate justification for intervention and how codification could prevent abuse in this area.

IV

Future acceptance of "humanitarian intervention" is linked to a conceptual and practical capacity to reconcile its two conflicting halves. Running through the United Nations Charter are two contradictions: (i) sovereignty and human rights and (ii) peace and justice.

Explicit Charter provisions illustrate the first contradiction. Article 2, paragraph one, bases the organization on the principle of sovereign equality of all member states; paragraph four prohibits the threat or use of force against any state; and paragraph seven protects from UN intervention "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." At the same time, preceding these provisions are the first words of the Charter preamble: "We the Peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women...." Article 1(3) then states that "the Purposes of the United Nations are . . . to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Under Articles 55 and 56, members are committed "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization" for the promotion of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples," including "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." In Article 68, the Economic and Social Council "shall set up commissions . . . for the protection of human rights." Article 76(c) states that a basic objective of the trusteeship system is "to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all...."

The second contradiction is apparent in the following questions: Are human rights exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of states or are they an international concern with community jurisdiction?³⁷ What is the separation of powers? Should the prohibition on the threat or use of force against states be applicable to violence against human beings? Or, for that matter, is the threat or use of force against states permissible for the protection of human rights? Which authority is superior, state jurisdiction over individuals within its boundaries, or international jurisdiction over inalienable human rights?

Underlying these questions is the perennial conflict between peace and justice, stability and change. The avoidance of war, or at least the control and centralization of violence, is central to the Charter. Order, ideally maintained through Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms, was considered the best means to peace. Order, however, amounted to the maintenance of the status quo, which enabled "those who already ‘have’ to secure their privileges and . . . encourage[d] the ‘have nots’ to accept their lot."³⁸ Seeking justice often implied disorder, instability, and therefore the scourge of war. Order and the hope for peace normally outweighed the concern for justice. Sovereignty and human rights were reconciled through a similar hierarchical interpretation of Charter provisions.

The concept of humanitarian intervention could not develop if respect for sovereignty (and the prohibition on intervention) always superceded humanitarianism. As sovereignty and the prohibition against outside intervention protecting it have been eroded, human rights have grown in clarity, strength, and breadth. The evidence of 40 years suggests that this trend will continue, but it has not reached the point yet where human rights systematically outweigh sovereignty. Occasionally, however, they do, and the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq was a watershed. While the reversal in priorities was only temporary, the event was a dramatic harbinger that reflects the pace of humanitarian developments.

Four decades have been spent defining human rights, and they are now clearer as a justification for action than ever before.³⁹ Human rights norms are reaching a point where they can be implemented and enforced. In the last decade, the United Nations "has developed an impressive array of new enforcement machinery–machinery that is not widely known but has fundament-ally changed what the United Nations can and does accomplish to aid individual victims of human rights violations."⁴⁰ This machinery includes:

–Establishing a variety of specialized theme mechanisms (a Working Group and several independent rapporteurs) to take effective action (often on an emergency basis) wherever there are problems regarding several critical human rights problems that affect individuals: disappearances, summary executions, torture, and religious intolerance.

–Appointing numerous Special Rapporteurs (or Representatives) to examine conditions in individual countries. Afghanistan, Chile, E1 Salvador, Iran, and Romania are among the current ones.

–Establishing and expanding the activities of new supervisory committees that monitor compliance with human rights treaties, several of which have new optional complaint mechanisms through which individuals can seek redress.

–Substantially expanding the advisory services program that provides technical assistance in human rights.

–Developing a major initiative to expand UN public information on human rights in a new world campaign designed to advance awareness of rights and awareness of the UN machinery through which individuals can claim their rights.

Moreover, in August 1991 the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) became the first military-civilian operation with the task of monitoring human rights abuses. The General Assembly has convened a world conference on human rights in 1993. The importance of human rights is highlighted in recent proposals for restructuring the secretariat, including one of four new deputy secretaries-general responsible solely for humanitarian and human rights issues.

