Political Gain and Civilian Pain: The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions

Edited by Thomas G. Weiss, David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear

Review by David Westwood, Policy and Research Department, World Vision UK, in Development in Practice, vol. 8, number 3, August 1998

‘Because sanctions have in many cases proved more devastating in the humanitarian sphere than effective in the political, those imposing sanctions have an obligation to proceed with caution’. This sentence, to be found in the concluding chapter of the book (p. 239), effectively summarizes this latest offering to the great sanctions debate. After much expectation, the reader cannot help but feel that the editors fail slightly to deliver what they promise.

Political Gain and Civilian Pain sets out to take a ‘dispassionate review’ at the gain versus pain argument which currently seems to have reached a sort of impasse. The proclaimed added value of the work revolves around the framework/methodology the editors have developed in order to carry out an initial comparative assessment of the humanitarian cost of sanctions, and of their political impact, in the four selected cases of multilateral sanctions of the 1990s. The case studies–South Africa, Iraq, Former Yugoslavia and Haiti–indeed provide insight on the humanitarian impact of sanctions, covering a wide range of indicators of the status of civilian life. They also detail how the impact of sanctions was felt and interpreted by political groups in and out of power, analysis which goes beyond the usual sender/target assessment of other studies.

In spite of the new methodological approach, the conclusions drawn from the case studies do not differ significantly from other works. Sanctions, they reiterate, have been a contributing factor rather than a definitive one in bringing about desired change, and they are a lot easier to impose than to implement or indeed lift. There is a need for greater clarity of objectives, and if they are to be an effective diplomatic tool, there also needs to be greater opportunity for dialogue on the reasons for application and conditions for removal of sanctions with the target country prior to enforcement. Similarly, there needs to be some ‘carrot’ alongside the ‘stick’. On the humanitarian front, sanctions, they agree, increase need, the result outweighing the capacity of humanitarian agencies to respond. Humanitarian responses are impaired by the sanctions system, and the independence and effectiveness of humanitarian activities are compromised by association with the imposing parties. Furthermore, the cost of reconstruction and development post-sanctions, often overlooked, must also be taken into account. The conclusion drawn is that ‘there remains a need for a clearer, more transparent, and accountable framework of acceptable sanctions practice’.

A central question which arises from reading the book is whether there is much additional value in fine tuning methodologies in an attempt to capturing the exact extent of humanitarian suffering, when there is little evidence that it will ever be sufficient to bring about an abandonment of sanctions in the country concerned. In Iraq, for example, evidence of the horrendous impact of sanctions on the general population–to levels ‘far below the international poverty line ... established by the World Bank’–does exist, but continues to be ignored. Essentially, therefore, it seems to all boil down to a question of political will–the question posed by the IFRC in its 1995 World Disaster Report continues to be valid: ‘Where is the balance between politics and humanitarianism?’

Perhaps the main disappointment is that the authors fail to take the debate much beyond the current impasse. If the debate is to move forward, one critical area that requires more detailed research is indeed that of alternatives, or ‘smart sanctions’, which are specifically targeted to impact the elite rather than the general population. The study does point to the fact that, in several cases, ‘specifically targeted measures seem to have succeeded in catching the attention of the authorities’. Evidence, it points out, also exists, however, to suggest that, in other cases, sanctions gain effectiveness as they become more inclusive.

In spite of adding little new to the sanctions debate, Political Cain and Civilian Pain does provide a useful review of the issues and complexities faced in dealing with this issue. It covers the arguments in a thorough fashion, and, importantly, ensures that the pain versus gain debate remains on the agenda.