To the Editor:

We read with interest your review of our monograph, Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh (JSAS 9 [1996, 1997 {1999}, pp. 184-197), and have several comments.

First, the purpose of the Humanitarianism and War Project is to understand the dynamics of conflicts and to provide recommendations for more effective performance by humanitarian organizations, our core stakeholders. We did not intend to produce a definitive historical-political account of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s origins and trajectory, a worthy project given the dearth of serious and sustained historical scholarship on the topic. We did seek to provide a comparative analysis of this conflict in relation to other post-Cold War conflicts in which humanitarian operations have been mounted. We regret that the reviewer did not judge our study in terms of its stated objectives and specified audience.

Second, the reviewer found the study based on "instant expertise clothed in pithy prose" (p. 187), an example of a new genre of studies conducted by sovietologist retreads and "newly minted specialists" (p. 184) who make "a few short trips in and out of the region [in lieu of] prolonged exposure to peoples, cultures, and histories" (p. 186). As a point of fact, the research team included a leading U.S. specialist in Armenia, an Azerbaijani scholar based in the U.S., and a university-based expert on the Caucasus with ten years research on, and extensive contacts in the region. The study was one in a series that included separate monographs reviewing the conflicts in Georgia and Chechnya and a handbook for humanitarian practitioners in the Caucasus. What the reviewer describes as "pithy prose" represents our effort to make historical-political complexities accessible to busy practitioners and policy-makers.

In our judgment, the task of mounting effective protection and assistance for civilian sin today’s internal armed conflict needs both the best possible area expertise and the widest global context, both the sharpest acumen of specialists and the widest perspective of generalist. The Project has thus assembled teams for its dozen-plus country case studies since 1991 that include a wide range of backgrounds and competencies. In the course of their work, our teams interview the broadest possible range of actors and draw heavily on local non-governmental expertise. The methodology employed by the Project’s research and its interactions with humanitarian, political, and military actors in the Caucasus is detailed in a recent article. The Project’s four monographs on the Caucasus may be downloaded from www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/H_W.

Two elements in the reviewer’s criticism of Thomas G. Weiss’ preface to the study invite particular comment. Weiss’ statement that "allocations of international aid took their cues from diaspora politics in the United States, which produced generous and disproportionate sums for Armenia and a restrictive approach to Azerbaijan" is deemed to be "simplistic," distorting "the complicated legislative process of foreign aid distribution" (p. 185). The reviewer does not contest either the study’s data regarding levels of need in and levels of assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan or the bedrock humanitarian principle of proportionality: that assistance should be provided in response to need, unaffected by political considerations.

In our debriefings with aid agencies and policy-makers on the monograph, it was our analysis of the corrosive effects of politicization on humanitarian action that was most welcomed by aid agencies, if not always by donor or recipient governments. Our analysis reflected a theme stressed by the comments o f those interviewed–‚whether from governmental or non-governmental organizations, whether with humanitarian or political portfolios, whether speaking on or off the record. If the disproportionality of U.S. assistance to the region does not reflect diaspora politics, as the reviewer suggests, why are Armenian lobbying groups so active and so recognized in their lobbying?

Second, the reviewer questions Weiss’ account of the Armenian government’s denial of an entry visa for our country specialist. That account was shown in advance to the person concerned, who confirmed its substance. Upon rechecking the matter after reading your review, we have learned that the researcher who was barred has in the meantime received confirmation of the reason our study had given for her exclusion. We see no reason to doubt that account. In this context, the reviewer’s comment that "Weiss is either ignorant of the actual circumstances surrounding this incident, or he is purposefully trying to distort what happened" is uncalled for, provoking suspicion in the reader’s mind by hinting at some special insider knowledge.

Two other points require comment. First, the reviewer claims that we "uncritically" (p. 186) accept Azerbaijani figures of 20% for the territory under Karabakh Armenian control, again further demonstrating what he considers bias on our part. Estimates range from 15% (see Christopher Walker, cited in Edmund Herzig’s recent Chatham House work on the Caucasus) to 25% (see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, "Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh," p. viii). We settled on "[r]oughly 20 percent" (Humanitarian Action, p. 20). Moreover, the assertion that we claim that all the Azeri settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh were damaged is inaccurate. Again, our formulation was more nuanced: that "all of the settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh were damaged to varying degrees" (Humanitarian Action, p. 20).

Second, the reviewer takes issue with our characterization of Karabakh intransigence in the negotiations. Our observation regarding the Karabakh Armenian belief that time was on its side comes directly from an interview in Step’anakert with a senior official of the Karabakh Foreign Ministry. As for Karabakh negotiators being willing to trade land for peace if given adequate security guarantees, we note (Humanitarian Action, p. 86) the willingness of Karabakh Armenians at the time the study was prepared to trade land in the context of an agreement. Yet the security guarantees that the de facto authorities of the region were seeking at the time were so far beyond the realm of possibility that they could hardly be seriously interpreted as evidence of willingness to compromise. The reviewer’s assertion that "Azerbaijan insists on returning to the status quo ante" (p. 186) is in our view an inaccurate rendering of its position. As we saw it, the real problem with the Azerbaijani position was its unwillingness to spell out clearly what was meant by "maximum possible autonomy" (Humanitarian Action, p. 87), a position that draws Azerbaijani seriousness into question as well.

Objectivity in scholarship, like neutrality in humanitarian action, is as essential as it is difficult to achieve. Having made a major effort to be fair and nuanced in our framing of highly politicized issues, we particularly regret allegations and insinuations of anti-Armenian bias in our work. A journal such as yours and reviewers to whom you grant space bear a heavy responsibility in this regard.

Larry Minear

Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies

Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island