Reversing the conventional priority of sovereignty over human rights, however, would not automatically reconcile internal contradictions in the term "humanitarian intervention." In practice, the concept of intervention would still imply violating sovereign authority without having identified a higher authority on which the supremacy of human rights rests. Questioning the source of authority for human rights invites responses from many angles of a traditional split in jurisprudence: positivism considers international law to be derived fundamentally from the will of states, while natura1 law maintains that there is a higher authority than sovereignty.⁴¹ For positivists, human rights exist only because states permit them to exist; and as sovereignty is the source of rights, it will always be the higher authority. This is contrary to the spirit of the movement toward increased respect for human rights, since as a formulation it is self-defeating. Natural law is the best means by which state abuse of human rights can be challenged; but one of the reasons that human rights have not yet gained primacy is that their source of authority is more difficult to identify than the concrete mechanisms of state. Identifying the source of natural law is an ancient problem, but one that merits increased attention today. From this can be deduced the legitimacy and authority for the concept of human rights, as well as for their protection.

While both sovereignty and the source of natural law are absolutes, they differ in their formulations. The former is quantified in secular terms manifested as the state; the latter is a qualitative determination of basic goods.⁴² Thomas Aquinas’s "treatise on law" in the Summa Theologica consolidated much of the earlier thought on this subject since Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. His def~nition of natural law is encapsulated in a condensed phrase, participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura: the participation of the eternal law in rational creatures. It is an operation between our capacity to understand and existing universal laws. This principle is comparable to the Tao, or way, of Lao Tzu; Confucian rites or "style of life"; Hindu and Buddhist dharma, or right action; Islamic Sunna, or model behavior of the Prophet; Japanese giri, or rules of behavior.⁴³ Aquinas’s "account of the source of natural law thus focuses first on the experienced dynamisms of our nature, and then on the intelligible principles which outline the aspects of human flourishing, the basic values grasped by human understanding."⁴⁴

The authority for natural law is what ought to be. It is very much the purpose of law to restrict possible destructive action. Allott states that "Law constrains or it is a travesty to call it law.... Law transcends the power of the powerful and transforms the situation of the weak or it is a travesty to call it law."⁴⁵ While what human rights ought to be has largely been enumerated, clarification of how it ought to be enforced has only begun.

V

Whether values are universal or culturally or even individually specific is a question that emerged from the earliest human social relations. It is linked to the basic duality that divides all philosophy, religion, and ideology: diversity and unity, the individual and the collective. Despite these persisting dilemmas, there is not disagreement about whether in principle humanitarian intervention is acceptable. The crux of the issue is fear of abuse and how the danger can be mitigated to make the pill of intervention easier to swallow.

Swallowing is particularly difficult for Third World states. Their representatives draw obvious parallels to the unpalatable power of imperialists who intervened on the basis of "principles" such as "civilization," "white man’s burden," and "manifest destiny." The fact that in the present international system those with the resources to intervene are former colonial powers or large and traditionally obtrusive neighbors does not facilitate discussion. Nonetheless, there are two starting points for dialogue–codification and decision making. The codification of objective criteria of the circumstances in which humanitarian intervention should be carried out and the type of operation it should be is the first premise. The second is that decisions about humanitarian intervention must be made exclusively on a genuinely collective basis.

Some authors have attempted to identify lists of objective criteria. Lillich enumerates five conditions that would validate humanitarian intervention: immediacy of violation of human rights; extent of violation of human rights; invitation to use forcible self-help; degree of coercive measures employed (i.e., proportionality); and relative disinterestedness of acting state. Moore adds five qualifications: an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights, particularly a threat of widespread loss of human life; a proportional use of force which does not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at stake; a minimal effect on authority structures; a prompt disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action; and immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations.⁴⁶

In the context of relief for man-made disasters, Minear has set down nine operational principles governing humanitarian assistance: recognition of the importance of safeguarding human life, including redefining its relationship with sovereignty; motives for assistance missions must be transparent to affirm legitimacy; response to assistance needs must be consistent in each case, and therefore automatic and not selective; assistance must be provided comprehensively to all categories of persons in need, and not according to artificial distinctions such as between "refugees" and "displaced persons"; success of assistance operations depends on local popular participation, or mutuality; civilian management is preferable for civilian humanitarian initiatives; increasing fidelity to international law; disaster prevention measures and methods of peaceful conflict resolution should be fostered to avoid the need for intervention after the fact; and there must be accountability by the assistance donor, as well as by host governments to their own populations.⁴⁷

An essential problem with codification that has re-emerged in the current debate, however, is the desirable degree of specificity: the enumeration of appropriate circumstances might exclude unforeseen situations requiring assistance which do not fall strictly within any agreed categories. As mentioned earlier, definitions cannot be exhaustive, nor can they be extensive without becoming too restrictive. At the same time, flexibility requires general provisions, which are then open to abuse. The best way to overcome this dilemma and reduce the danger of abuse is to restrict humanitarian intervention exclusively to the category of collective action as understood in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Prohibiting it as a form of self-help would circumvent the unreliability of unilateral interventions.

To circumscribe illegitimate justifications, the United Nations should have sole responsibility for determining the existence of humanitarian crises, in the manner that it has monopoly to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39. Furthermore, direction or conduct of humanitarian operations should be only a United Nations activity, ideally through Chapter VII of the Charter. In the absence of Article 43-47 agreements for a standing UN force and adequate military capacity, much greater thought needs to be given to clarifying the meanings of "collective action" and "subsidiary organ."

"Collective" must mean the subordination of command and control of sovereign armed forces to a centralized instrument, authorized to act by the larger community in the event of a crisis.⁴⁸ Action through international organization, or multilateralism, is distinct from multinational action, which amounts to individual states independently cooperating in a particular venture, effectively as a form of self-help. Particularly, collective action is conducted according to standard operating procedures devised and agreed to prior to a crisis, and which are consistently applied whatever the configuration of subjective interests of community members. The importance of "collective" is not necessarily in the operation, which may be executed by one or two or many states, but in the decision to act as well as the continued direction of the operation. Given the U.S.-led coalition’s prosecution of the Gulf War and the lack of reporting once the decision to authorize "all necessary means" was taken, the nature of centralized command and control has assumed a greater importance.⁴⁹

Under Article 7(2) of the UN Charter, the principal organs of the organization, including the Security Council, can appoint an agent or establish "such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary." The Charter nowhere defines "subsidiary organ," but Kelsen argues that it can include a collegiate body, a single individual or member state, or a group of members.50 This raises the question of whether the Security Council can delegate the execution of enforcement measures–as a category of tasks distinct from others–to a "subsidiary organ." While the Charter is unclear, it would seem that the answer is affirmative if three conditions are met: First, it should be clear that the state or group of states is acting on behalf of the world organization and that the link between the two is direct Second, given that the command of the operation is not functionally part of the UN administration, the instructions from the organization to its agent must be clear, specific, and incontestable. Finally, the agent must be directly responsible to the authority of the organization.⁵⁰ Avoiding the kind of inadequate contact between the United Nations and allied forces in Kurdistan after resolution 688 has made imperative a formalization of sub-contracts for humanitarian relief to subsidiary organs.

While the United Nations should develop its professional capacity to conduct such operations on its own to avoid any dispute as to the collectivity or legitimacy of actions called for by the Security Council, it might well begin by strengthening its humanitarian assistance mechanisms for interventions not involving uses of force Coordination of assistance efforts is a significant step toward collective action and regulation of motives. Recent examples include the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA) and the Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations in Liberia (UNSCOL).

Among the decisions of the 1991 General Assembly was the appointment of a single humanitarian aid coordinator with the authority, at least in principle, to respond to governments and opposition groups that deny assistance to suffering civilians. Resolution 4~182 also creates new and useful institutional mechanisms, including a special new $50 million fund, a standing interagency committee in Geneva, unified appeals, and a new roster of expertise.

Observers have criticized the United Nations for inefficiency and duplication, because individual agencies are more concerned with their particular objectives and fund-raising needs than with delivery. The harmonization of efforts among intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations is an imperative, and the new coordinator and institutional machinery, when backed by the Secretary-General and the five permanent members of the Security Council, should be able to better coordinate activities. The choice of the new coordinator as well as continued vigilance ensure that concrete implementation should be among the highest priorities of the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali.

VI

The struggle toward a law of humanitarian intervention is a twofold task: to mollify contradictions between human rights and intervention and to codify norms so that humanitarianism cannot be used to justify unacceptable and self-interested interventions.⁵² Overcoming the abuse of humanitarianism as a justification for ulterior motives is the common ground in the debate and a useful starting point for discussion. Drawing upon both the analysis of humanitarian intervention and re-examination of legal meanings of terms in a political context provides the means to build bridges. and act. Legal definition and political agreement together provide the means to unify "justice" and "peace" through humanitarian action. The retiring UN Secretary-General, in his final report on the work of the organization, arrived at a similar conclusion: "We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights. The last thing the United Nations needs is a new ideological controversy. What is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of states to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies."⁵³

The Bush administration has devoted much rhetorical attention to developing a strong underpinning of international law for the so-called new world order. It has also devoted a significant amount of energy and military might to multilateral diplomacy and the implementation of international decisions. There is now a rare opportunity to harness this rhetoric and place long-standing humanitarian concerns at the center of international decision making in the 1990s. The erosion of sovereignty and the emergence of a human rights regime converge in the present decade, when it is finally possible to enforce growing recognition of individuals’ rights of access to humanitarian aid, irrespective of their governments’ permission.

Missing still, however, is what Third World representatives refer to as a lack of moral authority for humanitarian intervention. Recent thinkers have looked beyond sacrosanct sovereignty and the state toward social organization based on culture or society, defined in their widest senses. As these subvert sovereignty, we must better understand the hu~’an desire for absolutes, inherent in both individuals and communities. For us to transcend the dictates of sovereignty, we must articulate an ethical vision and so reshape human relations with authority.⁵⁴

While human needs do not as yet override sovereignty in all instances, the latest resolution of the General Assembly nonetheless takes a significant step along the path of establishing more rights for the afflicted. This process is a continuation of the efforts by the ICRC to protect prisoners, the wounded, and innocent civilians from states during wartime.⁵⁵ In the past few decades, humanitarian NGOs have taken matters into their own hands and resorted to cross-border operations, and intergovernmental organs have sought inroads in defining the rights of innocent civilians in war zones. But binding international legal instruments have not kept pace.

With the humanitarian intervention in Iraq and the recent debate at the United Nations, the international community appears perched on the brink of a new era. The international community is moving toward codification of principles and identification of the appropriate conditions under which humanitarian imperatives will override domestic jurisdiction. One million displaced persons in Yugoslavia and 20,000 civilians dead in Somalia are adequate testimony to the need for action.

NOTES

1 Theodor Meron, "Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez," American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), pp. 110-16.

2 See Mario Bettati, "The Right to Interfere," The Washington Post, April 14, 1991; Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," Survival 33 (Sept./Oct. 1991), pp. 451-64; Brian Urquhart, "Sovereignty vs. Suffering," The New York Times, April 17, 1991.

3 For a discussion of possible reforms, see Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, "Strengthening International Response to Humanitarian Emergencies," unpublished document dated October 1991, from work sponsored by the Dag Hammarskjold and Ford foundations; and the main UN background document, "Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations," document dated October 10, 1991, A/46/568. For an articulation of Third World views and concems, see Olga Pellicer, Uniting or Dividing the United Nations, Occasional Paper #10 (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, forthcoming 1992).

4 United Nations Doc. A/46/1, September 6, 1991, pp. 10-11. This theme was also prominent in an earlier speech, "Secretary-General’s Address at University of Bordeaux," UNDPI Press Release SG/SM/4560 of April 24, 1991.

5 See for instance, Richard B. Lillich, ea., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973); Richard B. Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights," Iowa Law Review 53 (1967), p. 325; J.P.L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," California Western International Law Journal 4 (1974). p. 203; Chilstrom, "Humanitarian Intervention Under Contemporary International Law," Yale Studies in World Public Order I (1974), p. 93.

6 Oscar Schachter,"United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), p. 469.

7 This was one of the themes in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, "Do International Ethics Matter? Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan," Ethics & International Affairs 5 (1991), pp. 197-214.

8 For conflicting views on whether the Pact outlawed strictly declared "war" or uses of force short of a formal state of war, see D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 132-38; and lan Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 8-92. The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War "as an instrument of national policy" is sometimes referred to as the "Pact of Paris." On aggression under the 1945 UN Charter, see further, Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 2nd ed. (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 262-66.

9 See James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), and Thomas M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 2(4)?" American Journal of International Law 64 (1970), p. 809.

10 For a general discussion, see Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991). For specific case studies, see Thomas G. Weiss and James G. Blight, eds., The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean (Boulder Lynne Rjenner, 1992).

11 See Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force," American Journal of International Law 67 (1973), p. 275; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 338-42; Ian Brownlie, "Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen," in Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 139~8; Tom J. Farer, "Humanitarian Intervention: The View From Charlottesville," in ibid., pp. 149-64.

12 See for instance, Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help," pp. 325-S1; John Norton Moore, "The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict," Virginia Journal of International Law 9 (1969), pp. 261 64; Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman, "Response by Professors McDougal and Reisman," International Lawyer 3 (1969), p. 444; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens, 1950), pp. 120-21; L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, ed. H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, 1955), pp. 667-72.

13 Louis René Beres, "Intemational Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide," Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 11 (1989), pp. 25-65.

14 See Larry Minear et al., Humanitarianism Under Siege (Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press, 1990).

15 See Cyril E. Black, "Challenges to an Evolving Legal Order," in Black and Richard A. Polk, eds., The Future of the international Legal Order, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 23-36; Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order," in ibid., passim; Richard A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Macmillan, 1964); and Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan. 1951).

16 |See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), and David Forsythe, The Politics of International Law (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

17 United Nations Charter, Arti£1e 2(4); "Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States," General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965; "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States," General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970.

18 See further, Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1990), chap. 3.

19 F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. I. This historical discussion is from chap. 11. See also, Allott, Eunomia, pare. 16.15 et seq.

20 See particularly, R.P. Anand, "Sovereign Equality of States in International Law," Receuil des Cours, 1986-II, pp. 11-228; and C.W. Jenks, A New World of Law? (London: Longmans, 1969), p. 133.

21 Marshall McLuhan, The Guttenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), and Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd., 1964).

22 John H. Herz, quoted in Anand, "Sovereign Equality," pp. 31-32.

23 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 391. On the concept of "the common heritage of mankind" generally, see chap. 14.

24 Allott, Eunomia, para. 16.65.

25 See Jarat Chopra, "The New Subjects of International Law," Brown Foreign Affairs Journal (Spring 1991), pp. 27-30.

26 See UN Charter, Article 6, "Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1946," American Journal of International Law 41 (1947), p. 172; Article IV, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948," United Nations Treaty Series 78, p. 277.

27 D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (London: Stevens & Sons, 1975), p.354. Also, see chap. 12.

28 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, ICJ Reports 1949, p.174; legal capacity of the UN, including privileges and immunities, are provided for in Articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter; Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between International Organizations or Between States and International Organizations refers to "the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties"; Re The European Road Transport Agreement (Case 22/ 70),Court of Justice of the European Communities, Common Market Law Reports, 1971, p. 335; Maclaine Watson v Department of Trade and Industry, Court of Appeal, All England Law Reports 3 (1988).

29 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v The Libyan Arab Republic, in International Law Reports 53 (1977), p. 389; Texaco v Libya and BP v Libya, International Law Reports 53 (1974), p.329. See also the formal system for dispute settlement between states and foreign companies under the 1966 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.

30 The ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations was established by ECOSOC res. 3(II) of June 21, 1946. It examines and reports on the consultative relationship that the Council should accord to international NGOs and recommends to the Council what action should be taken on submissions that those organizations may make to it.

31 One set of figures from Namibia numbered UN officials at 8,000, private individuals at 6,000, and the international press at 2,000.

32 J. Gawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law 48 (1976-77), pp. 93-182.

33 Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig case, PCIJ, Series AIB, No. 44, p. 24; Reparations for Injuries case, lCJ Reports 1949, p. 180. Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codified this principle with regards to treaties.

34 Allott, Eunomia, pare. 11.28.

35 W. Michael Reisman’s concept of "popular sovereignty" is no less sovereignty traditionally conceived than state sovereignty. "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law," American Journal of International Law 84 (1990), pp. 866-76.

36 See Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), chap. 7.

37 On human rights as an international concern beyond the domestic jurisdiction of states, see Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1991), p. 165; M.N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991), p. 196.

38 Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics (London: James Currey, 1990), p. 22. Mazrui also distinguishes between peace and justice on religious grounds: by adopting peace over justice, the UN Charter allied itself with the Christian God of love, whose Son was regarded as a Prince of Peace, while the God of Islam and Judaism has been a God of justice.

39 Articles 1-3, 28-30, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Articles 2-22, 26, 27, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; Articles 1-18 and Protocols 1 and 6, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950; Part I and Part II, Article 1, European Social Charter 1961; Part VII, Helsinki Final Act (Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1975), American Convention on Human Rights 1969; Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 17-22, 24. 26-30, 56, African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights 1981.

40 John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, eds., Issues Before the 45th General Assembly of the United Nations (Lexington: UNA-U.S.A./Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 119-20.

41 Although, on the artificiality of the origins of positivism, see Roberto Ago, "Positive Law and International Law," American Journal of International Law 51 (1957), p. 691.

42 For instance, John Finnis identifies the following: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, ‘religion’ (Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], chap. IV). On the generic principles of a constitution, see Allott, Eunomia, para 11.5.

43 See further, Rene David and John E.C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (London: Stevens and Sons, 1985).

44 Finnis, Natural Law, p. 403.

4S Allott, Eunomia, p. xvii.

46 For a definition of a threshold below which humanitarian intervention might be triggered, see Theodor Meron and Allan Rosas, "A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards," American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), pp. 375-81; Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help," pp. 347-51; Moore, "Control of Foreign Intervention," p. 264.

47 Larry Minear, "A Strengthened Humanitarian System for the Post-Cold War Era," testimony before the Select Committee on Hunger of the U.S. House of Representatives at a hearing entitled "The Decade of Disasters: The United Nations’ Response," in Larry Minear, Thomas G. Weiss, and Kurt M. Campbell, Humanitarianism and War: Learning the Lessons from Recent Armed Conflicts, Occasional Paper #8 (Providence RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1991), pp. 36-42.

48 See for instance, Inis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1964), chap. 12.

49 See the reflections by Stephen Lewis, Clovis Maksoud, and Robert C. Johansen, "The United Nations after the Gulf War," World Policy Journal 8 (Summer 1991), pp. 537-74; and Brian Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf War," New York Review of Books 38, March 7, 1991, pp. 34-7.

50 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problem (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1950), p. 138. See also discussion of issues that follows, as well as p. 149 et seq. on states and individuals as UN "organs."

51 For a more detailed analysis of these issues, see Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text (Hanover NH: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1992-I), Part Two, Section E.

52 This does not imply that better assistance (i.e., which ultimately contributes to development rather than simply emergency aid) or improved institutions would not also be necessary. On these issues, see Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow, Rising From the Ashes: Disaster Response Towards Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); and Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action (London: Pintet, 1987). For a detailed discussion of this problem with reference to refugees, see Leon Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1987). An effort has been made to develop some generic procedural guidelines by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations: Policy and Efficacy Studies No. 8 (New York: UNITAR, 1982).

53 UN Doc. A/46/1, p. 10.

54 For a work on social organization based on culture, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), on society, see Allott, Eunomia; for a revealing analysis on the human desire for absolutes, see George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), part III; and on articulating an ethical vision, see particularly Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

55 See the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of December 12, 1977 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1989).